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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine the impacts that legislation protecting
endangered species will have on agricultural practices in Saskatchewan. This project will
focus on endangered species in pastureland. A second objective will be to provide
alternative methods of achieving species protection other than those outlined in Bill C-65
of the Second Session of the Thirty fifth Parliament, the Canadian Endangered Species
Act (the Bill), one of which alternatives will be the Saskatchewan Wildlife Act (the Sask.
Act). Hyperbole and hysteria on both sides characterize the current debate about the
effects of the Bill on farmers and ranchers in Saskatchewan. That the Bill could have
affected farmer's and rancher's costs and thus management decisions is certain; as by
received economic theory anything that affects an economic agent's costs or profits will
affect that agent's decision making. This study assesses the extent of these costs by
resorting to the price necessary to bribe farmers/ranchers to increase habitat.
The Bill's purpose is the protection of bio-diversity through the conservation of
endangered species which is to be achieved by a species by species procedure which
mirrors the one adopted by the United States under the Endangered Species Act 1973
(the Act). This study's results suggest that the Bill and the Act share an institutional
framework that is sufficiently similar to suggest that only a difference in the perception of
the social costs ofnoncompliance would alter the results witnessed in the United States.
That is, if Canada had enacted the Bill it appears that given the similarities between
Canada's and the United States' systems of governing and law enforcement from a
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decision maker's perspective that the apparent disregard for the Act in the United States
might be expected to exist in Canada, unless Canadian's have a social cost structure that
is different from the social cost structure of residents of the United States. The analysis
of the survey results suggests that such a difference in social costs does not appear to
exist. The study explores a system ofmore generally protecting habitat and concludes
that in order to do so effectively will require the expenditure in Saskatchewan of between
twenty and forty million dollars per year on the part of the government. Effective habitat
protection is also going to require the passing of legislation granting a Minister of the
Crown discretionary authority to determine what should be protected where.
Accompanying this discretion legislative action is also going to be necessary to change
public interest standing and intervenor rules. Frivolous and vexatious actions against the
Minister should be controllable through legislated solicitor client cost awards, an award
were the unsuccessful litigant pays the successful litigants entire legal bill.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Biodiversity Crisis
Society faces a crisis of extinction of flora and fauna species. The consensus
amongst biologists seems to be that a principle reason that plant and animal species are
being driyen to extinction because they are running out of habitat (See for example Mann
and Plummer (1996), Clark, Reading and Clarke (1994), or Canadian Biodiversity
Strategy). That is, plants and animals are competing with humans for the land where
their habitat is found. This has led biologists and conservationists to argue that the
current epidemic ofextinctions that the planet faces is of a different character than the
extinctions of prehistory like that of the dinosaurs (See for example Mann and Plummer
(1996), or Clark, Reading and Clarke (1994)). Rather than being the result of alterations
of the environment due to a natural phenomenon, like an ice age, they are seen as due to
human pressure on other species caused by competition for space.
For example, consider bison that were all but driven from the North American
Great Plains for the benefit of settlers who would be spared having to put up with
millions of large wild ungulates roaming through their fields on a whim. The current
spate ofextinctions, estimates of which run as high as in excess of one hundred species
per day (Clark, Reading and Clarke(1994)), is thus seen to be based largely in the notion
that endangered species do not compete well with humans for access to the resources they
need to survive. Swanson argues that humanity now has sufficient control over the
biosphere that: "human decisions on resource allocation will determine which life forms
will continue to exist into the future" (Swanson (1994): 819).
In much more dramatic language Mann and Plummer have expressed a similar
idea as follows:
In the role of modem Noahs, we face momentous choices. We
want to load endangered species on our ark, but the task must compete for
scarce resources with other worthy projects. Because we are acting from
human impulse rather than on the orders ofa Supreme Deity, we don't
have blueprints for our conduct or, for that matter, the ark we are trying to
build. We don't even know the numbers ofpotential passengers, although
we know that whatever ark we choose to build will be unable to
accommodate everything. What will be saved and what will be left
behind? There is no automatic answer.
Few individual situations are foreordained. If the nation wants to,
it can buy outright the pine barrens and oak savanna needed by the Kamer
Blue butterfly; or it can build a new hospital to serve the Choctaws who
live on the wrong side of the Sans Bois Mountains in Oklahoma; or it can
dismantle the dams that block full recovery of the snail darter. It can do
any of these things, but not all of them at once. Each of these actions
diminishes our capacity to take other worthwhile actions. It is easy to say
that society should extract money from developers and give it to black-
capped vireos that need protection. But it is not possible to do this and
simultaneously ensure that good housing is available and affordable to
everyone. Or good health care, for that matter, or a good education.
Embracing the goal of saving biodiversity and the goals ofproviding
housing, health care and education, as well as the many other goals we
have taken up during the past two hundred years, makes our choice
difficult. (Mann and Plummer (1996): 212-13)
Thus, the problem appears to be one, from an anthropocentric view, of allocating scarce
resources, particularly land, between competing ends. Baring some revolutionary
changes, in the case of land, this would amount to choosing between non-human habitat
and the countless human demands upon land for food, habitation and supporting
infrastructure facilities. If this allocation does not insure that sufficient other species'
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habitat exists, to maintain some biologically essential number of species at risk, neither
does, it maintain a level of biodiversity that is sufficient to guarantee sustainable human
existence (Mann and Plummer (1996)). This suggests that the endangered species
problem is a problem that economics can shed some light upon.
1.2 Legislative Intervention as a Cure for the Crisis
In response to this problem the Government of Canada in the Second Session of
the Thirty-fifth Canadian Parliament introduced Bill C-65 ofthe session entitled, the
Canadian Endangered Species Act (Bill C-65 45 Elizabeth II, 1996-97) (hereinafter the
Bill). The Bill died on the order paper with the calling of the 1997 Canadian federal
election. The concept of endangered species protection legislation has subsequently been
the subject of numerous consultations between the federal and provincial governments
and stakeholder groups. These consultations may well have been prompted by the large
dissatisfaction expressed with the Bill to the House of Commons Standing Committee on
Environment and Sustainable Development that held hearings across the country with
respect to the Bill following its first reading (Archive of Committee Evidence). A great
deal of the discontent that surrounds the Bill appears to stem from the perceived
similarity between the Bill and the United State's Endangered Species Act, 1973 (16
USC ss. 1531-1544) (hereinafter the Act) that is advanced, particularly in the renewable
and non-renewable resource extraction sectors as having been of limited effectiveness
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since it became law in 1973. Consider for example the testimony of Mr. Jim Turner,
Director, Canadian Cattlemen's Association:
The legislation before this committee represents a U.S.-type approach to
endangered species. It is questionable how effective this approach has
been and at what cost it has been arrived at. It relies heavily on regulation
and enforcement and contains very little to encourage voluntary
cooperation and partnerships. In our view, the legislation in its current
form will actually create conflict between landowners and conservation
groups and will be detrimental to the future ofwildlife on private lands.
(Archive of Committee Evidence, Meeting 49, 19 November 1996)
On April 11, 2000 the federal government introduced a substantially revised
version of the Bill into the House ofCommons, The Species at Risk Act (Bill C-33 of
the Second Session, Thirty-sixth Parliament 48-49 Elizabeth II, 1999-2000). This Bill
died on the order paper with the calling of the 2000 Canadian Federal Election.
Subsequently, Bill C-33 was reintroduced with some minor amendments as The Species
at Risk Act (Bill C-5 of the First Session of the Thirty-seventh Parliament 49 Elizabeth
II, 2001) on February 2,2001. Bill C-5 passed on second reading and was referred to the
Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development on March 20, 2001.
The Bill in its preamble sets out the following reasons for protecting endangered
species:
Recognizing that
Canada's natural heritage is an integral part ofour national identity and
history,
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wildlife, in all its forms, has value in and of itself and is valued by
Canadians for aesthetic, cultural, spiritual recreational, educational,
historical, economic, medical, ecological and scientific reasons
Canadian wildlife species and ecosystems are also part of the world's
heritage and the Government of Canada has ratified the United Nations
Convention on the Conservation of Biological Diversity,
providing legal protection for wildlife species at risk will in part meet
Canada's commitments under that Convention,
the Government of Canada is committed to conserving biological diversity
and to the principle that, if there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage to wildlife species, cost effective measures to prevent the
reduction or loss of the species should not be postponed for a lack of
scientific certainty,
responsibility for the conservation ofwildlife in Canada is shared among
the various levels of government in this country and it is important for
them to work together to pursue the establishment of complementary
legislation and program for the protection and the recovery of species at
risk in Canada,
all Canadians have a role to play in the conservation ofwildlife in this
country, including the prevention of wildlife species from becoming
extirpated or extinct,
the conservation efforts of individual Canadians and communities should
be encouraged and supported and their interests should be considered in
developing and implementing recovery measures,
the role of the aboriginal people in Canada, and of the wildlife
management boards established under aboriginal land claims legislation,
in the conservation of wildlife in this country, are especially important,
and
knowledge of wildlife species and ecosystems is critical to their
conservation,
The aims that the Bill advances and the accompanying benefits that the preamble
suggests that Canadian society will receive from the Bill would only have been available,
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if the Bill had become law. These benefits will only become available if the Bill would
hav~ proven effective in protecting and enhancing biodiversity. The challenge is to
ascertain the likely effectiveness of the Bill, or any other piece of legislation, prior to its
enactment. As economic theory suggests that decision making should remain constant
over constant institutional structures, the likely effectiveness of the Bill will be examined
in light of the American experience under the Act. This will require ascertaining the
effectiveness of the Act and its fitness as a model for the Bill.
1.3 Organization of the Study
It will be argued herein that the mere presence ofan endangered species problem,
in Canada, is an indication of institutional failure. It will be hypothesized that the Bill
will not prove effective in reversing biodiversity loss. It will also be argued that the
hypothesized failure of the Bill is a result of the manner that it addresses the institutional
failure.
These arguments will be made by examining the policies, in the developed North
American economies, that affect habitat preservation, either positively or negatively.
Once an appreciation of the policies is attained the structures used to implement those
policies and the incentive structure that such institutions put in place can be examined. It
should then be possible, using economic theory and the results of the survey of
Saskatchewan cattle producers' attitudes, to ascertain the likely effectiveness ofnew
institutions to achieve their policy goals and to assess their associated costs.
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Chapter Two will examine the nature of the biodiversity crisis and attempts that
have been made to address it. Chapter Three will then examine the economic theory as it
relates to the biodiversity crisis. Chapter Four will look at the manner in which the
United States has chosen to address the problem, then draw upon economic theory to
explain the problems inherent in the American approach. Chapter Five will then test the
appropriateness of using the American Act as a model for the Canadian Bill. Chapter
Six highlights the survey, setting out how it was conducted and the results obtained from
questioning the attitudes of cattle producers. Chapter Seven looks at policy instruments
other than prohibitive policy to affect improvements in biodiversity, and will also
examine the two subsequent Bills brought before the House of Commons to address the
endangered species problem. Chapter Eight quantifies the costs associated with
increasing the amount ofhabitat available in the agricultural portion of Saskatchewan to
the twelve percent of land mass suggested by the World Commission on Environment
and Development. Finally, Chapter Nine sets out the conclusions, limits and
recommendations of the study as well as suggesting areas where further research is
necessary.
1.4 Scope of the Study
This study presumes that the proposition that globally biodiversity has fallen to a
point which renders the sustainability ofhumanity's current standard of living
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problematic. That is, it accepts as given the premise that the ability of the environment to
absorb and render harmless the wastes of our industrial society has been compromised to
the point that it is questionable whether or not the current equilibrium between man and
his environment can be sustained. This study further presumes that the increasing rate of
extinction of non human species is somehow correlated with declining biodiversity and as
such that fact that species are at risk of extinction or of extirpation from a region are
indicative of a want of the biodiversity necessary for the continued existence of modem
industrial society. From the two previous propositions flows a third; that is, that a
slowing of the rate at which non human species go extinct or are extirpated from a region
suggests the presence of a level ofbiodiversity that is more likely to be able to ensure the
continued existence of our industrial society. Finally, the study rests on the premise that
the majority of the species at risk are at risk due to habitat loss and fragmentation and
thus concerns itself with means to protect and restore habitat. This approach means that
other threats to species at risk such as climate change, the presence ofpollutants in the
environment, increased predator populations, ecosystem transition, like the southern
encroachment of the aspen parkland into the North American plains and over utilization
by humans will be largely ignored.
The survey that serves as the source of most ofthis study's conclusion was
conducted solely among Saskatchewan cattle producers and as such any attempt to draw
inferences respecting the wider prairie and Canadian rural populations should be done
with care. However, an Environics survey of Canadian rural residents done subsequent
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to the survey seems to support the proposition that the findings of the survey may be
representative of rural Canadian residents generally (Environics (2000)).
Given the limitations of the survey, the study speaks, in the main, of the
agricultural region of Saskatchewan specifically and the agricultural region of the
northern North American plains more generally. Thus, the ecosystems to which the study
has clearest implications are those ofthe short grass prairie, of the North American
plains. Therefore, the species at risk ofextinction or extirpation to which the study most
directly applies are those of that region.
The species at risk of extinction or extirpation in the short grass prairie of the
North American plains include plants, birds, mammals, amphibians and reptiles. These
species are at risk from a variety of reasons, including but not limited to: habitat loss and
habitat fragmentation, that is, conversion of native grass to crop production; pesticide
use, either directly through poisoning of the species or indirectly through depletion of the
species food sources; predation, often caused by loss of cover to grazing; acidification of
marshes due to acid rain (SERM (2001), Watson and Russell (1997) Caceres and Pybus
(1997), Petersen (1997), Wagner (1997), Prescott (1997), RENEW (1999)). A far from
exclusive list of the species at risk of extinction or extirpation from the causes listed
above and others would include: hairy prairie clover, slender mouse-ear cress, piping
plovers, Sprague's pipit, sage grouse, greater prairie chicken, burrowing owl, swift fox,
wolverine, northern long eared bat, black tailed prairie dogs, black footed ferrets,
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northern leopard frog and the prairie rattlesnake (SERM (2001), Watson and Russell
(1997) Caceres and Pybus (1997), Petersen (1997), Wagner (1997), Prescott (1997),
RENEW (1999)).
Within this context habitat in this study is taken to be landscape in which the
species at risk of extinction or extirpation proceeds through its life cycle. For any
particular species at risk of extinction or extirpation a particular sort of landscape is better
or poorer habitat for that species depending upon how readily the species thrives in the
landscape. Accordingly, a particular landscape can be better or poorer habitat generally
depending upon how many species at risk of extinction or extirpation can thrive
throughout their life cycles within it. This study, therefor views habitat as graduating
from cities, the poorest form ofhabitat, to short grass prairie as it existed prior to
European contact, the best form of habitat. Thus, to tear up a street and seed it to wheat
is to improve the landscape as habitat, as is the transformation of a wheat field to a brome
or crested wheat grass pasture, as is the seeding of such a pasture to native grasses a
habitat improvement. Each of these transitions of the landscape is seen as a habitat
improvement because each transition improves the probability that a greater number of
the species at risk of extinction or extirpation within the region will be able to thrive
throughout their entire life cycle within that landscape: Thus, given the premises,
highlighted above, that underlie this study, improvements in habitat that increase
endangered species' probability of avoiding extinction or extirpation are indications of
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improvements in the biodiversity of the region and therefore increase the likelihood that
our society will continue.
Finally, the study is limited solely to privately held land. While there are a
myriad of interesting questions about endangered species and public lands they are not
addressed here. This study analyzes the potential effectiveness of the Bill and several
other policy instruments to increase the quality of habitat for endangered species. In
doing this the study adopts the effect these policies could have on an individual economic
agent acting out of self interest, within the current institutional structure and the
institution structure that would ofexisted had the Bill become law. This analysis lends
itself to addressing questions of compliance with laws in the face of actual or perceived
costs being imposed by a change in the law. Questions like how much if any public land
should be sold to private individuals, or what sort of conditions should be placed on
pasture leases, or whether or not the crown should allow crown land to be farmed are
more amenable to examination through public choice theory than the methodology
adopted here.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE NATURE OF THE CRISIS AND ATTEMPTS AT ADDRESSING THE
CRISIS
2.1 How the Crisis Arose
Swanson argues that humanity now can essentially control nature (Swanson
(1994)). While the roots of Swanson's claim lie deep in antiquity the readily apparent
manifestation of this ability is a post Industrial Revolution phenomena. The transition
from the hunter-gather societies of the Stone Age to the world we witness in today's
Information Age is the story ofhumanity's ever increasingly successful attempts to first
exploit nature, then to harness nature and finally to control nature. It is simultaneously
the story ofmankind's ever expanding technological ability. Finally, it is also the story
of our increasing, in material terms, standard of living, and the accompanying increases
in life expectancy and population.
The often cited rise in atmospheric carbon dioxide levels is a post sixteenth
century phenomenon. The rise of commercial agriculture from subsistence agriculture is
also a modem age phenomenon. The scientific revolution (Kealey (1996)) and the liberal
enlightenment (North and Weingast (1989)) transformed England from a feudal to
industrial society, with the rest of the western world following closely behind (Kealey
(1996)). With industrialization came a marked increase in material wealth, and in
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population (Czech and Krausman (2001)). This, of course, led to increased demand for
food and the expansion of land dedicated to agricultural production, and ultimately to
decreased habitat for non-human species (Czech and Krausman (2001)). Concern about
loss of habitat, in North America, goes back at least until 1933 when'Leopold obliquely
cites it as a concern in game species management (Leopold (1933)). Clark, Reading and
Clarke and Czech and Krausman argue that this loss ofhabitat has lead to a level ofnon-
human species extinction that is apparently unprecedented without an accompanying
cataclysmic event such as an ice age (Clark, Reading and Clarke (1994), Czech and
Krausman (2001)).
2.2 Why Humanity Might Care About Biodiversity
The Canadian Biodiversity Strategy (the Strategy) makes the following
observation:
Biodiversity supports human societies ecologically, economically,
culturally and spiritually. Despite its importance, however, ecosystems are
being degraded and species and genetic diversity reduced at an alarming
rate due to the impact of our growing human population and increasing
resource consumption rates. The global decline of biodiversity is now
recognized as one of the most serious environmental issues facing
humanity (p. 6).
The Strategy argues that humanity should be concerned with diminishing
biodiversity for at least four reasons. The concerns appear to break into two broad
categories. They can be ecocentric or anthropocentric. That is the concerns can be either
that the ethics of driving other species into extinction is questioned, or the wisdom of
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driving another species into extinction is questioned because of the potential adverse
effects that humanity might face because of the extinction.
The first class ofconcerns argues that humanity cannot morally drive another
species to extinction. That is, the proponents of the argument develop an ethical system
in which other living organisms are granted a right to survival and it thus becomes
immoral to force another species into extinction, purely for human convenience (Solow
and Polasky (1999)). The Strategy makes that argument as follows:
Many Canadians believe that each species has its own intrinsic value,
regardless of its value to humanity, and that human society must be built
on respect for the life around us. They believe that we should conserve
biodiversity for its own sake, regardless of its economic or other value to
humans (p. 14).
The other class of arguments takes a much more anthropocentric point ofview.
One principle concern of this class is that a potentially valuable life fonn may become
extinct before humanity can exploit it. Hence, for example phannaceutical companies
canvas the world seeking traditional remedies and testing the ingredients for medicinal
value (Solow and Polasky (1999)). The other principle concern of this class of argument
is that the environment acts as a sink for the wastes humans produce. An ecosystem's
resilience, its ability to recover from the insult that industrial society level against it, is
thought to be a function of its diversity (Mann and Plummer (1996)). That is, the more
diverse an ecosystem the more resilient. Endangered species, in this context, are a proxy
for biodiversity. Much as the death of caged canaries were once used to indicate an air
quality, in coal mines, hannful to human miners, this argument runs that as more and
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more species become extinct, the level of biodiversity must also fall, perhaps even
ultimately to a state incapable of supporting human existence. Unfortunately, it appears
that humanity has been trying rather hard to kill off the canaries.
Again, the Strategy recognizes this class of argument of endangered species
protection when it notes:
Failing to conserve biodiversity puts future options, flexibility and
economic opportunities at risk and passes enormous costs onto future
generations. Conserving biodiversity is an investment in the future and
makes good business sense (p. 14).
Thus whether a society chooses to act upon ethical grounds, or the preservation of the
spiritual and cultural or intrinsic value ofother species, or the more crass anthropocentric
advantages that accrue from biodiversity, it would seem that a society should be able to
build a fairly broad consensus respecting the need to protect biodiversity. This is, in fact,
what Canadian society has done. There was not a single witness before the House of
Commons Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development hearings
into Bill C-65, who questioned the necessity of federal endangered species protection
legislation (Archive of Committee Evidence). The vast majority of the witnesses lauded
the government's initiative before setting out to argue that while the goal was laudable
the implementation through Bill C-65 was in some manner or another flawed (Archive of
Committee Evidence).
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2.3 The Extent of the Problem
The Canadian Biodiversity Strategy suggests that the loss of species is, at the
least, alarming:
Despite the importance ofbiodiversity to humanity, we are currently
witnessing a global biodiversity crisis. Ecosystem, species and genetic
diversity are being reduced, largely by human activity, at an unnaturally
high rate. It has been estimated that the current rate of global species
extinction is 1,000 to 10,000 times greater than natural. Scientists estimate
that upwards of 25 percent of the total number of species on Earth could
vanish by the first decades of the next century. Forests, wetlands, lakes,
coastlines and other natural areas are being altered by human activities,
while genetic variation within species - including domesticated crops and
animals - is decreasing. These changes threaten our ecosystems and the
ecological services that make life on Earth possible (p. 15).
In more specific terms Clark, Reading and Clarke aver that the planet faces an
extinction explosion of historic proportions. In what they claim to be conservative
projections of species loss, they cite estimates of losses in the neighborhood of ten
percent of the planet's biodiversity from 1994 levels being likely to occur as early as
about 2005 and almost certain to occur by roughly 2025. This would suggest species
losses at a rate of one hundred or more species per day, worldwide. They then tum to the
United States predicting, in 1994, that 675 plant species might become extinct in the
United States before the year 2000 (Clark, Reading and Clarke (1994): 3). These were
estimates, so what is the reality? The sad fact is that humanity really has very little idea
of the number of species that currently exist or have existed (Czech and Krausman
(2001): 11-14). As Professor Tom Herman, Head, Department of Biology, Acadia
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University, observed into the hearings before the House of Commons Committee on
En~ironmentand Sustainable Development's hearings into Bill C-65:
Well, clearly the first step in protecting endangered species is to identify
them. How well are we doing? How many endangered species are there? I
have no idea, quite frankly, but if you look at the COSEWIC list, it can be
very misleading. How well do we know our biodiversity in general? I
think my colleague from New Brunswick has more to say on that (Archive
of Committee Evidence, Meeting 58, 05 Dec 1996).
At the same meeting, Dr. Don McAlpine of the New Brunswick Museum,
observed:
We must also recognize that in the short term the task ofenumerating and
describing species is too great and the available expertise too little to
accomplish anything near the full census of Canadian species we need
now (Archive of Committee Evidence, Meeting 58, 05 Dec 1996).
Considering these limitations, Clark, Reading and Clarke further claim that about
one-third of fresh water fish species in the United States are endangered due to habitat
degradation. According to these authors, up to 3000 species may be candidates for listing.
Listing is the inclusion ofa species on the list of endangered and threatened species that
the Act mandates be maintained. Listing is also the first step in the process that allows a
species the protections the Act legislates for endangered species. They further aver that
out of that 3000 as many as 300 may already be extinct or may become extinct prior to
listing because of the resource constraints faced by the Fish and Wildlife Service, the
American Government agency principally charged with implementing and enforcing the
Act. Finally they observe that fewer than one-half dozen endangered species have
recovered under the Act (Clark, Reading and Clarke (1994): 3).
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An examination of the listings under the Act reveal that between 1994 and 2000
that 458 species have been listed, and 28 delisted between 1973 and 2000. The Fish and
Wildlife Service gives as the numbers and reasons for delisting: eleven species are said
to have recovered, seven have become extinct, four each were the result of taxonomic
change or the discovery ofnew information, while one species each was delisted as the
result of erroneous data and an amendment to the Act (US Fish and Wildlife Service).
While these listing numbers suggest that Clark, Reading and Clarke's estimates may well
be high. The mere fact that listings continue at rates an order of magnitude greater than
delisting suggests that the problem continues to be exacerbated, although perhaps less
dramatically than Clark, Reading and Clarke feared. Similarly, in Canada as in the
United States, the Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada
(COSEWIC) list of species at risk in Canada continues to expand (Environment Canada).
Thus, while estimates derived through the use of species area curves may over dramatize
the extent of the problem, an examination of listings makes it quite clear that the problem
is not going away.
While Mann and Plummer cast some doubt upon the use of a species area curve, a
hypothesis that the number of species that a particular area of land can house is a function
of the area in the form S=cAz, where S is the number of species, c and z are constants
and A is land area, to derive predictions of the likelihood and rates of extinction, the
predominant methodology for deriving such estimates, they conclude:
We face, in sum, not the onrushing, all-destroying wave of
extinction described by S=cAz, but an immense aggregation of small,
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individual situations that is not reducible to a simple equation. These
situations are nudging a large (though exactly how large is unknowable)
fraction ofNorth American biodiversity down the path toward extinction.
Predicting the exact time of arrival is less important than recognizing our
direction of travel and that we are picking up speed now. In other words,
our biodiversity problem is better thought of in terms of endangerment
today than extinction tomorrow. Although the latter will surely occur if
the former is not controlled, we have time for considered action, not
panicky reaction (Mann and Plummer (1996): 79-80).
This clearly reinforces the notion that humanity faces a grave situation that continues to
be exacerbated in spite of the actions thus far taken to alleviate it.
That this crisis is largely the result of habitat loss is mainly uncontested. The
Globe and Mail of February 24, 1999, suggests that 80% of species at risk in Canada are
at risk because ofhabitat loss. This implies successful attempts to limit species loss will
ultimately depend upon some form ofhabitat protection and thus affect land use policies.
It also implies that humanity should attempt to cease the over exploitation of species that
account for the remaining 20% of the threatened species.
2.4 Addressing the Problem
As early as the 1940's Aldo Leopold saw the need to address what he labeled the
conservation problem through the development of a land ethic. Leopold described this
ethic in the following terms:
All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that the individual is a
member of a community of independent parts. His instincts prompt him to
compete for his place in that community, but his ethics prompt him also to
co-operate (perhaps in order that there may be a place to compete for).
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The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to
include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively, the land.
(Leopold (1966): 219)
Lest the impression is left that Leopold was naive it should be recalled that later in the
same work he observed:
By and large, our present problem is one of attitudes and
implements. We are remodeling the Alhambra with a steam-shovel, and
we are proud of our yardage. We shall hardly relinquish the shovel, which
after all has many good points, but we are in need of gentler and more
objective criterion for its successful use. (Leopold (1966): 241)
This implies several things about our society. Firstly, Leopold implies that we live in a
society that attempts to control nature, an attempt that Swanson argues has been
successful (Swanson (1994)). Secondly, the idea that progress can be measured as some
form ofa society's ability to control nature is implicit in Leopold's observation. Thus the
crux of the problem becomes how, as a society that holds these conceptions, do we arrive
at the "gentler and more objective criterion"? That is how do we move from control of
nature to some form of co-existence with nature.
This task is exacerbated by the near reverent attitude that western society
possesses respecting property ownership. As Machiavelli observed:
Nonetheless, the prince must make himselffeated in such a way that, ifhe
does not obtain love, he may escape hatred; because being feared and not
hated can go together very well; which he will do always when he keeps
himself from this citizens' and his subjects' possessions, and from their
women: and even when he might have need to proceed against someone's
blood, he should do it when there might be convenient justification and
manifest cause; but above all, he should abstain from other people's
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things; because men sooner forget the death of the father than they do the
loss of patrimony (Machiavelli (1997): 62).
This respect for property is so pervasive in western society that Locke dedicates an entire
chapter, chapter five, ofThe Second Treatise of Government, to "shew how men might
come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common,
and that without any express compact of all the commoners." (Locke (1956): 15) In
other words, the sanctity of private property in western culture possesses an inertia that
predates the Glorious Revolution. Thus, the land ethic that Leopold suggests as the
solution to the problem must overcome, particularly in the western world, the cultural
inertia that the owner ofproperty, both real and personal, is free to do with the property
what the owner will, subject only to the rights of the other property owners to the use and
enjoyment of their property.
The question must surely become: how is this change in societal attitudes to be
accomplished? The Canadian Biodiversity Strategy observes:
It has been demonstrated that education is the most cost-effective means
ofproducing long-term social change. Education allows individuals to
make lifestyle and consumption decisions that are sensitive to biodiversity
conservation and sustainable use objectives.
Biodiversity education and community awareness should be strengthened
in a variety of ways to reach people across the country. Biodiversity
themes should be enhanced in the curricula of formal education systems,
as well as in non-formal settings such as museums, zoos, aquariums,
botanical gardens, nature centres and parks. Awarene$s-raising and
education could also take place through such means as the mass media,
films or interactive computer programs.
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A significant portion of Canada's biodiversity exists on private land.
Education programs developed for land-owners and local communities
will need to be tailored to the needs of these vital audiences (p.67).
Again, Leopold addresses the question, saying:
Conservation is a state of harmony between men and land. Despite nearly
a century of propaganda, conservation still proceeds at a snail's pace;
progress still consists largely of letterhead pieties and convention oratory.
On the back forty we still slip two steps backward for each forward stride.
The usual answer to this dilemma is 'more conservation
education.' No one will debate this, but is it certain that only the volume
of education needs stepping up? Is something lacking in the content as
well?
It is difficult to give a fair summary of its content in brief form,
but, as I understand it, the content is substantially this: obey the law, vote
right, join some organization, and practice what conservation is profitable
on your own land; the government will do the rest.
Is not this formula too easy to accomplish anything worthwhile? It
defines no right or wrong, assigns no obligation, calls for no sacrifice,
implies no change in the current philosophy ofvalues. In respect to land-
use, it urges only enlightened self-interest. Just how far will this education
take us (Leopold (1966): 222-3)?
Both Leopold and the Strategy see education as critical to effecting change over the long
term. Both however note a need to alter the message. The mere existence of the
biodiversity problem suggests that society's current educational programs are not
sufficient to advance the land ethic and thus allow society to avail itself of Leopold's
solution. This leads to the question: how is society to accomplish this task?
North defines institutions as: ''the rules of the game in a society or, more
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction" (North
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(1990b): 3). The land ethic that Leopold proposes is, in the vernacular of new
institutional economics, an institution. Thus, if the solution to the problem is to adopt
Leopold's land ethic the institutional structure is going to have to change. Assuming that
society wishes to adopt this solution the question then distills to how does a society affect
an institutional change? How do we change the "humanly devised constraints that shape
human interaction"?
The Strategy envisions an educational system, albeit a modified education system,
as the means by which, in the long run, humanity will be able to alleviate, ifnot rectify,
the biodiversity problem. While Leopold acknowledges the importance ofeducation he
cast doubt on the ability of enlightened self-interest to be completely successful. Implicit
in these observations is the premise that society's decision makers currently lack all of
the information necessary to make decisions, based upon their self interest, that lead to
biologically sustainable outcomes. Thus, in the parlance of economics what both the
Strategy and Leopold are referring to is informational problems; both a fundamental lack
of information and an asYmmetric distribution of the existing information. While
education can cure the latter, the former is the providence of research. .Thus Leopold's
allusion to education as too easy an answer, coming too cheaply and Dr. Don McAlpine's
comments above (Archive of Committee Evidence, Meeting 58, 05 Dec 1996) may have
merit.
By received economic theory it is axiomatically true that if the information
problems are solved, self-interest can lead to the adoption of something like the land ethic
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Leopold advocates. Unfortunately, for at least two reasons, this does not end the
problem. First should the more pessimistic estimates of species loss prove accurate the
development of such an ethic through fully informed self-interest may prove too slow a
process to avoid catastrophe. This suggests a need for interim measures. Secondly,
relying on self-interest requires that current decision makers are truly concerned about the
living conditions, not only oftheir grandchildren, but also of future generations. To
prove effective in addressing the biodiversity problem this concern will need to be
translated into the adoption ofappropriate discount rates for the utilization of natural
capital. Should this not be the case, biodiversity protection will have to be affected
through some other means. Thus, some mechanism, other than pure self-interest, is going
to have to be utilized to effect the institutional changes necessary to insure biodiversity
protection, at least in the interim.
If individuals will not voluntarily act to effect the institutional change necessary
to provide biodiversity protection, then some form of coercion is going to be necessary to
override economic agents' perceived self-interest. In the western world were the state
maintains a monopoly on the legal use ofcoercion, intervention by the state is necessary.
Again, in the western democracies attempts at conserving biological diversity are going
to require legislative initiatives.
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2.5 The North American Legislative Response
This section of Chapter 2 will concern itselfwith the nature of the legislative
initiatives that have been taken to protect biodiversity. It will be argued that this
approach was effective against the biodiversity threat inherent in the over harvest of
game animals and birds that commenced in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. It will be further argued that against the more insidious problems ofhabitat
loss and degradation, that command and control regulation has not proved as effective.
2.5.1 The United States' Response
The Endangered Species Act, 1973 (16 USC ch. 35) (hereinafter the Act, a copy
of which is attached as Appendix A) is the legislation which protects endangered species
in the United States. It is legislation with few friends. It is decried by landowners who
see it as expensive and overly intrusive (see for example Mann and Plummer (1996», and
by conservationists who see it as ponderous and ofquestionable effectiveness (see for
example Clarke, Reading and Clark (1994». Whatever it faults may be, the Act is the
culmination of over a century of federal legislative intervention in the United States for
the protection ofnonhuman species that most visibly began with the creation of the first
national park in 1872 (Anderson and Leal (1997».
25
The first step on this highway was the creation of the national parks and of the
National Park Service. The first of the national parks was Yellowstone, created in 1872.
This was done by the second session of the 420d Congress by the passing of the
Yellowstone Park Act (c. 24, 17 STAT., 32 and 33). Anderson and Leal (1997) argue
that the principle motivation behind the creation of Yellowstone and all of the other late
19th century western national parks was the railroads seeking to increase passenger
traffic by marketing the relatively pristine mountains, geysers and glaciers of the Rocky
Mountain ranges to affluent urban tourists. Marketing the vistas to the affluent requires
that the vistas be maintained, and as Anderson and Leal observed of the railroads: "They
were profit motivated, but their actions resulted in the preservation of the cornerstones in
our national park system"(Anderson and Leal (1997): 28).
If you protect where the species lives through the creation of national parks you
ultimately provide some protection for the species. Actual protection of species
themselves was undertaken to protect the interests of sport hunters (Czech and Krausman
(2001)). It bears notice that even though Yellowstone became a de facto United States
Federal Wildlife Refuge in 1894 principally to protect bison, Gust as Afognak Island,
Alaska was protected to conserve commercial salmon spawning grounds) protection of
individual species lay largely with the state governments until 1900 (Czech and
Krausman (2001): 16).
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In the United States federal protection ofendangered species essentially began as
a response to the rapid decline of the passenger pigeon with the passage of the Lacey Act
(1900, ch. 553, stat. 187), designed to allow the Secretary of Agriculture to adopt
measures to protect game and other wild birds from interstate commerce (see Clark
(1994): 19 and Czech and Krausman (2001) Chpt. 3). This was followed by the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (3 USC sec. 301) that implemented a treaty with
Great Britain on behalfof Canada entered into in 1916. This Act was later amended to
become the Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929 (1929, ch. 257, stat. 1222), to
include the then negotiated expansion ofthe treaty with Britain to include Mexico. The
treaty was subsequently signed in 1932. These Acts were aimed at protecting migratory
birds in North America (Clark (1994): 19-20 and Czech and Krausman (2001) Chpt. 3).
These early pieces of conservation legislation were, by and large, attempts to facilitate
sport hunting of waterfowl and upland game birds (Czech and Krausman (2001) Chpt. 3).
In this regard, much of the support for this legislation came from hunter/conservation
groups, like the Boone and Crockett Club, the Audubon Society, and The American
Game Protective and Propagation Association (Czech and Krausman (2001) Chpt. 3).
The early 1960's saw a marked change in the philosophy driving conservation.
As Clark observes:
Slowly, political and public awareness of the growing problem of
endangered species began to increase. The environmental activism of the
early 1960's accelerated this growing awareness, and in 1964 the
Department of Interior's Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife (now the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service) formed the Committee on Rare and
Endangered Wildlife Species. Based on the work of this committee, the
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Department of Interior published "Redbook-Rare and Endangered Fish
and Wildlife of the United States-Preliminary Draft." This 1964
publication, more commonly known as the "Redbook," contained the first
official listing of species the federal government considered to be in
danger of extinction (Clark (1994): 20).
Two years later, Congress passed its first comprehensive endangered species
legislation: the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966(80 Stat. 926). Though
espousing the lofty goal of"conserving, protecting, restoring and propagating selected
species of native fish and wildlife" (Section 2(a)), the 1966 Act did little except authorize
efforts to acquire important habitat. Congress soon recognized the inherent weakness of
this Act and replaced it with the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969 (83
Stat. 275). This replacement Act extended protection to certain invertebrates, increased
prohibitions on illegal trade, and began the process that culminated in the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, an
international agreement aimed at halting trade in endangered species and their body parts
(Clark (1994): 20).
One of the strongest voiced objections to the Endangered Species Preservation
Act (the 1966 Act) was that while it required the federal government's development
agencies such as the Army Corps of Engineers to be cognizant of the effects of their
projects on endangered species, it really did not require them to do any thing beyond
telling the Fish and Wildlife Service what they were doing. Thus, the perception was that
the development agencies were proceeding with their own agendas with no real regard
for endangered species, and that private agents were free to do whatever they wished.
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The Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969 (the1969 Act) did little to address
these perceptions, and while it attempted to make the taking, particularly ofendangered
or threatened species unlawful, it also made some allowances for commercial interests,
particularly furriers and trappers. Yaffe argues these concerns were driving forces behind
the repeal of the 1969 Act and the enactment of the Act (Yaffe (1982): 32-57).
The Act in its present form is the culmination of over a century of United States
Government legislative intervention to protect nonhuman species. It adopts a process,
upon the species being listed that entitles a species to the protections under the Act,
including habitat protection. Listing, occurs upon the ratification by the Secretary of
Commerce or the Interior of the scientific determination by either the Fish and Wildlife
Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service that the species' numbers are such that it
falls within the statutory definitions ofendangered. An endangered species is defined as:
any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant
portion of its range other than a species of the Class Insecta determined by
the Secretary to constitute a pest whose protection under the provisions of
this chapter would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to man.
Once this occurs the species and its habitat, defined as being "critical to the species
continued existence in the wild" (Act s. 3 (5» are protected.
In the view of Mann and Plummer there is an additional philosophical change in
the 1973 Act. This change was the abandonment of the notion of conservation where
practicable in favor of the adoption ofa perfect duty owed by humanity to biodiversity.
As they observe:
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\Vhatever the cost-the Court[United States Supreme Court in Tennessee
Valley Authority v Hill (98 S.C.R. 2279 (1978))] was saying something of
almost embarrassing obviousness. By enacting a law that eliminated the
practicable, Congress had with little discussion or debate created a perfect
duty to biodiversity. Although Allen[the Audubon Society biologist]
believed that people care about endangered species "for reasons peculiarly
our own," the act embraced the Noah Principle, which abjured'human
aspirations. The nation's natural heritage must be saved, no matter what.
The implications of that commitment soon stared Congress in the face-and
it blinked. (Mann and Plummer p.169)
It is what they call the perfect duty owed in favor ofbiodiversity by humanity, that Mann
and Plummer see as driving the Act, and which largely fuels discontent with the
legislation.
It should be noted that while the Act is clearly the comer stone ofAmerican
biodiversity protection law, it is not the only stone in the structure. Clark lists the
following United States federal statutes as forming part of the structure: the Marine
Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (1972, 86 stat. 1027), National Forest Management
Act of 1976 (1976, 90 stat. 2949). More recently, Congress has established a
conservation program for lands owned by the military, programs for tropical forests and
the commercial fishery (Clark (1994): 20). Clark further notes that there are also state
and local statutes and international conventions that enter into the picture (Clark (1994):
21). Clark finally allows that private groups, such as the Nature Conservancy and Ducks
Unlimited, by activities such as entering into agreements with various levels of
government, are important players in protecting biodiversity.
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2.5.1.1 The Endangered Species Act (1973)
The Act, appended in Appendix A, is the cornerstone of the policy and as such is
the focus of this analysis. The sections of the Act ofparticular interest are 2, 3,4, 6, 7, 9,
10, and 11.
Section 2 is the purposes section. The purpose is really quite simple. It is to
protect the ecosystems housing endangered and threatened species so that those species
can be preserved. It is also a purpose of the Act that all federal departments and agencies
should promote biodiversity conservation.
Section 3 is the definitions section. There are two things of note here. Firstly,
sub-species are included in the definition of species. Species are the unit of conservation,
therefore sub-species can also attract the protection of the Act. Secondly, critical habitat
is that habitat necessary to insure the survival of a species in the wild.
Section 4 is the meat and bones of the Act. Section 4 delineates the listing
process. The same criterion applies to both listing and delisting. The process is
commenced by a petition by an individual or a group or on the initiative of the Fish and
Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service. The Fish and Wildlife Service
or the National Marine Fisheries Service are the federal government departments charged
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with the Act's administration. The section establishes a ninety-day period from the date
of the petition for the Secretary of Commerce (sec 4(a)(2)), for a petition made by the
National Marine Fisheries Service or a petition respecting a species over which they have
jurisdiction, and the Secretary of the Interior (sec 4(a)(I)) for a petition made by the Fish
and Wildlife Service or for a petition respecting those species over which it has
jurisdiction, to decide if the petition presents sufficient information to determine that
listing may be warranted. The jurisdiction of the National Marine Fisheries Service is
basically anything that lives in ocean water and is, or can be, commercially harvested.
The Fish and Wildlife Service looks after everything else. These distinctions were put in
place by President Nixon by executive order in 1970 (Czech and Krausman(2001)). The
Secretary within one year from the date of the petition has to make the decision whether
or not listing is warranted. If warranted the species is listed, unless service action on other
listing proposals precludes immediate action. In making these determinations the
Secretary is obliged by subsection 4(b)(I)(a) to rely upon the best available scientific data
as to the numbers of the petitioned species and to the threats or risks that it faces. These
decisions are subject to judicial review(sec. 4(b)(3)(C)(ii)). It should be noted that the
economic consequences of listing are not to be considered by the Secretary. This was
made clear when Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the majority of the United States
Supreme Court, in Tennessee Valley Authority v Hill said:
The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. (98 S.C.R.
2279 (1978) at p. 2297)
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Public hearings are available under subsection 4(b)(5)(E), upon the request of any
individual within 45 days of the initial publication ofany regulation proposed by the
secretary under subsection 4(b)(5), the final orders subsection. Emergency listing
provisions are set out in subsection 4(b)(7) and give the Secretary the discretion to
promulgate an order by publication in the Federal Register. This emergency listing lasts
240 days from publication unless the Secretary determines that it should, on the best
scientific evidence, be earlier abandoned or should become a permanent listing in
accordance with subsection 4(b)(5).
Section 6 sets out the requirement for cooperation with the States, particularly
with respect to habitat protection. This is largely to be facilitated through federal/state
agreements. In the words of the statute: "Such cooperation shall include consultation
with the States concerned before acquiring any land or water, or interest therein, for the
purpose ofconserving any endangered species or threatened species."(sec. 6(a».
Management agreements are the principle tool, wherein the state agrees to look after
habitat and the federal government pays up to three quarters of the costs ofhabitat
acquisition and management (Mann and Plummer (1996». Czech and Krausman view
the inclusion of this section as a compromise between traditional sport hunter and angler
conservation groups, who feared federal involvement of in wildlife management into
game species, and the broader conservation community (Czech and Krausman (2001):
25-6).
33
Section 7 sets out the requirement that no federal department or agency can do or
fund any activity that would place a listed species in danger. This section was amended
in 1978 to allow for the creation ofwhat Mann and Plummer have labeled the "God
Committee", "after the only power who can overrule Noah"(Mann and Plummer (1996):
170) (see subsections 7(c) through 7(p) of Appendix A). The members of the committee,
officially known as the Endangered Species Committee, are the Secretary ofAgriculture,
Secretary of the Army, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency, Secretary of the Interior, Administrator of the
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Institute, and one member from each affected
state as appointed by the President. This committee has the power to exempt a particular
federal project from the operation of the Act. The committee's decisions are subject to
judicial review by subsection 7(n). Subsections 7(c) through 7(p) establish a minefield of
procedural requirements and time limits. With these fourteen procedural requirements
and time limits it easy to see why in 1996, some eighteen years after the amendment
passed and seventeen years after the Endangered Species Committee's January 23, 1973
unanimous ruling against an exemption for the Tellico Dam across the Little Tennessee
River (Mann and Plummer (1996): 171) Mann and Plummer observed:
Notwithstanding the fears of some members of Congress that the escape
hatch would turn into a revolving door, the God Committee has met once
since the Tellico Dam; in three other cases, a party has applied for an
exemption but did not proceed beyond the preliminary stages of the appeal
process (Mann and Plummer (1996): 175).
The Committee is obliged to grant an exemption in two instances. First pursuant
to subsection 70), if the Secretary of Defense declares a project necessary for nation
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security reasons. Second pursuant to subsection 7(P), if the President of the United States
acting under his authority under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42
U.S.C.A. Section 5121 et seq.), deems a waiver necessary for a project for the repair or
replacement of a public facility. The President's authority is limited in that the repaired
or replacement facility must be substantially as it existed prior to the disaster under which
the President invoked the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C.A.
Section 5121 et seq.).
Section 9 prohibits any activity adverse to the health or welfare ofany listed
species. Section 9 also makes it an offense to violate any regulation pertaining to an
endangered species or the threatened species offish or wildlife (subsection 9(a)(I)(E)).
Thus, as critical habitat is designated by regulation under subsection 4(b)(6)(C), it is an
offense to harm critical habitat.
Section 10 provides the exemptions to the Act. There is an exemption for
scientific study including captive breeding programs (subsection 10(a)(I)(A)). Subsection
1O(a)(1)(B) of the Act allows for the issuing of a permit for the incidental destruction of
habitat and incidental taking of listed species if the acts are incidental to another
otherwise lawful purpose. By subsection IO(a)(2) provides that an exemption can only be
granted if conservation plan has been accepted by the Secretary. The plan, by subsection
IO(a)(2)(B) is subject to public comment. The plan has to show that a listed species will
remain viable. Given the nature of listed species this is no simple task. There is a short-
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term (maximum ofone year(sec IO(b)(l)(A» exemption for undue economic hardship
caused by the listing of a previously unlisted species (sec 1O(b». The definition of undue
economic hardship (sec IO(b)(2» requires a person to suffer a substantial economic loss
due to the inability to perform a contract entered into prior to notification of the
commencement of the listing process in the Federal Register (sec lO(b)(2)(A)). The
taking of the proposed listed species can only be legal if in the year prior to the
notification of the commencement of the listing process such takings fonned a substantial
portion ofthe person's income (secl0(b)(2)(B)) or, a person who is involved in takings
for subsistence, with no other subsistence takings alternative (sec 10(b)(2)(C)). This
definition would seem to practically exclude any potential applicants for the exemption
except hunter/gathers. It should also be noted that this exception cannot be granted for a
species listed under Appendix I of the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (sec 10(b)(I)(C)). Subsection lOG)
allows an exemption from the Act for the purposes of attempting to reintroduce an
extirpated species.
Section 11 sets out the penalties. Simply put, after a hearing the Secretary of the
Interior can level a civil penalty of up to twenty-five thousand dollars per violation (sec
11(a)(l)). In the event that criminal charges are laid there is a maximum fine of twenty-
five thousand dollars and/or up to six months for any person who knowingly violates any
regulation except those specifically listed in subsection 11(b)(l). Alternatively criminal
charges can lead to a maximum fine of fifty thousand dollars and/or one year
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imprisonment for any person who knowingly violates any section of the Act, or a permit
or certificate issued under it or any of the regulations specified in subsection II(b)(I).
2.5.1.2 The Response to the Act
How has the Act faired? To President Nixon and the members ofCongress, in
1973, the protection ofbiodiversity must have seemed a policy as good and benevolent as
motherhood and apple pie. The Act was passed and proclaimed with nary a whimper of
dissent. The Act passed 92-0 in the Senate and 390-12 in the House ofRepresentatives
(Yaffe (1982): 56). In the nearly thirty years that have followed enactment, the voices of
discontent with the Act have become a veritable roar(Mann and Plummer (1996), Czech
and Krausman (2001), Yaffe (1984), and Clark, Reading and Clarke(1994)). The
dissatisfaction with the Act crosses the political spectrum, albeit for substantially
different reasons. The conservationists bemoan what they see as the Act's glaring
failures: few species listed, the length of time required for listing, the fact that delistings
due to extinction outnumber delistings due to recovery, amongst others (see for example
Clark, Reading and Clarke (1994)). On the other hand, those who take a more humanistic
view of the operation of the Act attack what they perceive as the Act's effect on their
lives and businesses, with complaints such as: why should a fish stop the Tennessee
Valley Authority from using a substantially completed dam (TVA v. Hill 98 S.C.R. 2279
(1978)), why should a butterfly stop Wilton, New York from spraying for mosquitoes
(Mann and Plummer (1996): 95-97), why should a beetle stop the State ofOklahoma
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from building a road to a hospital (Mann and Plummer (1996) Chpt. 1). The questions
Mann and Plummer pose generally amount to asking why the restriction on killing of an
endangered species or the protection of its critical habitat, the core of the Act, should
interfere with the use and enjoyment ofproperty by humans; particularly when the
species in question are apparently insignificant. What after all, the argument runs, is one
less ugly fish species or one less butterfly or beetle species when compared to freedom
from mosquitoes, sport fishing behind and the electrical power generated by another dam
in the Tennessee River Valley, or easy access to a hospital?
The extent of the current dissatisfaction with the Act can easily be seen by
considering the indictment of the Act offered by Clark, Reading and Clarke, and by Mann
and Plummer. Following a depressing paragraph about "a few statistics about the
endangered species problem"(the estimates of species loss cited earlier in this chapter)
(Clark, Reading and Clarke (1994): 3), Clark, Reading and Clarke go on to say:
Are there plausible explanations for these dismal facts? Perhaps
the ESA is an unworkable law; perhaps it addresses elements and
processes that have no bearing on the disappearance of species. Another
possibility is that extinction is inevitable given the scale and pace of
human alteration of landscapes and no herculean human efforts can stop
its course. Or perhaps it is simply that the implementation of the existing
law has been weak- ... (Clark, Reading and Clarke (1994): 3).
Mann and Plummer offer a somewhat different account:
In Robert Allen's day, the law imposed few duties toward
biodiversity. When he traveled to Aransas, his expenses were paid by his
employer, the National Audubon Society, a private organization; when he
convinced the helicopter pilot to fly him near the whooper's breeding
grounds; he used persuasion, not the coercive force of the state; and when
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he exhorted others to join his crusade, he drew on the love for the crane
shared by his fellow biologists, naturalists, and citizens in Canada and the
United States-but he could not order people to change the way they lived.
People helped him because they thought saving the crane was good and
virtuous, not because they had a legal obligation to participate.
Since that time, laws like the Endangered Species Act have
expanded our obligations, pushing them closer to the realm of perfect
duties. Moving away from the old balance is surely good in principle,
because in the past our legal system did not nudge us to remember our
natural heritage and thereby may have helped to encourage thoughtless
waste. At the same time, one can wonder whether our laws today strike
the proper balance among goods (that is, whether they are ethical), and
whether they respect the importance of having appropriate means (that is,
whether they are practicable).
A clue to the answer came during our visit to Florida. After
visiting the cranes, we drove to a restaurant a few miles away with
Stephen Nesbitt, the biologist. The restaurant looked like any farmland
eatery: faded tablecloths of red-and-white plaid, a plethora of calendars
on the wall, pickup trucks in the parking lot. The room was full of burly
men who looked as if they worked outdoors. To our surprise, heads
swiveled in our direction when we entered. The object of the stares was
not us, the two strangers with notebooks, but Nesbitt, in his Game and
Freshwater Fish uniform....
Along the way, it occurred to us that matters had gone awry.
Ranchers, farmers, loggers, and the like live in rural places because they
love the outdoors and its inhabitants. Nesbitt was a biologist for precisely
the same reason. Yet Nesbitt's uniform set them off. Something about the
simple presence of someone associated with government-organized efforts
to preserve wild areas attracted hostility from the very people who live
there (Mann and Plummer (1996): 145-146).
What prompted this change in the way that the Act is viewed? Arguably, the
change resulted from the failure of Congress to consider how individuals view benefits
and costs of a program. It is the bureaucrats of the United States Department of the
Interior Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service who are
largely responsible for the implementation of the Act. It is the American resident who
has his or her property and way of life affected by the operation of the Act, or at least
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perceives such effects. From the received economic theory of rational expectations it is
clear that an economic agent's decisions, particularly in the face of incomplete
information are going to be affected by the agent's perception of reality. Thus, if agents
have a rational reason to believe that the Act is placing a burden on them, say for
example they can witness the tax payers of Wilton, New York being forced to pay more
for less effective mosquito control to save some butterflies, or the residents of rural
Oklahoma being required to drive farther to get to hospital for the benefit of a beetle, they
will form the expectation that the Act is imposing costs on them. If this perception of
costs is coupled with a perception ofbenefits, which the rational agent will have given
the much heralded if amorphously specified benefits ofbiodiversity, the rational agent is
going to want his or her perceived benefits to equal or exceed the perceived costs.
Should the perceived benefits not equal or exceed the perceived costs, a policy that forces
such a situation on rational agents is not going to be popular. This want ofpopularity is
going to be exacerbated if the rational agent expects that his or her share of the costs is
higher than some other agents, particularly if there is a common benefit. Congress,
apparently, neglected to consider these sorts of effects, and thus the Act has become a
piece of legislation decried by many, lauded by few. That rural residents, in general and
property holder specifically, should resent Nesbitt's uniform should not be surprising;
they reside where the endangered species and their habitats exist. Thus, they fear they
will bear the costs, while the benefits will be shared among the entire society, including
those urbanites who often destroyed the habitat to create their cities.
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How has this dissatisfaction with the Act been expressed? Mann and Plummer
observe:
As a result they had a great incentive to ensure that official endangered
species never appeared on their property. The implications of this were
demonstrated in an extreme form by the case of the San Diego mesa mint,
which the Fish and Wildlife Service proposed listing in October 1978.
One of the plant's three populations inhabited a 279-acre tract on which
Pardee Construction of San Diego intended to erect a 1,429-unit
subdivision. Pardee had asked the Veterans Administration to provide a
loan guarantee. A few days before the mesa mint was added to the list, the
VA informed the developer that the plant lived on the site; Pardee
promptly bulldozed the population while it was still unprotected. After a
few angry letters, the company got a VA loan guarantee-no endangered
species existed on the property to disrupt construction (Mann and
Plummer (1996): 187).
If people will race the listing process to be rid ofan endangered species is there any
reason to believe that losing the race will alter their behavior, particularly if there is a
good chance that the presence of the listed species is unknown?
While the incorporation in the Act of an incentive perverse to its purpose is
sufficient to generate concern among conservationists it is not the only concern expressed
in relation to the Act and its goals of protecting endangered flora and fauna regardless of
cost Clark suggests that the Act's implementation can be criticized on eight grounds.
First, as the Act fails to establish qualitative or quantitative standards for what constitutes
danger of extinction, it suffers from imprecise standards for delineating species status.
Second, the Act is said to suffer from inappropriate units ofprotection, by section 4 it
protects species rather than ecosystems. Third, the Act leaves funding decisions
principally in the administration's hands. The fact that in 1990 one-halfof the funds
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available for recovery projects were spent on ten species leads Clark to argue that the
administrations funding decisions pay undue attention to high profile species. this is, of
course, to the detriment of less popular, although potentially more biologically important
species. Fourth, Clark argues that as subsection 4(a)(3) sets out that habitat should be
protected only to the "maximum extent prudent and determinable" that insufficient
habitat has been protected given the latitude the phrase allows. Fifth, although the Act
requires by subsection 4(t) that recovery plans be adopted Clark argues that since the
Government Accounting Office reports that only 61 percent of listed species have
approved recovery plans that the recovery planning process is inadequate. Sixth, the only
time that the Act requires the consultations between federal agencies be public is an
application for exemption to the "God Committee". Clark argues that because of this
want of transparency that the Act's interagency consultation process is inadequate.
Seventh, Clark argues that since Congress did not specify a methodology for accounting
for uncertainty in the Act that whatever method the services choose to use is subject to
attack for being inappropriate. Finally, given the dicta in TVA v. Hill (98 S.C.R. 2279
(1978» it is clear that the Act pays insufficient consideration to economic factors (Clark
(1994): 30-35).
In his proposed solutions to these eight problems Clark notes three more
problems. First, Clark alleges that the resources allocated to the endangered species
problem are insufficient. Second, he argues that too much discretion is granted to the
implementing agencies by the Act. Last, he observes that extensive politicization of the
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system has occurred (Clark (1994): 36-38). It seems that extensive politicization of the
system in fact underlies all to the other complaints in Clark's indictment of the Act.
Czech and Krausman bring a tangential view to the Act and its apparent problems.
They view any problems with the Act as relatively minor and fairly easily overcome.
They argue that the Act is technically legitimate(Czech and Krausman (2001) Chpt 7), its
major problems being twelve incorrect or highly questionable assumptions made by the
drafters of the legislation (Chpt 5). They aver that these assumptions are either the result
of political compromise or underestimation of the resource requirements for achieving
the Act's goals (Chpt 5). By their reasoning, given technical legitimacy, correction of the
incorrect and questionable assumptions would render the Act good policy. Any
remaining problems are the result of the underlying structure ofAmerican society. Thus,
they argue that the problem lies not with the Act, but specifically with the social ethos
they perceive in American society that views economic growth and increased
consumption as laudable. The solution to the problem, becomes relatively simple;
decrease consumption to the point were the United States adopts a steady state economy,
relying upon its own natural capital base for all of its consumption (Chpt 11). This
essentially is a call for living off of the interest of the natural capital rather than the
principle. They further argue that adoption of this solution removes the apparent
hypocrisy of the North admonishing the South to conserve and preserve (Chpt 11). Their
analysis will undoubtedly be viewed as naive, by some, in that it fails to consider the
undeniable gains from trade, first demonstrated by Ricardo, and Solow's steady state
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growth models. Finally, beyond noting that compared to other nations in the world the
United States is relatively wealthy in natural capital per capita (Czech and Krausman
(2001): 163) and that the view that economic growth must be slowed is gaining in
popularity (Czech and Krausman (2001): 142) they offer no real guidance as to how this
transition is to be effected.
2.5.2 Canada's Position on the Introduction of the BiU
Given the apparent problems that the United States has encountered with its
endangered species protection legislation why would Canada chose to travel down the
path ofattempting to legislate the protection of endangered species? Perhaps the first
place to seek an answer to such a question is with the legislators themselves, who like the
witnesses before the House ofCommons Standing Committee on the Environment and
Sustainable Development largely see the enterprise as laudable. It bears notice that the
high praise for legislation to protect endangered species crossed all political parties
within the House of Commons and across all regions of the country. Some examples
follow.
Mrs. Karen Kraft Sloan, Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of the Environment,
of the Liberal Party of Canada on November 29, 1996 speaking to a motion to send the
Bill to committee prior to second reading said, in the House of Commons:
Canadians from all walks of life, from urban to rural areas, have told us
we need endangered species legislation.
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Members of Parliament on both sides, in the government benches and in
the seats across the way, have reflected this genuine concern for Canada's
wildlife. That is why the government looks forward to working with the
committee while they study and strengthen Canada's first ever endangered
species legislation.
The government commitment to this legislation was made in the speech
from the throne. It followed extensive consultations with wildlife
conservation groups, other environmental groups, farmers, the private
sector, provincial and territorial governments and individual Canadians.
Our planet is losing from one to three species per day, mainly as a result of
human activity. The recently released IUCN red list contains over 5,000
animal species currently at risk ofbecoming extinct. Unhappily some
countries now have up to 50 per cent of their mammal species in this
category.
Fortunately Canada is nowhere near that figure but we are not immune
from this disturbing trend. One out of every 25 ofour mammal species and
one out of every 33 ofour bird species are threatened or endangered. In
Canada 276 species offish, amphibians, reptiles, mammals and plants are
facing extinction and once they are gone, they are gone forever.
All levels of government have a duty and a responsibility to work in
partnership with one another and with concerned citizens across the
country and around the world to do all in our power to prevent this from
happening.
As I said, Canadians feel passionately about our natural environment. Our
provincial and territorial colleagues and our federal minister have listened
to Canadians. Last month we agreed to a national accord to the protection
of species at risk. With it we have put nature first and jurisdictional
disputes second.
The accord commits all provincial and territorial governments, along with
the federal government, to take action within specific time periods to
provide for the recovery of species in danger. I am confident that the
provincial and territorial governments will live up to the spirit and the
letter of that agreement in the same way that we are doing with this
legislation before us today (Hansard November 29, 1996).
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NIrs. Monique Guay, the Member of Parliament for Laurentides, of the Bloc
Quebecois speaking to the same motion as Mrs. Kraft Sloan observed:
In the last two decades, the preservation of biodiversity has become an
international priority. As a result, we had the 1980 World Conservation Strategy;
the 1991 report entitled "Caring for the Earth"; the 1987 report ofthe World
Commission on Environment and Development entitled "Our Common Future";
and more recently, in 1992, the International Convention on Biological Diversity.
As we can see, environmental awareness is a recent reality.
In Canada, some provinces and the federal government have already passed laws
in this area. Some 12 federal acts deal with the conservation and protection of
threatened species. These laws include the Canada Wildlife Act, the Migratory
Birds Convention Act, the Fisheries Act, the National Parks Act, the Health of
Animals Act, and the Canadian Environmental Protection Act.
At the provincial level, four provinces-New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario and
Manitoba-have their own laws designed to protect endangered species. As for the
other provinces and the territories, they have laws on wildlife management and
endangered species. Their content varies considerably.
On October 2, at a meeting in Charlottetown, the federal and provincial ministers
responsible for wildlife agreed in principle on a national convention for the
protection ofwildlife in Canada. This agreement is designed to prevent the
extinction of wildlife species in Canada as a result of human activity. It
establishes a new framework for co-operation between the federal, provincial and
territorial governments. It deals with co-operation, collaboration and
complementarity between its signatories (Hansard November 29, 1996).
Finally, Mr. Paul Forseth, the Member ofParliament for New Westminster-
Burnaby, of the Reform Party of Canada added:
Mr. Speaker, it is good to be able to speak to this motion today which has
some basic optimism about doing good things which have general social
support across the country.
As civilization on this planet becomes more developed, humanity
encroaches on the world ecosystem. Although there is some adaptive
specialization and limited evolution to the living world, what we observe
is a general trend to deterioration of the environment and living things,
and more prospect of dying than living and the trend to extinction rather
than survival.
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There is difficulty for mankind to find better health on this spaceship
earth, as it is turning into everything opposite of the garden ofEden.
Society may not be able to halt all of what is happening to the earth, but
we can be reasonably responsible in stewardship. Mankind is on a life
support system called earth that hurdles through space. It is all we have for
our children, so we have to take care of its bounty and all those who live
on it.
Today with this bill we are attempting to mitigate some of the excesses of
civilization on other species. It is not the dawning of a new day but some
basic housekeeping for our land (Hansard November 29, 1996).
On February 4,1997 the Honorable Sergio Marchi then Minister of the
Environment said:
After all, Canada in 1997 is where Europe, for instance, was about 125
years ago, in terms ofabundance of wildlife and richness ofour
biodiversity. In Europe they now put wild animals on their coats of arms
and even name cities after bears, but just about the only real animals
Europeans enjoy are the ones they find in their zoos, or the ones they fmd
when they visit us in greatly increasing numbers in Canada.
In Canada we have an opportunity to be different, and for the sake ofour
children and the generations to come we must remember what happened in
places like Europe and elsewhere on the globe and not get caught up in the
unrelenting chase of industrial development at any cost.
Canadians of all ages, of all backgrounds, from all regions of the country,
both rural and urban, want this legislation. So it's up to us to deal with it as
quickly and as fmnly as we can, and to make it better if we can, but above
all and at the end of the day to make it part of Canadian law within the life
of this Parliament (Archive of Committee Evidence, Meeting 69, 04 Feb
1997).
From the above that there are several common threads that appear to have fueled
the belief, held by Canadian Parliamentarians, that Canada required legislation to protect
endangered species. Foremost is the state ofbiodiversity in Canada and the desire to
protect and enhance it. Mrs. Guy points to the presence of the Convention on Biological
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Diversity, as a signatory Canada is obliged to protect its biodiversity. Mrs. Guy also
poi~ts out some of the steps both federally and provincially that have been taken to that
end. By implication Mrs. Guy's comment reveal a further reason; given that respect for
political borders is not in the nature of members ofthe plant and animal kingdoms
effective protection in Canada is only possible through federal legislation. That is, since
Canada is a federal state in order to protect species that move across both interprovincial
and international boundaries the national government has to act. From Mrs. Kraft
Sloan's comments The National Accord on the Protection of Species at Risk obliged
the Government of Canada to legislate to protect species at risk. It would seem that the
legislators quoted above take the view that the Bill was meant to be the apex of
legislative initiatives aimed at protecting biodiversity that began with the formation of the
national park system with the establishment of the fIrst Canadian national park, Banff, in
1885. It bears notice that this is not substantially different than the American experience
highlighted in Section 5.1, albeit some 23 years later. The present challenge is to attempt
to determine the wisdom of the Government of Canada's choices.
2.5.2.1 An Overview of Bill C-65
Bill C-65 is appended as Appendix B. Section"2 of the Bill is the statutory
dictionary, which sets out the meanings that the listed words and phrases take throughout
the Bill. Of particular note are the definitions of"critical habitat", which is habitat that is
critical to the survival ofa wildlife species, and "endangered species", which is a species
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that is facing imminent extinction or extirpation. The definition of "residence" will be
specifically addressed in chapter five. It bears notice that definition of "wildlife species"
includes subspecies and geographically distinct populations.
Section 3 is the applications section. It sets out that the Act applies to all wild
species on federal land. Section 33 has the potential to expand the application ofthe Act
to private property. This will be discussed more fully in chapter 5. Section 4 binds the
Crown, that is it sets out that the Government of Canada would have been subject to the
operation ofthe Bill as if it were just another person in Canada. While section 5 is the
purposes section. The purpose of the Bill is to prevent the extirpation or extinction of
wildlife species, and to provide for the recovery of those species that face either risk, as a
result ofhuman activity.
Administration is dealt with in sections 6 through 8. Section 8 allows the
Government to enter into agreements with anyone it pleases, to provide contributions to
the costs ofprograms or measures aimed at facilitating the purposes of the Bill. The
section does not oblige the Government to neither enter into any agreement nor attempt to
negotiate them in good faith. While sections 9 through 11 establish a public registry to
facilitate access by the public to documents relating to "matters under the Bill, and thus
provide transparency. Section 12 establishes the Canadian Endangered Species
Conservation Council. It is a federal and provincial Ministers committee charged with
overseeing the activities of the Committee on the Status of Endangered Species in
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Canada (COSEWIC), which is established by section 13. COSEWIC is charged with
detennining the status of species, and reporting same. As in the United States, this
detennination is to be made solely on the basis of biological evidence. Sections 14
through 17 set out the rules under which COSEWIC operates. Sections 18 through 30
deal with the listing procedure. They include the designations and that can be made, the
various reporting procedures, application procedures and decision rules. These will also
be examined in more detail in Chapter 5.
Section 31 through 33 set out the prohibitions. Sections 31 and 32 read:
31. (1) No person shall kill, harm, harass, capture or take an individual of
a listed endangered or threatened species.
(2) No person shall possess, collect, buy, sell or trade an individual of
a listed endangered or threatened species, or any part or derivative of one.
32. No person shall damage or destroy the residence ofan individual of a
listed endangered or threatened species.
Section 33 grants the Minister regulatory power to protect cross boundary species and
will be discussed more fully in Chapter 5.
Section 34 allows COSEWIC to make an emergency order, which the Minister
must repeal when adequate measures have been taken in response to the emergency
order. Section 36 sets out some general exceptions to the prohibitions. These include
activities authorized by another Act ofParliament for the protection of national security,
health or safety; activities in accordance with an aboriginal treaty, land claims agreement,
self-government agreement or co-management agreement that deals with wildlife;
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activities in furtherance of a recovery plan. Sections 38 through 45 of the Bill deal with
the recovery planning process. The sections set out that if recovery is feasible that the
federal government is to attempt to cooperate with all interested parties, including all
levels of government, foreign or domestic, individuals and citizens groups to see that it
occurs.
By section 46 the Minister can issue permits for activities that would otherwise be
outlawed. The permit can only be issued if it can be shown that the species survival will
not be imperiled by the activity, that all reasonable alternatives have been considered, and
that everything feasible will be done to minimize the activities impact on the species.
The section reads:
46. (1) The responsible minister may make an agreement with a person, or
issue a permit to a person, authorizing them to engage in an activity
affecting
(a) a listed endangered or threatened species or its critical habitat; or
(b) wildlife species to which regulations under section 33 apply or its
residence.
(2) Before making the agreement or issuing the permit, the responsible
minister must be satisfied that
(a) all reasonable alternatives to the activity have been considered;
(b) all feasible measures will be taken to minimize the impact of the
activity on the species or its habitat or residence; and
(c) the activity will not imperil the survival of the species.
(3) The agreement or permit may contain any terms and conditions
governing the activity that the responsible minister considers necessary
for protecting the species, minimizing the impact of the authorized
activity on the species or providing for its recovery.
(4) The responsible minister must review the agreement or permit if an
emergency order is made with respect to the wildlife species.
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(5) The Minister may make regulations respecting the issuance, renewal,
revocation and suspension ofagreements and permits.
Section 47 allows permits issued, or agreements entered into by responsible
ministers under other acts to have the same force and effect as those from section 46,
provided the responsible minister considers those things specified in subsection 46(2).
Section 48 sets out that all permits and agreements must be registered. Section 49 ties the
act to the environmental assessment process. The section requires that the Minister be
advised any time that a project that is likely to affect an endangered species or its habitat
comes before an authority under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act. The
section also obliges the authority to ensure that the effects on the species or its habitat are
mitigated in accordance with the recovery plan for the species.
Sections 50 through 59 set out the enforcement measures. Among other things
these sections grant powers of search and seizure and allow for forfeiture. Sections 60
through 76 establish a procedure whereby anyone can bring an action to enforce the Bill,
regardless of interest. That is, anyone has standing to commence an action, even if the
only interest they can show is public interest, if they follow the procedural hoops set out
in the Bill.
Sections 77 through 99 deal with offences and punishment. Section 77
establishes a dual offence for breaching sections 31 or 32 or any regulation or emergency
order. There is a maximum $100,000 fme for a corporation and a maximum $50,000
52
and/or one year imprisonment for an individual convicted on summary conviction.
Conviction by indictment subjects a corporation to a maximum fine ofhalf a million
dollars, while an individual faces a maximum fine of $250,000 and/or five years
imprisonment. The maximums double on subsequent convictions. A continuing offence
can be charged separately day by day, with the fines being cumulative. Section 80
establishes a defense of due diligence. Section 81 through 86 deal with administrative
details like forfeiture and venue. Sections 87 through 99 establish an alternative
measures procedure. Rather than face trial and conviction an accused person with the
consent of the attorney general can elect alternative measures, accept some form of
punishment and avoid conviction and the associated record. The attorney general is
obliged to consult with the Minister prior to consenting, and can only consent if the use
of alternative measures would not be inconsistent with the purposes of the Bill. By
section 100 the crown can prescribe fees and charges for a permit or agreement under
section 46 and for access to or inclusion of records in the public registry. Section 101
through 103 deal with reports to Parliament. Section 101 requires an annual report by the
Minister on the administration of the Bill. Section 102 requires a report on the status of
wild species. The first report is due three years after the coming into force of the Bill will
subsequent reports required every five years. Section 103 requires that committee of
either the House of Commons or the Senate or a joint committee ofboth Houses of
Parliament is initiated to conduct a comprehensive review of the Bill. Again, this
committee was to sit three years after coming into force and subsequently every five
years.
53
This brief review of the two pieces of legislation should make two things
relatively clear. The Bill shares some key components with the Act, particularly in the
areas around listing, and listing's consequences. Second, the Bill makes an attempt at
addressing some of the complaints with the Act. The question that remains is how
successful could those attempts have been expected to be?
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CHAPTER THREE
CONSIDERATIONS FROM ECONOMIC THEORY
3.1 Market Failure
If the root of the endangered species problem is habitat loss and if land use
decisions are made in self-interest, why then have markets failed to provide the habitat
necessary for the sustainable continuance ofthe human species? In other words, given
that the habitat market has apparently failed, the question becomes what has caused the
market for habitat to fail and what institutional problem underlies that failure?
The simplest answer would be that markets have not failed. This, of course, from
economic theory, would require that our society has a utility function that ignores future
generations or that current treatment of endangered species is optimal. That is, if the
proposition that markets have not failed holds, economic theory tells us that one of two
things must be true. Either our society as a whole does not care about the living
conditions of its children and grandchildren or that the current level ofbiodiversity is
sufficient to allow future generations to live in the style that society desires them to have.
The fact that the popular press is consistently reporting polls that exhibit ever increasing
environmental awareness suggests that there is little merit in the proposition that markets
have not failed. If things were perfect, people would not be worried.
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The Government of Canada upon examining the endangered species problem in
1996 concluded that some form of governmental intervention was necessary to abate the
habitat driven endangered species problem I. To a neo-classical economist this implies
that the Government of Canada had concluded that the market had failed to provide an
optimal level ofhabitat. Market failure is the only justification for governmental
intervention in the economy in the neo-classical economic paradigm2.
Markets in the neo-classical welfare paradigm fail when they fail to achieve the
Pareto optimal allocation of resources. This may occur for a variety of reasons. These
reasons range from market power through any number of identified information problems
to ill defined property rights (Just, Hueth and Schmitz, 1982).
This suboptimal allocation of goods and services is, in neo-classical economic
theory, the result of inappropriate price signaling, or quantitative restrictions such as
quotas. That is, as a result of the market failure the relative prices of the goods and
services as revealed by the market are incorrect in that they do not reflect the value of the
scarce goods. Ifhabitat is under provided, theory suggests its relative price is to low,
which is to say that the market is ascribing a price to habitat relative to other land uses
that over values the alternative uses. This is a market failure.
1 This should not be taken to preclude the possibility that the Government ofCanada was in large part
responding to the environmental lobby.
2 See Boadway (1997) for a discussion of market failure in the context of stabilization and distribution
objectives of government.
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What could lead the market to undervalue habitat relative to other land uses?
First, the supplier cannot entirely capture the benefits of supplying habitat. For example,
a private landowner is not able to charge individuals when endangered species exist on
private property. There are information problems that result in the market under
producing habitat. Biologists do not know the relationship between habitat and the
entropy reducing capabilities of ecosystems. In theoretical terms this means that
marginal social benefits and marginal private benefits of supplying habitat are not
equivalent.
Graphically this can be represented in figure 3.1. Where the P axis is the price of
habitat and the Q axis is the quantity ofhabitat. S is the private supply curve for habitat.3
The private supply curve is the locus ofpoints were private individuals are prepared to
supply the greatest quantity, q, ofhabitat that they are prepared to supply at the price, p.
That is, for any given price, p, the maximum amount ofhabitat that private individuals
will supply is the quantity, q, read off the supply curve. D is the private demand curve
for habitat. The private demand curve is the locus ofpoints that represent the minimum
quantity ofhabit, q, that private individuals will demand at a given price, p. That is, the
most that private individuals will pay for a given quantity ofhabitat, q, is the price, p,
read off the demand curve. The private market is said to be in equilibrium when the
quantity demanded is equal to the quantity supplied at the same price. That is the
intersection of the supply and demand curves for habitat, were at the same price suppliers
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are supplying as much as they are willing to while at the same time demanders are
receiving the least amount they will take. In figure 3.1 the market equilibrium would be
to supply habitat in the amount qe at the price Pe. In the absence ofmarket failure, the
allocation ofhabitat at the equilibrium, qe and Pe, can be shown to be optimal.4 If,
however, you live in a world, as we apparently do, were the optimal amount ofhabitat is
•q there is a clear market failure and government intervention is justified by received
economic theory.
Figure 3.1: The Private Demand and Supply of Habitat
P of habitat
s
Per--------~
.-....-.-------"O"----:.r--------Q of habitat
qe q
Given that there is a market failure before government intervenes it is necessary
to ascertain the cause of the market failure. The cause of the market failure needs to be
ascertained in order to insure that the corrective policy adopted does not exacerbate the
3 The supply curve intercepts the quantity axis to the right of the origin, because there is some land that has
no economically viable use other than habitat. As technology continues to change so will the intercept of
the supply curve and either the quantity or the price axis.
4 The interested reader can see Varian for example.
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problem. In the instant case the problem is caused by the public good nature of
biod,iversity generally, and endangered species habitat specifically.
The public goods problem has its roots in the inability of the provider of the good
to extract all the benefits available from the supply of the good. By received economic
theory an economic agent will only make an investment if the expected stream of benefits
that the investor can extract from that investment is equal to or greater than the costs
associated with the investment. The costs in such a comparison, again by received
theory, must include the opportunity costs of the investment. That is, those benefits that
could accrue to the agent through an alternate use of the investment, in the case ofhabitat
the foregone benefit of some other use of the land. The economic agents that provide
endangered species habitat, landowners, cannot extract the complete benefit generated by
the land as habitat. This is because no legal means exists for the landowner to extract the
benefits that other people receive from the habitat. In fact, the only benefit that
landowners can extract is their own personal benefit. Thus, when landowners compare
the benefits available to them of the land as habitat to the costs associated with the land
as habitat, they will value only the benefits that they can extract, and accordingly will
under invest in habitat. This is because as soon as some other use, say growing grain,
produces benefits to the landowner that are greater than the benefits that the landowner
receives from the land as habitat that other use will be chosen. This is true even if the
total benefit to the society of the land as habitat exceeds the total benefit to society from
the other use, and is the root of the public goods problem.
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The public goods problem is modeled graphically in figure 3.2. In figure 3.2 MPB
is the marginal private benefit of habitat, while MSB is the marginal social benefit of
habitat. Marginal private benefit is the benefit gained by private individuals from the last
unit of habitat created and in a perfectly competitive world is the same as the demand
curve in figure 3.1. Marginal social benefit is then, of course, the benefit that society
gains from the last unit ofhabitat created. The fact that these two curves are separate is
why the market failure occurs. Q, P and S are, as in figure 3.1, the quantity, the prices
and the supply of habitat.
Figure 3.2 Market for Habitat with the Public Goods Problem
P of habitat
MSB
p.~,--~--~
I
p,I----~~
MPB
.-""'-------q....l.....--q-------Q ofhabitat
5 The price of supplying habitat need not be a direct cash outlay on the part ofproperty owners. In fact, the
cost of habitat is likely to be the opportunity cost of foregoing some other use for the land.
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By the same reasoning that the intersection of the supply and demand curves in
figure 3.1 represent an equilibrium in the private market, the intersection of the MPB and
the supply curve, at p and q represents the identical private equilibrium in figure 3.2.
However, by allowing the private suppliers to extract the social benefit rather than merely
the private benefit, figure 3.2 shows that the optimal quantity ofhabitat, q*, is available at
the price, p*, were the MSB curve intersects the supply curve. That is, at the point were
for the same price, the maximum amount ofhabitat that suppliers are prepared to supply
is just equal to the minimum amount of the benefits of habitat that society is prepared to
accept at the price. The move from point a to point b requires the elimination of the gap
between the two benefits curves, the solution to the public goods problem. The gap
exists between the two benefits curves, in figure 3.2, because the landowners can and will
choose uses for the property other than habitat, when they only receive p of benefit rather
than p*of benefit. In instances like this, the policy government wants to adopt is one that
will eliminate the gap between the MPB and the MSB curve. One way the gap can be
eliminated is by the transfer from the rest of society to landowners of an amount equal to
the area in the rectangle pp*bc. That is, one policy that will solve the problem is to have
an additional amount pp*bc invested in habitat by the state. This is the classic Pigovian
subsidy. If a change in landowner preferences, that is, ifwhat they perceive as beneficial
and how they value it occurs that results in an upward ·shift of the MPB curve to the point
that it overlays the MSB curve, then the problem eliminates itself. This notion underlies
the idea that education will assist in alleviating the endangered species problem.
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If the market fails in supplying habitat to the level where marginal social benefit
equ,als marginal social cost, is this a prima facia case for government intervention?
Governments also fail, especially when providing environmental goods because ofthe
high transactions and information costs. The transactions costs literature takes a different
view on the role of government when markets fail and when government intervention
becomes justified. Therefore, a discussion of transaction costs and property rights is
required before answering this important question.
3.2 Transaction Costs
The term transaction costs is attributable to Ronald Coase (Coase (1960)).
Transaction costs are quite simply those costs associated with conducting a transaction.
They include a variety ofcosts, from the cost of finding a purchaser, to the cost of
determining if what you received is what you contracted for, to the costs ofdetermining if
an employee is shirking. They are an economies analog of friction in the physical world.
Just as friction affects the movement of physical objects, transaction costs affect the
manner in which transactions occur and are governed within an economy. If the costs of
conducting a transaction become too high the transaction may not occur. With
transaction costs minimized the neoclassical economic competitive equilibrium results in
an efficient allocation ofproduction and consumption within an economy. This is the so-
called Coase Theorem. Thus, apparent market failure must be examined in a new light.
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l\tlarket failure must be examined in the context of all of the costs, including any
costs that government imposes on the apparent market failure. Thus, it is possible that the
only way that the apparent market failure can be relieved is by minimizing the transaction
costs, including those imposed by government. Thus, even if transaction costs are
minimized everywhere else in the economy poorly designed governmental policy can
increase transaction costs and reduce the amount of goods and services produced. That
is, relative prices actually discovered in the market may be different from actual relative
scarcity because of transactions costs imposed by government and not because of the use
of market power, or one ofthe other neo-classical causes ofmarket failure. The price of
failing to recognize the true cause of the problem and as a result adopting an
inappropriate governmental response may be to worsen a bad situation.
Oliver Williamson and others have advanced these concepts. The result has been
that the neoclassical economic paradigm is left with a small and diminishing role in the
evaluation ofpolicies and events advanced and occurring in the real and theoretical
world. The role is largely a comparative one, the actual result is compared to the
standard set by the neoclassical result. Williamson's contributions include positing
humans as boundedly rational and opportunistic as opposed to the neoclassical
assumption of rational behavior (Williamson (1986)). "This has several important
implications. First, time matters. What a bounded rational actor sees as his or her best
interest ex ante may not prove to be his or her best interest ex post. So long as he or she
can take an action to alter the ex post outcome when he or she recognizes the change in
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circumstances he or she will. The expected benefits of such an action must, of course,
equal or exceed the expected costs. Second, opportunism, defined as self-interest with
guile, effectively destroys the free and perfect information assumptions of neoclassical
economic theory. Thus, information, its cost and its distribution become important in
assessing efficiency. Williamson (1983) and Akerlof (1970) drive this point home.
Allowing for temporal effects and informational effects, the combination ofwhich leads
to uncertainty, is perhaps Williamson's greatest insight. People are going to attempt to
choose a governance structure, for their affairs, which they believe will limit the
transaction costs they face. In such a search the most important factor may well be to
limit the ability of those with whom they interact to act opportunistically (Williamson
(1986)). It should be noted that while there is an ever expanding literature in economics
on this subject, it is beyond the scope of this examination.
Finally it must always be recalled that transactions costs need not cause markets
to fail. Indeed, transactions costs will always be present in any transaction even if they
only extend to the time lost to go to a store. The true challenge oftransaction costs is to
achieve an institutional structure that minimizes them as their elimination is impossible.
3.3 Institutions
At their core, both market failure in the neo-classical sense and the failure to
achieve the neo-classical equilibrium, are due to transaction costs. This amounts to an
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institutional structure that fails to achieve the assumptions of the neoclassical competitive
equilibrium, and hence to an allocation of resources that is not consistent with that
equilibrium.
Decisions respecting habitat that have led to a shortage of habitat are no different
in this regard. Suboptimal levels ofhabitat arising in either a regulated or an unregulated
market for habitat are the result of the decisions being made within an inappropriate
institutional structure.
It is received theory that economic agents want as much as they can get for as
little as they have to pay. This implies that they will seek to lower any and all costs that
they face and that they will not act out of altruism. When the assumption of opportunism
is added, the agents are allowed to act with guile. That is, agents may attempt to take
advantage of any opportunity that presents itself to them, provided they believe that they
can successfully take advantage of the opportunity. This implies that agents can act in a
manner prior to a certain or expected event (their ex ante position) to insure that they are
in the best possible position after the event (their ex post position). This end will be
accomplished by utilizing any advantage, informational or otherwise, that they possess or
can acquire even should it cause to worsen the ex posfposition of other agent or agents in
the economy. Thus, even agents who recognize that habitat is not available in sufficient
quantities, a realization complicated by the grasp ofhow much habitat is indeed
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necessary to sustain human existence, will demand less habitat than necessary and free
ride on that habitat supplied by others.
Habitat viewed only as a necessary use of land for the preservation of human
existence is, in essence, a public good, and thus subject to the problem of free riding.
That is, habitat is something that the owner of the habitat cannot exclude others from
enjoying the humanity maintaining biodiversity benefits that flow from the habitat. If
someone is prepared to pay to provide level ofhabitat because he or she receives utility
from watching burrowing owls or some other species then all other member of society
gain the biodiversity advantage to human existence accompanying that expenditure. The
person who makes the original investment in the habitat has no way to extract from
society any of the benefits it receives from that investment. Thus, a boundedly rational
opportunistic agent will not invest in habitat, preferring others to make the investment
from which he/she can extract the benefit. Unfortunately when everyone is boundedly
rational and opportunistic, everyone will be inclined to make the same decision and thus
there will be under investment in habitat. That is, as people free ride you get the classic
under investment in the public good noted by economic theory. Therefore, even if
society's preferences change over time toward increased populations ofendangered
species, free riding could, but need not necessarily, resUlt in continued under investment
in habitat.
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Whether or not the investment in habitat accorded by a change in societal
preferences will achieve optimality, will depend upon the relationship between the
marginal societal and private benefits, and the private marginal cost of habitat. It is
undisputed in economic theory that in a free competitive market that individual economic
agents equate the marginal benefit they receive to the marginal cost they incur to receive
the benefit. Thus, following a change in preferences, it is possible that there will be a
sufficient number of agents who value habitat to compensate for the free riders and arrive
at a level ofhabitat sufficient to insure sustainable human existence. That this is not
presently occurring is evidenced by the fact of the existence of the public concern
respecting endangered species. Thus the ability to free ride has generated a free market
outcome that generates a suboptimal allocation of habitat because of the wedge driven
between private and social benefits at the margin by free riding.
Unfortunately, the ability to free ride is not the only problem that can create a
lowering of the relative price of habitat. Economic theory holds that the decisions on the
use of land are going to be made, by a rational agent, on the basis of the highest value use
to which the land can be put. That is, the rational agent is going to choose that use for
land which yields the greatest net present valued returns from the land. This means that
anything that affects the price of the output of the land; like a deficiency payment for
grain production, or the cost structure of a particular use, like a grain transportation
subsidy, can affect the agents best use. Thus institutions in general and laws in particular
will have an effect on how decisions are made. Policy regimes that distort the private
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agents' marginal benefit may distort land use decisions and thus can affect the amount of
habitat available.
As the new institutional economics literature has developed two things have
become eminently clear. The institutional environment that a decision-maker faces
affects the decision made. Secondly, institutional environments are not consistent over
geo-political boundaries or over time within a particular geo-political unit. Thus, as
institutions change, the decisions of self-interested decision-makers may also change.
This is because the incentives, both positive and negative, that these decision-makers face
change as the institutional environment changes. This further implies that as the
decisions change the resulting allocation of resources change. Thus different institutional
arrangements can result in different allocations even if identical decision-makers, under
the different institutional arrangements, commence with a common endowment to take to
the market. The allocation of resources that an economy will ultimately arrive at will
reflect both the individual actions of agents in the market and the collective action of
these individuals in determining the institutional structure.
3.3.1 Government Policy and Incentives
In Saskatchewan not only does the incentive for under investment associated with
the free rider problem affect the amount of available habitat, but government policies can
also have an effect. The Gross Revenue Insurance Plan and the grain transportation
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subsidy under the Western Grain Transportation Act both had negative effects on
habitat prior to their repeals. This is because the rational economic agent is going to
make land use decisions based on the costs and benefits that the agent actually sees. This
can be exhibited by considering a landowner facing the decision of whether or not to
place native short grass prairie under cultivation as wheat land. The landowner, as a
perfect competitor, will make his production decision based on marginal cost pricing.
That is, the landowner will want to cultivate only the number of acres necessary to give
him the quantity of wheat such that the marginal cost ofproducing the last acre of wheat
is equal to the price he actually receives for it at his farm gate. As the price that the
farmer receives is the world price less the basis, which includes transportation cost, for
any given world price the farm gate price in the absence of the transportation subsidy is
going to be lower than the farm gate price in the presence of the subsidy by the amount of
the subsidy. Hence, removal of the subsidy lowers farm gate price and, for a marginal
cost pricer, will lower the optimal quantity of the good produced, and thus lower the
demand for the factors ofproduction necessary to produce the good. In the example of
wheat one of those factors is land. Thus, in the absence of a transportation subsidy, short
grass prairie is less likely to be put under cultivation.
The case for the Gross Revenue Insurance Program is even simpler to see. For
payment of a premium the Program would guarantee premium payers a contracted
quantity of production at a contracted price. This essentially establishes a return floor for
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any particular piece of ground. Given the relatively generous nature of the program, land
would have to have been pretty poor before a rational agent would opt not to cultivate it.
3.3.2 The Example of a Transportation Subsidy
Graphically, for a transportation subsidy, this is shown in figure 3.3, by taking a
production function for a composite field crop, Q, as a function of land, L, and some
other composite input, X, such that Q = f(L,X). Assuming that the producer is a perfect
competitor yields a flat price line, p, that is anyone producer cannot affect the price.
Allowing then for an institutional change, removing a transportation subsidy, drops the
price to Pl. The removal of the subsidy shifts the amount of the composite field crop
produced from QI to Q2. Making the standard assumption that rL > 0, suggests that the
amount of land dedicated to composite field crop production after removal of the subsidy,
L2, must be less than the amount of land used for production of the composite field crop
while the subsidy is in place, LI. These results can be fairly simply generalized
mathematically using a Muth model (Gardner (1987)). It bears notice that following the
abandonment of GRIP and the transportation subsidy under the Western Grain
Transportation Act, Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food reports that pasture acreage in
the Province of Saskatchewan has increased by over three hundred thousand acres
between 1991 and 1996 (Agricultural Statistics (1996)).
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Figure 3.3 The Effect of the Removal of a Transportation Subsidy on Land Use
Decisions.
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A more direct way to consider the same phenomena is eXhibited in figure 3.4. At
the equilibrium where the value of the marginal product from using land for agriculture,
VMPA, equals the value of the marginal product from using land for habitat, VMPH, the
social optimum, L*, divides the total amount of land available into the optimal levels of
habitat and agricultural land necessary for sustainable human existence. PA and PH are the
price of land used for agriculture and habitat respectively. Introducing a transportation
subsidy for agricultural products increases the price of those products and shifts the
VMPA curve up and to the right to VMPAI • This shift generates the new suboptimal
division of available land between agriculture and habitat, L1, which has more
agricultural land and less habitat then L*.
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Figure 3.4 Effect on the Allocation of Land Between Agricultural and Habitat Uses
of Introducing a Transportation Subsidy on Agricultural Products
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3.3.3 An Example of Changing Property Rights
The manner in which the state decides to define and protect property rights can
have a huge effect on the manner in which land use decisions are made. The free rider
problem observed earlier is a classic example of this. If the property rights regime were
structured to allow landowners to extract from the free riders the value of the marginal
product of habitat would increase, and more habitat would be created.
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Consider Figure 3.5 where the original equilibrium, L1, divides the total amount
of land available into some suboptimal levels of habitat and agricultural land. Where PA
and PH are the price of land used for agriculture and habitat respectively. Now enact a
new property rights regime that allows landowners to extract the benefits that others gain
from his or her investment in habitat. This essentially increases the price ofhabitat and
shifts the VMPH curve up and to the left to VMPH·. This shift generates the new optimal
division ofavailable land between agriculture and habitat, L·, which has less agricultural
land and more habitat then L1•
Thus, economic theory suggests two different causes that underlie the habitat loss
driven endangered species problem. The first is, of course, the lack of institutional
structures to address the free rider's disincentive to invest in a public good, or the
property rights problem. The second and perhaps broader contributor being, the
incentives to convert habitat to agricultural land inherent in the existing and recent
institutional structures. It would seem that a policy bundle intended to solve the
endangered species problem that ignores these two causes will be ofquestionable
efficiency. Put at its simplest the problem is not merely one ofeconomics or one of the
laws of Canada, but is one generated out of the feedback effects between the two. That
is, the market solution will be driven by the underlying legal structure, while at the same
time decisions respecting responses to the underlying legal structure will be made by
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Figure 3.5 Effect on the Allocation of Land Between Agricultural and Habitat Uses
of Changing Property Rights to Allow Landowners to Extract Others Benefits
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individual agents on utility optimizing criterion. Thus, a grasp ofboth the economics and
the underlying legal structure will allow a more complete understanding ofthe problem.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE UNITED STATES' EXPERIMENT IN LEGISLATIVELY PROTECTING
ENDANGERED SPECIES FROM A THEORETICAL POINT OF VIEW
4.1 A Model of Implementation
The perceived problems with the Act, respecting implementation and compliance,
highlighted above can be predicted by existing economic theory. The explanation of why
individual decision-makers may chose not to obey the law can be enhanced by examining
jurisprudence and some of the other social sciences.
4.1.1 The Theory of Transaction Cost Politics
The transaction costs paradigm differs from the neoclassical, and thus, the
rationale for North's claim becomes evident:
Rational choice models in politics have applied the basic assumptions of
neoclassical economic theory to politics. Those assumptions include
instrumental rationality and the notion (usually implicit) of efficient
markets. I believe that the uncritical acceptance of both of these
assumptions has led political theory astray. A transaction costs theory of
politics is built on the assumptions of costly information, of subjective
models on the part of the actors to explain their environment, and of
imperfect enforcement of agreements. Choices employing such models
result in high political transaction costs that make political markets very
imperfect, I believe that modifying the standard rational choice model by
incorporating into it transaction cost theory can substantially increase the
explanatory power of the model and make more sense out of the political
markets we observe. (North (1990): 335 footnotes omitted)
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North proceeds to examine what a rational choice model of the democratic
poli~ical process might look like and advances the idea he called transaction costs
politics.
Transaction costs are the costs of measuring and enforcing agreements. In
economies, what are measured are the valuable attributes of goods and
services or the performance of agents; enforcement consists of the costs
associated with realizing the terms ofexchange. Measurement consists of
the physical and property right dimensions to goods and services and the
performance characteristics of agents. While measurement can frequently
be costly, the physical dimensions have objective characteristics (size,
weight, color, etc.) and the property rights dimensions are defined in legal
terms. Competition plays a critical role in reducing enforcement costs.
The judicial system provides coercive enforcement. Even so economic
markets throughout history and in the present world are frequently very
imperfect, beset by high transaction costs and defmed by institutions that
produce incentives that work against economic efficiency. Indeed,
creating markets is the key issue to creating productive economies.
Political markets are far more prone to inefficiency. The reason is
straight forward. It is extraordinarily difficult to measure what is being
exchanged in political markets and in consequence to enforce agreements.
(North (1990): 362)
Dixit expands upon North's idea of transaction costs politics in a manner
particularly relevant to the issues addressed in this study. Dixit postulates that the
relationship between citizen, legislator and bureaucratic regulator is a multi-task multi-
principal agent relationship. As the name suggests Dixit put forth a model in which an
agent (agency) is charged with multiple tasks, say listing endangered species, protecting
the habitat of listed species, and enforcing the Act. While carrying out these multiple
tasks the agent is, at least in some sense, answerable to several potentially different
principals. These principals could include Congress, the executive branch, the general
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public, various interest groups, and perhaps even the press. Each of these potential
principals may have divergent if not contradictory goals.
In the case of a single principal, Dixit's approach is built upon the premise that
the world is one that conforms to the transaction costs paradigm. This has two important
consequences. First, the decision-makers are boundedly rational and opportunistic.
Second, information is imperfect, costly and asymmetrically distributed. This, of course,
suggests that while any player can understand and optimize his or her ex ante position
that this is not necessarily true ofhis or her ex post position. It further suggests that there
may exist other players who not only have a better knowledge as to the ex post result of
an ex ante decision by a particular player, but that they may, in fact, have the ability to
affect the ex post position of the fust player to that player's detriment and to their
advantage. This is particularly the case if the players with the superior information have
the ability to respond to the initiatives of the players with the inferior information.
Dixit's model explicitly assumes that the tasks the agent faces at least partially compete
for the agent's time and effort and that the priorities of the principal and the agent
diverge. Dixit suggests, as possible sources for such divergence, that the parties have
different concepts of the type of effort a task requires or that new tasks may have lower
value to an existing agency in terms of its original mission (Dixit (1996): 96).
The principal's problem then becomes arriving at an incentive structure that
prompts the agent to behave in the manner desired by the principal. That is, the principal
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must design a system of penalties and payoffs which make it in the agent's best interest to
pursue the principal's desires.
The first question to address is: What is the nature of the incentives available?
Dixit observes:
Even in economic contexts, rewards or penalties may be financial
or nonmonetary. The former category must be interpreted broadly to
include career concerns, that is, future material rewards as well as the
immediate payoff; similarly, a broad interpretation ofnonmonetary
incentives includes status, power, and job satisfaction. In political
contexts the nonfinancial aspects are likely to be more important than in
economics, Even with this understanding, however, it is commonly
observed that incentives for policy makers are quite low powered; the
marginal rewards for producing an outcome of greater value to society, or
the marginal penalties for doing worse, are generally a very low
percentage of the value added or lost. A bureaucrat in the Office of
Management and Budget, or an international trade negotiator, can take
actions that benefit or hurt the economy to the tune ofbillions of dollars,
but the effect on his own compensation, monetary or otherwise, is at most
a very tiny fraction of this. Much ofthe commonly held belief that
political processes and institutions cope poorly with agency problems can
be attributed to the low power of their incentives. (Dixit (1996): 94-95)
Dixit then goes on to observe that the choice of incentives schemes is going to be
a function of how observable the different inputs and outputs of the system are, and ofthe
difference in values. That is, the lesser the degree of informational asymmetry between
the principal and the agent the easier the agent will be to control. In support of these
observations Dixit offers the following example:
An example close to home will make the point clear, University
professors have two tasks, teaching and research. The output ofresearch
is relatively easily measurable in terms ofprestigious publication and
citations; that of teaching is more nebulous because the real effects are
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long term, and the students' evaluations have their own biases. If the
university considered each task and its incentives in isolation, it would
recognize the different precisions of information and set up a high-
powered reward scheme for research and a low-powered one for teaching;
but that would induce professors to divert effort away from teaching and
into research. Therefore, considering the two together, the university is
forced to reduce the power of its scheme for rewarding research.7[7. A
better solution may be greater specialization among universities. Some
can place more emphasis and reward on research, while others concentrate
on teaching; then, each will attract the type of students who value its
favored activity relatively more highly. In the context of politics, such
specialization is not be[sic] feasible for national governments, although it
may be for localities within a country.]
Now introduce a third activity, outside consulting, that is primarily
of value to the professor rather than to the university. If the reward
schemes for teaching and research are low-powered for the reasons
explained above, the teachers will divert their effort into consulting. The
university could cope with this by increasing the power of the incentives
for teaching and research together, but that would be a costly alternative
because teaching effort is not easily observable. ... The university
therefore instead prohibits consulting, or at least restricts the time allowed
for it. Some consulting will be allowed if that makes it easier to ensure
that the professor gets enough utility from the whole bundle ofactivities to
be willing to work for the university, that is, to satisfy the professor's
individual rationality (participation) constraint. But this calculation will
involve comparing the average product of consulting time and marginal
reward for teaching and research. A full social optimum would equate the
marginal product of the two. This departure from the ideal is the
unavoidable cost of the informational asymmetry in this case. (Dixit
(1996): 96-97)
As an aside, it might be thought that firing is the ultimate high-power incentive. One
need only consider Dixit's example above and consider how difficult it is to fire a tenured
professor, to see that the power offrring as an incentive becomes suspect.
Now to aggravate an intractable problem, what happens if an agent faces multiple
principals? If the principals have a common goal the problem remains essentially the
same. Should the principal's goals be divergent, the agent would be expected to play one
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principal off against the other. Unless, of course, one principal can punish the agent for
doing another principal's bidding. In this case the principals have no incentive to offer
the agent anything but low-power incentives, as high-power incentives, such as a
monetary bribe, could be taxed from the agent by the other principal (Dixit (1996): 99-
100). This follows because the first principal is not likely to be prepared to enrich the
other principal through the agent if he can buy off the other principal directly at a lower
cost, since the agent will not be taking a cut. It is clear that if Dixit is correct that several
things are going to be required before one will see anything but low-powered incentives.
The tie between effort and results on the part of the agent are going to have to be known
and the results are going to have to be relatively easily discernible, else the principal has
no reason to offer the incentive. Why would anyone pay for something they do not have
to pay for, or why would they pay for something if they can not tell if it was delivered.
The second requirement is that the other principal(s) not be readily able to ascertain the
tie between the ultimate result and the original principal's high-powered incentive, or if
they can perceive of the tie that they be unable to punish the agent. Thus, the theory,
incidentally, provides a rationale for the prohibition on bribery, at least as far as it exists
as an exploitation of informational asymmetry.
4.1.2 The Predictions Respecting the Act
In a modem constitutional democracy such as the United States, or in Canada, it is
clear that only, in the immediate pre-election period, are members of the electorate
principals. It is'equally clear that only those members of the bureaucracy engaged in
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policy implementation and enforcement, and in no way involved in policy formation, thus
lower level bureaucrats, are agents and purely agents, save when they act as principals in
their guise as electors. It is also clear that it is not necessary to further exacerbate the
problem by including the numerous permutations ofpotential principal agent
relationships to see that the model predicts the rise ofpoliticization within regulatory
decision making. The low level bureaucrat may well be able to avoid the politicization,
but the minute that one becomes a principal in one relationship and an agent in another,
within the same structure, one it seems is, by definition, in a political environment. This
becomes clear when you consider that the paradigm role reverser in the system is the
elected official, who is also the ultimate political figure in the structure. The level of
politicization is, of course, going to shift as you move up the bureaucratic ladder.
Scarcity of resources is, in some sense, a complaint that can be leveled against
any rational choice model. If resources are sufficient to meet all competing ends then
choice, whether rational or otherwise does not arise. That is, if resources are sufficient to
accomplish everything why would everything not be accomplished? When, however,
scarce, resources are to be allocated by the state on public policy grounds, where there is
even the least divergence in public opinion over the correct allocation of those resources,
there will be those who feel that the allocation chosen was incorrect. Consider as an
example the American budgetary process. Assume that Congress is an agent whose
payoff is reelection. Further assume it has one million dollars, which can go to protecting
endanger species, or to the military, or it can be divided in some manner between
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environmental protection and the military. Alternatively Congress can raise taxes so that
it spend a million on each. Assume, further, that the general public, as principals, is
divided into thirds, one-third in favor of all the money going for protection, one-third
want all the money to go to the military, one-third does not want taxes raised. Next
assume that the public will vote in accordance to their preference, if Congress complies
with their desires they will vote for them, ifnot against them. Whatever Congress should
choose to do at a minimum one-third of the electorate is going to be displeased with their
allocation and not vote for them. Granted, this example abstracts from Dixit's transaction
costs postulates, however the adage that everyone cannot be pleased all the time will
continue to hold, although less strongly once you allow the players in the game to cheat,
steal and lie, and throw in detection problems.
Several implementation problems flow from, or are perhaps evidence of, bounded
rationality. Imprecision can flow from at least two sources. The first is lack of
knowledge. The second is the wish to afford a future opportunity for opportunistic
behavior, to equivocate if you will. Both flow out ofbounded rationality. Lack of
information is by definition bounded rationality. With regard to opportunities for
opportunistic behavior, under all ofDixit's assumptions, a legislator can choose at time A
to support a particular piece of legislation phrased in a·particular manner. At time B, the
credibility of that legislator's claim that the occurrence or the interpretation of the
legislation that has angered some group or the other was not what he intended, can only
be enhanced the more imprecise the language adopted at time A. As informational
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asymmetry makes it difficult to assess the validity of the legislator's claim, imprecision
should be expected. An analogous argument can be made for the granting of discretion.
Why take the blame if you can pass it on to someone else, particularly someone with
greater technical knowledge than you possess.
The manner in which uncertainty is discounted and to a lesser extent the unit of
protection, are also to be expected from bounded rationality. Beginning with units of
protection, the agent legislator's claim will be that species by species, with the
accompanying ecosystem for each species was, at the time, the best expert advice
available. It will likely also be observed that since this is a current professional dispute,
who is Congress to intervene. It must be recalled, that this is also the result of a political
process, and as such a compromise of sorts, which returns us to the notion ofpleasing
everyone. The method used to discount the future is a technical issue subject to highly
technical professional disagreement. These sorts of debates become rooted in a lack of
knowledge. The best way to determine who has the correct manner of discounting events
over the next century is to wait a hundred years and see who comes closest. This is,
unfortunately, not an available option when the decision must be made today. The
determination of the sufficiency ofhabitat protection and the adequacy of the recovery
planning process, also suffer from lack ofknowledge.. While there is general agreement
that matters appear to be getting worse, just how much worse and what is the best method
of correcting the situation appear to be questions over which reasonable, informed people
have sincere and sometimes profound differences of opinion. Again, some ofthese
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debates, particularly questions such as what is adequate or sufficient, have fallen and
continue to fall into the political arena.
Undue attention to high profile species falls straight from Dixit's discussion of
incentives. Politicians and bureaucrats alike are going to, if they are given a choice,
dedicate their time and energy to those things that the citizens care the most about. It is
the electorate, after all, that pay the salaries of both politicians and bureaucrats (Dixit
(1996): 96).
Finally, inadequate interagency consultation is a necessary corollary to Dixit's
discussion of incentives. Boundedly rational opportunistic individuals will desire to hog
the glory, sharing only the blame.
After Tennessee Valley Authority v Hill insufficient consideration ofeconomic
factors became certain, frankly, it became mandated because ofthe dicta in that decision.
This has become an implementation problem in two senses: first it affects compliance
decisions, second it will further tend to politicize the system. Implementation ofpolicy
without regard to the economic well being of the citizens is going to cause problems.
Given the politicization of the system that the model predicts, any senior bureaucrat in
any democratic country is going to be hesitant to implement policy that adversely affects
the well being of the voters to whom his or her political masters answer.
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While the models addressed above deal effectively with Clark's view of most of
the problems associated with implementation of the Act, they fail to address the problem
of compliance. Compliance might be one of the least understood areas of study of human
decision making.
4.2 A Model of Compliance
4.2.1 The Theory
That the mere passing of legislation is not sufficient to insure general compliance
with that legislation may not be self evident. In the Concept of Law, H. L. A. Hart sets
forth the notion of humans as internalists who obey the law essentially because it is the
law, and externalists who obey the law, if they obey it at all, from fear of sanction, either
from the community or by the law itself (Hart (1961): 86-88).
From Hart it becomes clear that if the external pressures are not severe enough the
externalist may not obey the law. Gary Becker casts the question of compliance in terms
of costs and benefits. Becker says:
The approach taken here follows the economists' usual analysis of
choice and assumes that a person commits an offense if the expected
utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and other
resources at other activities. Some persons become "criminals," therefore,
not because their basic motivation differs from that ofother persons, but
because their benefits and costs differ (Becker (1974): 9)
That is, Becker would have an individual faced with the choice of complying with or
breaking the law, conduct a cost benefit analysis and act in accordance with the results of
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that analysis. Specifically, the individual will calculate his expected utility from
breaching the law, which is equal to the utility he expects to gain from acting illegally
less the utility he must surrender in order to act illegally (Le. what it actually cost him to
perform the illegal act) less the expected utility lost due to detection and the consequent
liability. The expected utility lost due to detection and liability is the probability of
detection times the utility lost by being held liable, assuming that liability automatically
follows detection. Thus, if the expected utility of breaking the law is positive one will
break the law, if it is negative one will comply and if it is zero one will be indifferent
between the two outcomes. This is, of course, the idea that underpins the theory of
efficient breach in contract law. If the potential damage award one faces for breaching
the contract is less than the potential losses one will face by performing the contract one
will breach the contract. If however, the award exceeds the losses one will perform.
Unfortunately, the world is only this simple a place if the costs and the benefits
are properly accounted for. There exists some work, both theoretical and empirical that
suggest there may be a gain to an individual to act in a socially responsible manner.
Arrow has observed:
Thus there are two types of situation in which the simple rule of
maximizing profits is socially inefficient: the case in which costs are not
paid for, as in pollution, and the case in which the seller has considerably
more knowledge about his product than the buyer. (Arrow (1973): 309)
The two cases have come to be known in the economic literature as externalities and
information asymmetry, respectively. Arrow then goes on to conclude that should firms
or individuals act in a socially responsible manner and thus not maximize profits or
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utility, by not taking advantage of their superior knowledge or limiting their pollution
disc,harges, there is a net gain which can be distributed throughout society. Arrow does
not suggest that this sort of action will arise out of altruism. In fact, he says:
Now I've said that ethical codes are desirable. It does not follow that they
will come about. An ethical code is useful only if it is widely accepted.
Its implications for specific behavior must be moderately clear, and above
all it must be clearly perceived that the acceptance of these ethical
obligations by everybody does involve mutual gain (Arrow (1973): 315).
Should such a code be generally honored there is an advantage to anyone firm to cheat.
As Arrow observes:
The code may be of value to the running of the system as a whole, it may
be of value to all firms if all firms maintain it, and yet it will be to the
advantage ofanyone firm to cheat - in fact the more so, the more other
firms are sticking to it (Arrow (1973): 315).
The question then becomes why, or more specifically under what conditions, will a frrm
not cheat. From game theory it can be shown that in an infmitely repeated game where
the other player(s) have the ability to punish the cheater that the cooperative (non-
cheating) equilibrium prevails (Varian (1992): 270-271, Friedman (1990): 156-157).
Thus, reputation, if you will, matters, at least in theory. In questions of compliance with
the law, this suggest that it may be in one's long run best interest to forego a short run
gain obtainable through non-compliance and comply with the law in order to preserve
reputation. Therefore, when the decision to comply is made these sorts of long run costs
should be included in the cost benefit accounting.
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler empirically examined the question ofpunishment
of cheating and found that 68% oftheir urban Canadian sample would incur the
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additional expense of five minutes travel time to avoid dealing with a pharmacy that took
advantage of temporary market power, and that 69% of their sample would incur the
same cost to avoid a pharmacy they believed was discriminating against its elderly
employees (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986): 736). In the same study they also
concluded that there exists some form of community standard as to what is unfair
behavior for retailers in price setting and in their dealings with their employees. They
note that such standards are likely to vary in specifics across communities (Kahneman,
Knetsch and Thaler (1986): 737).
Community standards of fairness could be expected to affect the cost benefit
analysis to determine the question of compliance with law. If the law is perceived in the
community to be unfair it is conceivable that the reputational effects ofbreaking that law
will be lessened. It is conceivable that those effects could be as Iowa zero, or, perhaps,
even positive. Being convicted for the illegal processing of salt does not appear to have
harmed Ghandi' s reputation, and, in fact, appears to have enhanced it.
While not dealing with fairness, per se, Tom Tyler, did a study, in Chicago, in
which he found statistically significant correlation between perceptions of the legitimacy
of authority and compliance with.it. That is, authority·that was perceived to be legitimate
was more likely to be complied with than authority that was not perceived as legitimate.
From this study Tyler conclude that normative values are more important in compliance
questions than was previously believed (Tyler (1990): 178). It would seem that
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perceptions of fairness would be one of those normative values which Tyler avers matter,
in questions ofcompliance.
4.2.2 The Predictions Respecting the Act
So what does that lead one to expect about compliance with the Endangered
Species Act, 1973? It seems unlikely that the community of landowners forced by the
public to bear the costs ofprotecting endangered species as they are under the Act would
view the Act fair. Species are listed without any reference to the economic consequences
of their listing. Once they are listed the presence of the species brings forth the various
protections available under the Act to the species, this includes the protection ofhabitat
and the ban on taking, even on private land. Thus, the presence ofa listed species on
private land constrains the uses that the owner of the land may make of the land. All
other things being equal this will deflate the price of the land; given two identical pieces
ofproperty, one with constrained uses one with unconstrained uses, which will a buyer
pay more for? Unless the purchaser gains utility from the species and the act of
protecting it, the answer is clearly the land with the unconstrained use. In addition it is
conceivable that the presence ofa listed species will alter the management systems
available for use on the property, requiring more costly management. Consider the case
of Wilton, New York where the presence of a listed butterfly required that the city's
mosquito control program adopt a more expensive chemical to avoid killing the
butterflies (Mann and Plummer (1996): 103). In effect the Act imposes an externality,
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free riders, upon landowners that have a listed species on their property. These
land~wners are in fact bearing the cost ofprotecting the listed species for the general
public. This is the mirror image ofan industrial externality were the few force the many
to bear the cost. Given that the "not in my backyard" opposition to any particular
development tends to base its arguments in terms of the unfairness to them of being
saddled with the externality would it be surprising that owners ofproperty on which a
listed species resides would believe themselves treated unfairly?
If in the landowning communities, the Act is perceived as unfair, the decision not
to comply is not likely to be affected by fairness or reputational concerns. Thus, it would
seem that the decision to comply is going to be based on the simple cost benefit analysis
proposed by Becker. The rational land owner is going to estimate the decrease of the
market value of the land, the additional management costs, if any, the cost of any
property damage that the listed species may inflict, that is things like stock or stored grain
losses; these costs would then be summed and discounted for the length of time that the
owner intended to hold the land. The expected utility of breaking the law, in monetary
terms, would be the net present value of these avoided costs, less the actual cost
measured in monetary terms ofbreaking the law. The actual costs ofbreaking the law
would include cash costs such as bullets or poison and· the time cost. The cost of
detection would be the probability of detection times the cost of the penalty as set out in
section 11 of the Act. Should one be incarcerated the cost will be the opportunity cost of
sitting in prison. In the event that one is an employee that would amount, at a minimum,
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to foregone wages, if one is self employed it would, at a minimum, be the cost of hiring
replacement labor. There may also be some incidental costs such as difficulty in
obtaining visas and government permits and perhaps even subsequent employment.
These costs would also be discounted.
The probability ofdetection will drive the compliance decision. It is potentially
very low, particularly in the rural United States. This can be hypothesized as the
expected case, because detection is a function ofmonitoring. Listed species are by
definition rare, consequently in order to monitor for their protection you have to know
where to find them. If one is dealing with members of the species that are unknown to
the authorities, it seems highly unlikely that they would know where to look. Secondly,
monitoring is expensive, it requires that the regulator have employees out in the
heartland, employees have to be paid and the heartland is vast area where strangers are
readily identified and the population may not be hospitable, thus potentially requiring
large numbers ofemployees to insure effective monitoring. If one is in the center of a
100 square mile western Montana ranch the odds that there is anyone within 5 miles of
you may well be pretty low. The chances that that person \vould work for the Fish and
Wildlife Service may well approach insignificant. Given the foregoing, economic theory
suggests that the rational landowner faced with the presence of a listed species has a large
incentive to shoot, shovel and shut up.
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As with the complaints leveled against the Act with respect to implementation the
theory expounded above explains why the compliance complaints leveled at the Act
might be expected. The question that must now be faced, as was pointed out earlier, is
the fitness of the Act as a model for the Bill, given the admittedly different institutional
structures in Canada and the United States.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE ACT AS A MODEL FOR THE BILL
5.1 The Policy Analyst's Problem
How can a policy analyst rationally analyze policy that has no track record to
facilitate the examination of the effects of the policy? Neo-classical welfare economics
essentially rates policies based on the amount ofdistortion between the neo-classical
perfectly competitive equilibrium and the equilibrium achieved with the policy in place
that achieves the policy goal. The tool used to rate the policy is the total available sum of
consumer and producer surplus. That is, the area above the supply curve, or in the case
of habit the marginal social cost curve, below the demand curve, or in the case of habitat
the marginal social benefit curve, and to the left of the equilibrium. The preferred policy
is the one that has the greatest total surplus, while achieving it at the lowest possible cost.
This will be the equilibrium point were the marginal social benefit of more habitat is
exactly equal to the cost at the margin that society must expend to achieve that last unit of
habitat. Thus, the preferred policy will be that policy that equates the marginal social
benefit ofhabitat to its marginal social cost.
This requires that a policy, to bear consideration, 'achieve its objectives. When
dealing with policy that has yet to be implemented the determination ofwhether or not
the policy will achieve its objective can pose a considerable: challenge. This challenge
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might be overcome, if a policy has been implemented elsewhere. This allows for an
examination of the policy, as implemented elsewhere, to ascertain its strengths and
weaknesses. The strengths and weaknesses can then be modeled. Proposed policies can
then be examined to ascertain whether or not they have the theoretical ability to take
advantage of the modeled strengths and address the modeled weaknesses in the policy
implemented elsewhere. Utilizing such a methodology requires that the analyst be
constantly vigilant in recognizing and accounting for the differences between where the
implemented policy was implemented and where the proposed policy is to be examined.
This caution is equally necessary when moving between problems within a polity, as it is
when looking at cross political jurisdiction solutions to identical problems, as will be
proposed here. The implemented policy, to be used as a model, shall be the United States
Endangered Species Act, 1973. It will, of course, always have to be recalled that the
Act is American legislation that is somewhat different than 1he Bill, and is intended to
operate under a different constitutional structure than the Bill.
5.2 A Comparison of Canada's and United States' Institutional Structures
That the United States and Canada have different institutional structures is
undeniable. The two countries have fundamentally different forms of government. The
United States is a federal republic. Canada is a federal constitutional monarchy. The
question that a policy analyst must address is the determination ofwhether or not there
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are sufficient similarities between these different constitutional arrangements to expect
similar responses from similar policies.
Both forms of government are essentially representative democracies. Both forms
of government claim to proceed from England's Glorious Revolution of 1688, and to be
based upon the liberal principals of the Enlightenment used to justify the Glorious
Revolution. This has come to mean that both forms of government are founded on
several key principals. These include, the Rule of Law, private property, that the citizen
has rights that are unassailable by the state, and eventually, the adoption of universal
adult suffrage.
The similarities do not end with the fact that both forms of government fmd their
origins in what is essentially liberal political theory. Both Canada and the United States
have relatively rigid written constitutions. Although, given its current amending formula,
Canada's is likely the more rigid. Both of these written constitutions contain
constitutional protection of the citizen from the state. The American Constitution has, of
coutse, the Bill of Rights, while Canada's has the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Both documents protect essentially the activities on the parts of the citizens, except for
the inclusion ofproperty in the Bill of Rights. The absence of a not withstanding clause,
and the introductory limitation of rights which imposes limits on rights that are
"prescribed by law and reasonably and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society", suggest that individual liberty was and continues to be taken more seriously by
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Americans than Canadians. The two countries also share a similar legal system, one
based largely on English Common Law, but both ofwhich have been influenced by
European Law, because of the presence of former non-English colonies within the
borders of the current nation states. These legal systems hold the courts as the fmal
arbitrators of inter citizen disputes, of all constitutional questions, both those that relate to
the division of constitutional powers between the two levels of government within the
respective federations and between the citizens and the state with regards to the state's
ability to infringe upon the citizens' liberty, and finally with the courts' supervisory role
over inferior tribunals based upon the prerogative writs under English Law, often referred
to as Administrative Law. It bears notice that the American Courts generally have
friendlier public interest standing rules than we have in Canada. In as far as standing
with respect to endangered species protection is concerned the Bill by section 60
essentially grants public interest standing. These similarities seem to suggest differences
between the two forms of government are more matters of form than principle from the
perspective of a decision-maker facing existing policy.
With a majority government, in Canada, relying on party discipline the clearest
example of the difference in form between the two governments is where power to
regulate rests. In Canada at both the federal and provincial levels of government power
lies in cabinet. In the United States it is split between the legislative and the executive
branches, again at both the national and the state level. In both countries the courts have
supervisory roles, but can only act on the complaint that regulation is, for whatever
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reason, ultra virus, that is beyond the ·power of the government that made it. Thus when
enacting endangered species protection legislation the differences in form, while they can
be of extreme importance in other areas such as: who can do what; who do special
interest groups lobby or how do special interest groups have to structure their law suits to
get something done, do not appear to present any compelling reason to reject the Act as a
model for the Bill. Once the policy is in place a decision-maker in either country faces
ultimate enforcement of the policy through markedly similar judicial systems.
That there are also differences in the latitudes of the courts to favor the citizen
over the state is equally clear. These differences render no more a compelling reason to
reject the Act as a model for the Bill than does the difference in form. The American
Constitution, as was observed earlier, protects private property, which the Canadian
Constitution does not. The American Constitution also places greater limits on the state
in its relations with an individual than the Canadian Constitution does. Given the
acceptance of the Act by the United States Supreme Court in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill (98 S.C.R. 2279 (1978)), it would seem that there remains no reason,
except perhaps division of powers questions, to expect the Canadian courts to reject a
piece of legislation similar to the Act. That is, if the level of interference with individual
property and liberty that the Act affords the American "government is acceptable in the
United States there is no reason to suppose that similar legislation should offend
individual liberty in Canada with its more restrictive protections of individual liberty,
provided of course that the Government of Canada has the. authority under the division of
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powers to enact the legislation. Given the dicta of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v
Hydro Quebec ([1977] 3SCR 213), the division of powers question also becomes moot.
In this decision both the majority and the dissent agreed that the criminal law power
under s. 92 (27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 was broad enough to allow the federal
government to enumerate and legislate against crimes against the environment. As then
Chief Justice Lamer said in dissent with the concurrence of Sopinka, Iacabucci and
Major JJ.:
That being said, we wish to add that none of this should be read as
foredooming future attempts by Parliament to create an effective national
-or, indeed intemational- strategy for the protection ofthe environment.
We agree with La Forest J. that achieving such a strategy is a public
purpose of extreme importance and one of the major challenges of our
time. There are, in this regard, many measures open to Parliament which
will not offend the division ofpowers set out by the Constitution, notably
the creation ofenvironmental crimes. Nothing in our view prevents
Parliament from outlawing certain kinds ofbehaviour on the basis that
they are hannful to the environment. But such legislation must actually
seek to outlaw this behaviour, not merely regulate it (para 61).
Clearly, the creation ofenvironmental crimes is within the legislative competence
of the Government of Canada. The question then becomes, what is a crime? Mr. Justice
La Forest of the Supreme Court of Canada said, in R. J. R. MacDonald Inc. v The
Attorney General of Canada:
Given the "amorphous" nature ofhealth as a constitutional matter,
and the resulting fact that Parliament and the provincial legislatures may
both validly legislate in this area, it is important to emphasize once again
the plenary nature of the criminal law power. In the Margarine Reference,
supra, at pp. 49-50, Rand J. made it clear that the protection of "health" is
one of the "ordinary ends" served by the criminal law, and that the
criminal law power may validly be used to safeguard the public from any
"injurious or undesirable effect". The scope ofthe federal power to create
criminal legislation with respect to health matters is broad, and is
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circumscribed only by the requirements that the legislation must contain a
prohibition accompanied by a penal sanction and must be directed at a
legitimate public health evil. If a given piece of federal legislation contains
these features, and if that legislation is not otherwise a "colourable"
intrusion upon provincial jurisdiction, then it is valid as criminal law; see
Scowby, supra, at pp. 237-38.
As I have indicated, it is clear that this legislation is directed at a
public health evil and that it contains prohibitions accompanied by penal
sanctions. Is it colourable? In my view, it is not. Indeed, it is difficult to
conceive what Parliament's purpose could have been in enacting this
legislation apart from the reduction of tobacco consumption and the
protection ofpublic health. If Parliament's underlying purpose or intent
had been to encroach specifically upon the provincial power to regulate
advertising, it would surely have enacted legislation applying to
advertising in more than one industry. Similarly, if Parliament's intent had
been to regulate the tobacco industry as an industry, and not merely to
combat the ancillary health effects resulting from tobacco consumption,
then it would surely have enacted provisions that relate to such matters as
product quality, pricing and labour relations (paras 32-33).
Thus, the federal government can enact valid criminal law provided it enacts a
prohibition accompanied by a penal sanction and directed at some legitimate public harm,
without being a veiled attempt to usurp provincial legislative competence. That is, it
cannot be colourable. Would the Bill have been able to meet this criterion? The
preamble speaks eloquently of the value ofwildlife and ecosystems and implicitly of the
costs of losing them. The Bill, by its preamble sets out the harm it is meant to avoid.
The Bill establishes a list ofprohibitions, sections 31 though 33. It establishes penal
sanctions, 77 through 99. The first part of La Forest's test seems established. Is it
colourable? The Bill's effect upon private property under provincial jurisdiction is
limited to those situations where the residence of a transboundry endangered species is
actually present on the property, section 33. If the Federal Government's intent in
proposing the Bill had been to regulate the use of private property in the Provinces, surely
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as La Forest, J. observes about the tobacco legislation, they would have found a less hit
or miss way to go about it. A scheme that relies upon the existence of the residence of
an endangered species, does not lead to particularly predictable effects upon property
uses in the Provinces if the intent was other than to protect those spec'ies. Thus, it would
appear that the Bill should have been able to withstand a constitutional challenge based
on the legislative competence ofthe Government of Canada to enact it.
5.3 The Canadian Endangered Species Act
The Bill uses a listed species criterion similar to the Act. The Bill mandates that
if a species, which is defined to include subspecies, is on the best biological evidence, as
determined by the Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada
(COSEWIC) (Bill s. 13), in danger of extinction or extirpation that the species will be
listed. The Bill allows for five classifications in listing, based upon the level of risk that
the species face, these include: extinct, extirpated, endangered, threatened or vulnerable
(Bill s. 18). By section 30, once a determination of the status of a species is made by
COSEWIC it falls to Cabinet on the advice of the Minister to amend the endangered
species list or not. Once listed the species receive the protections enumerated under the
Bill. These protections include protection from killing, harming and harassing, it is an
offence under the Bill to possess a listed species or any of its body parts, and finally its
habitat is protected, if that habitat is located on federally owned or regulated land (s. 31-
32), and on private land under the appropriate circumstances (s. 33). Much of the
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publicly expressed concern over the Bill tends to arise out of its potential applicability to
priv~te property. The Bill only affects private property, by section 33 of the Bill, if the
residence of a cross international boundary migratory species, or a species whose range
crosses an international boundary is located on private property. The listed species is
protected under this scheme but the only habitat protected is the residence of the listed
species. The debate about the applicability of the Bill to private property seems to be
centered on how broadly the word "residence" is likely to be interpreted by the courts,
and how wide a latitude the courts will be prepared to grant under section 33 of the Bill,
for a species to be defmed as migratory and thus subjecting private property to the Bill.
Should these terms be defmed broadly enough they will impose a substantial externality
upon private landowners in the same manner that the Act imposes an externality on
private landowners in the United States.
Section 33 of the Bill reads:
33. The Minister may make regulations prohibiting any person from
(a) willfully killing, harming, harassing, capturing or taking an
individual of a wildlife animal species, other that one mentioned
in paragraph 3(1)(a) or (b), ifCOSEWIC
(i) has determined that the species migrates across an
international boundary of Canada or has a range extending
across such a boundary, and
(ii) has designated the species as an·endangered or threatened
species, or
(b) knowingly engaging in activities that damage or destroy the
residence of the individual
Before making the regulations, the Minister must consult the
provincial minister of each province in which the regulation will
apply.
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On the face of section 33 it is clear that the majority of animal species at risk in
Saskatchewan, such as whooping cranes, swift foxes, burrowing owls and black footed
ferrets (if there are in fact any left in the province) fall within one of the two parameters
of migratory, either they cross the border with the United States or their range extends
across the border. Consequently, it will depend upon the interpretation of residence to
determine how private land in Saskatchewan will be affected by the Bill.
The Bill's statutory dictionary defmes residence as:
"residence" means a specific dwelling place, such as a den, nest or other
similar area habitually occupied by an individual during all or part of its
life cycle.
If the courts should interpret residence as anything broader than the actual physical place
where the listed species actually lives, be that a hole in the ground or a nest in a tree for
example, the potential for imposing an externality on private landowners increases. An
interpretation of such breadth clearly strains the literal meaning of the words of the
definition. An argument in support of a broader interpretation is possible. Such an
argument would be have to rely on being able to convince a court that Parliament must
have intended that the individual member of the listed species have a sufficient amount of
protected space to insure its survival, as opposed to its· mere actual physical home. The
argument would have to be based on the idea that the whole scheme ofthe Bill is to
protect listed species. It would then have to be argued that it is nonsensical to suppose
that Parliament would protect the beast's burrow while allowing it to starve to death. The
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argument has been made that protecting the home and allowing the species to starve was
what was done by the United States Federal Court, ninth circuit, in the case of the
northern spotted owl. Prior to the listing of the owl under the Act in 1990 there was a
substantial amount of litigation launched by environmental groups to protect the owls and
their habitat from logging activities in the Pacific Northwest (see for example Portland
Audubon Society v Lujan (712 F. Supp 1456 (D. Or.), Portland Audubon Society v Lujan
(884 F. 2nd 1233 (9th Cir. C of A) or Portland Audubon Society v Hodel (866 F. 2nd 302
(9th Cir. C of A)). Much of this litigation was surrounded with interlocutory injunctions
restraining logging in areas around known nesting pairs of owls. One such injunction,
apparently in an unreported interlocutory motion surrounding the Hodel litigation,
restrained logging within 2.1 miles of the nest of a nesting pair, this suggests just under
14 square miles of protected old growth forest or just under 9000 acres. The acreage
protected by this injunction was above the low median range of 1411 acres reported by
Yaffe (1994), but below the high median range of 14,271 acres Yaffe (1994) reports.
Thus it appears that there is room to argue that American courts have established
precedents that fail to protect sufficient habitat for survival of the species, however the
decisions were not made under the Act, they did protect some habitat and were related to
Federal Forests managed by the Bureau of Land Management. Which interpretation the
Courts ultimately adopt may be a moot point.
If private landowners are boundedly rational, opportunistic decision makers, as
Williamson (1986) posits them, the mere fact that the argument can be made ex ante to
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any judicial decision may be sufficient to prompt those landowners to act to avoid the
risk of bearing the externality. That is, if landowners credibly believe that their land
could be affected by the Bill, should a listed species be present, they can be expected to
do what they can to avoid having the externality associated with the listed species fall
upon them. This is particularly the case since the landowners have vast knowledge
superiority over the regulators when it comes to knowing what is or is not living on their
land. This would suggest that there is a good chance that the Bill would have established
incentives perverse to its stated objectives much as the Act has. That is to say that there
seems to be little reason to reject the Act as a model for the Bill.
5.4 Testable Hypothesis Suggested
If the foregoing is correct it suggests several things that we should expect to be
able to see now. It also suggests several things that we can hypothesize as being critical
to ascertain the course of future events.
Dixit's model suggests that attempted solutions to the problem will become mired
in political debates. That this has occurred and continues to occur is self-evident. The
nature of the debate also flows quite readily out of Dixit. The debate does not revolve
around the policy goal itself, the protection ofendangered species, but rather centers on
how the goal is to be defined, achieved and on the allocation of the costs of achieving the
goal. That the debate has taken such a tone also adds credence to the argument that the
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underlying problem is one of free riders and accordingly property rights definition. The
previously noted increase in pasture acreage suggests that some merit in the observations
made above respecting the abandonment of grain and oil seed production subsidies.
The presence of the politicized debate over the goal ofprotecting endangered
species and the increase in pasture suggest testable hypothesis respecting the likelihood
of compliance with prohibitive policy to protect endangered species such as the Bill. As
was noted above attitudes related to the social and cash costs of conviction and the
likelihood of conviction all go into the mix in making the decision whether or not to
comply with a particular piece of legislation. Specifically, following Becker the higher
the benefits ofnon-compliance, the lower the social and cash cost of non-compliance
properly discounted by the probability of detection the less likely compliance. Thus if
these attitudes can be ascertained for a group such as land use decision makers it becomes
possible to arrive at a hypothesis respecting the likelihood of the groups compliance, this
hypothesis can then be compared to the hypothesis of noncompliance inherent in the
choice of the Act as a model for the Bill. These, of course, suggest hypotheses about
these attitudes. Specifically, if the theory is correct and if the Act is a valid model for the
Bill, the attitudes expressed should be a low perceived social cost accompanied by
perceptions of relatively low probabilities of detection~ It is also likely that individuals in
the test group would view the proposed legislation as unfair, and would expect their
neighbors to disregard it. The discussion of the discretion available to the Minister under
the endangered species protection provisions of the Saskatchewan Wildlife Act,
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contained in Chapter Seven, suggest that it is likely to be perceived as less intrusive than
the Bill. This hypothesis can also be tested.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE SURVEY
6.1 The Nature of the Questionnaire
The survey used a technique whereby the respondents were asked to select their
preference from a list of options contained in the questionnaire as opposed to a revealed
preference disclosure technique. While the literature clearly shows that a revealed
preference questionnaire is less likely to be biased than the technique used, the nature of
the information sought for this study made the use of revealed preference techniques
impractical. A copy of the survey questionnaire is attached as appendix C.
Questions one through fifteen and twenty-six and twenty-seven are designed to
acquire basic demographic and operation size data. Questions sixteen through twenty-
three are meant to test the hypothesis that the abandonment of the Western Grain
Transportation Act will lead to changes in the manner in which operations are
structured that will ultimately lead to improved habitat. Questions twenty-eight to thirty-
one and thirty-five to thirty-eight are used to elicit beliefs respecting the present existence
ofendangered species upon the landscape. Questions thirty-one and thirty-two, thirty-
nine and forty, and forty-five through forty-eight are meant to test perceptions of social
cost of unlawful behavior. Question thirty-four test attitudes respecting fairness.
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Questions forty-one through forty-four inquire into perceptions of the probability of
detection, as indirectly do questions forty-nine to fifty-one, which also query perceptions
of governmental commitment to endangered species protection. Questions fifty-two
through fifty-five examine the extent of a conservation ethic among participants, while.
questions fifty-six and fifty-seven ask participants to report their risk attitudes. Finally,
questions fifty-eight through sixty-two are essentially contingent valuation questions
meant to explore the respondents valuation of the opportunity cost of additional habitat.
The questionnaire was mailed to four hundred members of the Saskatchewan
Stock Growers Association. The four hundred were chosen by draw without replacement
from the membership list provided by the Association. Prior to the draw, the corporate,
government and academic membership were removed, leaving a pool of seven hundred
and eleven members, which were numbered from one through seven hundred and eleven.
From the numbers the draw was held. A list of the numbers drawn is attached as
appendix D. Of the 400 questionnaires mailed 90 responses were received, while the
question within those 90 responses that had the lowest response rate, garnered 63
responses.
6.2 Survey Results
Of the 90 respondents, 87 claimed to be the operation's principal decision maker;
while 83 reported to be male 3 respondents failed to respond to this question and four
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reported being female. The vast majority of the respondents, some 80 people reported
residing on their own operation. The distribution of the respondents by reported age is
shown in table 6.1.
<25
2
25-34
5
35-44
22
64-74
15
>75
5# Respondents
Source: Survey
Table 6.1 The Distribution of Respondents by Age
AGE GROUPS
55-64 45-54
14 28
As is clear from table 6.1, there is a skewed distribution age wise of the respondents.
This is consistent with other data that show an aging agricultural population in
Saskatchewan. Thirty respondents indicated that they raise stock other than cattle. Sixty-
two of the respondents reported doing some backgrounding, 29 reported some finishing,
and 3 reported some milking, with all of them milking fewer than 20 cows. Respondents
tended to be from larger operations, with 41 of the respondents reporting operations of
two hundred or more breeding head. The distribution ofrespondents by reported size of
breeding herd is shown in table 6.2.
Table 6.2 The Distribution of Respondents by Size of Breeding
Herd
<20
# Respondents 4
Source: Survey
# Breeding head
20-49 50-99
6 16
100-149
15
150-199
9
200-250
17
>250
24
Twenty-four respondents use PFRA community pastures. Government of Saskatchewan
community pastures use was reported by 18 of the respondents.
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Respondents were asked to use a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 was strongly disagree, 3
was indifference and 5 was strongly agree, to express their level of agreement to
statements respecting the presence of endangered species, the fairness of expecting land
owners to bear the cost of protecting endangered species, the likelihood of the Bill, if
passed, to affect their land. They were asked to use the same scale to address statements
respecting perceptions of social cost of noncompliance, about their beliefs respecting how
concerned government actually is, how they perceived the probability of conviction, the
likelihood of their neighbors complying and about how they think about the presence of
endangered species6.
The respondents weakly denied the presence ofendangered species on land
owned or rented by their operation, responding with a mean assessment of 2.8, however
the T-statistic, for the hypothesis that this mean was significantly different from 3, was
1.21. Similarly the mean response of 3.2 to the statement averring the possible presence
ofendangered species on land owned or rented by the respondents' neighbor was not
statistically significantly different from 3 given its T statistic of 1.36. The statement "I
feel that it is manifestly unfair to expect landowners to bear the cost ofprotecting
endangered species" had a mean of 4.3 and was strongly significant with a T statistic in
excess of 100. With both means equa14.3 and T statistics in excess of 100 the statements
suggesting that if passed the Bill will affect the respondents or the respondents neighbors
land was also strongly significant.
6 The T statistics reported throughout the remainder of this section test the null hypothesis that the mean
associated with the T statistic is equal to three. Rejection of this hypothesis means that the means are
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The statements respecting perceived social costs were intermixed throughout the
questionnaire, and all were structured such that indifference (3), agreement (4), or strong
agreement (5) is indicative of a perception of respectively lower sociciI costs associated .
with noncompliance with the Bill, should it become law. For example a mean response
indicating indifference to or agreement with the statement: "I would invite a convicted
poacher to my or my child's wedding" is taken to indicate that in general society does not
hold the illegal killing ofanimals in contempt, and thus will not shun a poacher or impose
any other significant social costs on a poacher. Incidentally this statement was the only
one of the social cost question that had a mean less than 3. However, with a T statistic of
1.16 the hypothesis that the mean of 2.8 is different than 3 cannot be rejected neither can
the hypothesis that the 3.0 mean accompanying the statement" I would accept an
invitation to the wedding ofa convicted poacher" is different from 3 be rejected, as the T
statistic associated with the hypothesis was 0.15. The avowal, that if the respondents'
neighbors feel it to be in their best interest not to obey the Bill that the neighbors will not
comply, had a statistically significant mean of3.9. The T statistic was in excess of 100.
Whe·n asked to aver that they would socialize with a neighbor convicted of breaching the
Bill should it become law the mean response was 4. This response again had a T statistic
in excess of 100 and is therefore strongly significant. When asked to avow a preference
between socializing with a neighbor convicted ofbreaching the Bill or a urban relative, a
rural relative not a member of the respondent's district and a rural relative resident in the
respondents district, who objects to the presence of the felon the means were 3.4, 3.5 and
statistically significantly different from three.
III
3.4 respectively, all of which were statistically significantly different from 3 at a 95%
confidence level. The T statistics being 2.70,3.17, and 2.26 respectively. Similar
responses were received when the same questions were asked respecting the
Saskatchewan Wildlife Act and its endangered species protection provisions.
The respondents on average express some statistically significant distrust of
government commitment to the preservation ofendangered species. When asked whether
they disbelieved that either the Government ofCanada or the Government of
Saskatchewan was particularly interested in the preservation of endangered species or if
either level of government was prepared to commit anything beyond minimal resources
to endangered species preservation the respondents responses returned means of 3.3 and
3.4 with T statistics of2.00 and 2.73 respectively. The respondents did, however, exhibit
a fairly strong conservation stance. When asked if they liked to watch wildlife on their
land the mean was 4.2 with a T statistic in excess of 100. When asked about liking to
watch wildlife on their neighbors land the T statistic was again in excess of 100, while
the mean was 4.1. They also gave significantly greater than 3 responses on average when
asked if they wanted to see more wildlife if they did not have to pay for it. This query
had a mean of 3.7 and a T statistic of 4.69. However, they expressed on average
indifference to seeing more wildlife when it was not qualified by the ability to escape the
associated costs. The mean response being 3.1, with an accompanying T statistic of
0.50.
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The respondents tended to exhibit a belief that the probability of detection was
quite high. The average response to the statement that there was a one in a thousand
chance of conviction was not significantly different from three at the ninety percent level.
The mean response being 3.3, with a T statistic of 1.44. The same is true to the responses
for a chance of conviction of greater than one in a thousand, with a mean of 3.2 and T
statistic of 0.89. The statistically significantly different from three responses were for
one in five chance of conviction with a mean of 3.4 (T statistic of2.73) and one in a
hundred with a mean of 3.3 (T statistic of 1.97). These results seem contrary to the
respondents claimed distrust respecting the seriousness of government's commitment to
endangered species protection and may be the result of lack ofexperience on the part of
the respondents with enforcement branches of government. The anecdotal evidence from
the United States suggests that enforcement is a problem and that the probability of
successful detection is quite low. Given Canada's larger land mass and markedly smaller
population than the United States it seems unlikely that the probability of conviction will
be higher here than it is in the United States.
6.3 Regression Results
The representativeness of.these attitudinal results was tested by regressing, using
ordinary least squares and White's correction for heteroskedasticity, each of the vectors
of responses to the attitudinal questions as a dependent variable against a matrix of
demographic independent variables. The demographic variables were age, sex,
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residence, size of breeding herd, amount ofpasture owned and rented and the amount of
cropland owned and rented. Fits were poor, which is to be expected if demographics has
little to do with the attitudes. The R squareds, the percentage of the variation in the
dependent variable explained by the independent variables, for the regressions ranged
from a low of 0.04 to a high 0.18.
As well as heteroskedasticity the data exhibited symptoms of multicolinearity.
Principally, the dropping ofan observation led to changes in the estimated coefficients of
up to 50%. Combining the rented and owned pasture variables and rented and owned
cropland variables into two single variables cropland and pasture eliminated some ofthis
change. Eliminating any variables with T statistics of less than one essentially stabilized
the coefficients of any statistically significant variables. This led to nine equations with
statistically significant independent variables at a 90% or greater level of confidence.
The dependent variables for the regressions with statistically significant
independent variables included invite and attend, which is the vector of responses to the
query respecting inviting a poacher to a wedding or attending a poacher's wedding
respectively. The variable fair, which is the vector of responses to the question
respecting the belief in the fairness of expecting landoWners to pay for protecting
endangered species also had statistically significant independent variables. The equations
for the dependent variables named felon over family member of your district and felon
over rural family member, which are the responses to the questions that aver a preference
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to socializing with a neighbor convicted of breaching the Bill or the Saskatchewan
Wildlife Act over a family member who lives in a rural area or a family member who
lives in the same rural area as the respondent who refuses to socialize with the neighbor
purely because of the conviction had statistically significant independent variables. As
did the variable government cares, which is the vector of the responses to the assertion:
"I do not believe that either the Government of Canada or the Government of
Saskatchewan is particularly committed to the protection of endangered species". The
same is true for the variables labeled EIINS, EIINIOOO and GRIINIOOO, which are the
responses to the avowal that the probability ofdetection is one in five, one in one
thousand or greater than one in one thousand respectively. The independent variables
were: c, the intercept; age, the age of the respondents; sex, the gender of the respondents;
res, how large a population center that the residence of the respondents is located in;
herd, the size of the respondents breeding herd; crp, the amount of crop land that the
respondents' operations own and rent; and pas, the amount ofpasture that the
respondents' operations own-and rent. The F-statistic is the statistic to test the joint
hypothesis that the coefficients of the independent variables a statistically significantly
different from zero. While the column headed t-statistic is the statistic to test the
hypothesis that the coefficient of each of the independent variables is statistically
significantly different from zero. The results for the least squares (LS) regression on
dependent variables invite and attend are reported in table 6.3 and 6.4 respectively, the
remaining six regressions are reported in appendix E.
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Table 6.3 Regression Results With Invite as the
Dependent Variable
LS 1/ Dependent Variable is INVITE
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Probe
C 2.280668 0.543646 4.195131 0.0001
RES -0.3075 0.129881 -2.36753 0.0205
HERD 0.100286 0.083391 1.202608 0.2329
CRP 0.047024 0.043879 1.071687 0.2873
PAS 0.032514 0.028088 1.15757 0.2507
R-squared 0.118724 F-statistic 2.559658
Sample Size: 82 Source: Survey
o
0.0002
0.4038
0.198
0.1502
3.547907
Table 6.4 Regression Results With Attend as the
Dependent Variable
LS 1/ Dependent Variable is ATTEND
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Probe
C 2.422664 0.511125 4.739871
RES -0.37729 0.096297 -3.91802
CRP 0.036888 0.043935 0.8396
PAS 0.036778 0.028324 1.298486
HERD 0.120875 0.083166 1.453419
R-squared 0.15735 F-statistic
Sample Size: 82 Source: Survey
The signs of the significant variables suggest that the larger the community you
live in the less likely you are to invite a poacher to a wedding or to attend a poachers
wedding. That the larger your breeding herd or the more pasture you own and rent the
more likely you are to attend a poacher's wedding and the less likely you are to believe
that the probability of conviction is one in five. That the older you are the more likely
you are to believe that it is not manifestly unfair to expect landowners to bear additional
costs for habitat protection. That females are more likely than males to prefer to socialize
116
with family members than neighbors who have been convicted of violating the Bill, if the
family member objects to the neighbor. That the larger your breeding herd the more
likely you are to believe the government is serious about endangered species protection.
The larger the community in which you live the less likely you are to think that the
probability of detection is one in five and the more likely you are to believe that it is one
in a thousand or greater.
6.4 Implications of the Survey and Regression Results
The low R squareds of the regressions and the small number of statistically
significant coefficients suggest that the attitudes found in the survey are fairly generally
held across the respondents. Given the mean responses to the attitudinal questions it
seems that the social costs ofbreaching the Bill, had it become law, were not sufficiently
high to guarantee that a rational economic agent, who personally gains little or no utility
from the presence ofendangered species, will comply. As the penalty structure under the
Bill is similar to that under the Act, and as has been argued above there is little reason to
expect any greater rates ofconviction in Canada than in the United States it seems clear
that the compliance problems associated with the Act could have been expected in
Canada had the Bill become law.
If the Bill can be expected to suffer from compliance problems similar to those
that afflict the Act, this, of course, suggests that the Bill by itselfwould not have proved
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particularly successful at addressing endangered species protection problems in the
hea~ily human inhabited regions of Canada. If, as this work suggests, there is good
reason to believe that the prohibitive policy framework inherent in the Bill is not likely to
prove successful in addressing the endangered species problem the obvious question
becomes what will address the problem.
If the endangered species problem is underscored by a free rider driven under
investment in habitat as has been argued above then the use ofa stick that can be avoided
by means fair or foul cannot be expected to cure the problem. As this work suggests that
the Bill, had it become law, would likely have been avoided by unlawful means one of
the corollaries that must arise is that successfully solving the endangered species problem
is going to require some form of augmentation of the Bill.
The need for augmentation suggests that to prove successful the Bill would have
had to have been joined to policies that either inflict unavoidable costs on activities that
exacerbate the endangered species problem or that allow decision makers to capture some
of the public good benefits associated with investment in habitat. Colloquially, if your
are going to use a stick make sure the decision maker cannot avoid it and ifyou cannot
find an unavoidable stick use a carrot. Ultimately if Canada is going to successfully
resolve its endangered species problem such measures aimed at making the stick
unavoidable or measures that dangle carrots may prove a key component in the
successful policy package.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
IMPLEMENTED POLICIES THAT MAY AFFECT ENDANGERED SPECIES
HABITAT
7.1 Of Carrots and Sticks
If the Act is a valid model for the Bill, and if the Act is the expensive and
ineffective piece of legislation that it is represented as, then is there anything policy
makers can do to avoid the problems associated with the Act? In neoclassical economic
theory, the principal reason to regulate is, of course, market failure. In the case of
endangered species, that would be an attempt to deal with the free rider problem. This
seems to suggest that policy that is going to deal effectively with free riding is going to
accomplish one of two things. It will either render the agents to be free ridden upon
incapable of resisting the free riders or it will render it impossible or at least more
difficult for agents to free ride. That is, the policy can employ a carrot or a small stick, as
opposed to the big stick ofprohibitive policy.
Those policies which render the agents to be free ridden upon incapable of
resisting the free riders, small sticks, basically remove benefits from or impose costs on
agents who act as perfect competitors. That is, the state removes benefits from or
imposes cost~ upon agents who lack market power and thus have no means ofpassing
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them on, and if properly structured have no means legal or illegal of avoiding them. The
agents are then forced by the market to make land use decisions, in theory, based upon
the highest use value of the land. This aids habitat in the agricultural region of
Saskatchewan by moving marginal crop land out of grains and oil seed production into
the production of forage or use as pasture, both of which are presumably better habitat
than fence row to fence row cultivation.
7.2 Policies that Impose Costs or Remove Benefits
As far as the removal ofbenefits goes, we have seen some of that already
occurring in the agricultural region of Saskatchewan. For various reasons, all ofwhich
are beyond the scope ofthis examination, both the Federal Government and the
Saskatchewan Provincial Government have largely abandoned subsidizing agricultural
production generally and grain and oilseed production specifically. This has had the
corollary, although probably anticipated, effect of lowering the expected return from
grain and oilseed production relative to other uses for less fertile land. The abandonment
of the Gross Revenue Insurance Plan and the Crow Benefit for grain transportation have
had the effect of rendering grain and oilseed production, particularly production of grain
and oilseeds for export, on marginal land uneconomic.' The abandonment of GRIP
lowered revenues and the abandonment of the Crow Benefit raised costs, both ofwhich
lower net returns to cropland. One of the most likely results of these changes, over time,
will be an increase in pastureland. This will provide better habitat than grain and oilseed
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production does. The full effects of these changes should be expected to occur over a
number of years, although improved.pasture acreage has increased in Saskatchewan from
2,658,002 acres in 1991 to 3,047,567 acres in 1996 (Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food
Agricultural Statistics 1996). Thus, the abandonment of subsidies tied to grain and
oilseed production has the effect of altering the highest use value for marginal land away
from grain and oilseed production toward better habitat.
The survey tested the hypothesis that the abandonment of the WOTA
transportation subsidy moved land use away from cropping into better habitat forms.
Forty-nine respondents reported changing their operations composition in the last five
years. There were twenty reports of change in the size of the cattle herd because of the
elimination of the WOTA transportation subsidy; with nineteen reports of increased herd
size. Seventeen reports of changes in owned pasture with sixteen increases, six changes
in pasture rental with five respondents reporting increases. Eighteen respondents
reported changes in owned forage as a result of the repeal of the subsidy with sixteen of
the reports being increases. Two respondents reported changes in leased forage, both of
which were increases. Fifteen respondents changed their owned cropland as a result of
the repeal, twelve of them decreasing their holdings. All three of the respondents who
claimed changes in leased cropland as a result of the repeal of the WOTA transportation
subsidy claimed decreases. The response to whether or not the operation had changed in
the last five years was regressed as the dependent variable against the same demographic
data that was regressed against the attitudinal data reported above. The statistically
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significant results are reported in table 7.1. These results suggest that the older you are
the less likely you were to have made any changes and the more cropland you have the
more likely you were to change.
o
0.0004
0.0186
8.675572
Table 7.1 Regression Results for Change in
Operation in the Last Five Years as the Dependent
Variable
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.862622 0.159673 5.402426
AGE -0.11377 0.030846 -3.68815
CRP 0.037769 0.015734 2.400483
R-squared 0.169526 F-statistic
Sample Size: 88 Source: Survey
In a similar vein the move to limit moral hazard under the crop insurance program
should, at least in theory, move marginal land out of the production of grains and oilseeds
and into something friendlier as wildlife habitat. Moral hazard is the action on the part of
an insured that alters the risk the insurer faces after the contract is entered into, for
example speeding in an automobile, or sowing land that you would not have sown but for
the policy. Insuring on the basis of an individual producer's average yields rather than
area average yields should lower the incentive to seed marginal land. If your only going
to be covered for what you have historically actually grown rather than on the basis of
what has actually been grown in the area, your incentive to seed marginal land should
decline, thus increasing the amount of land for which the highest use value is not grain or
oilseed production. Before drawing any real conclusions respecting crop insurance two
things bear notice. First, the idea that individual averages will dissuade moral hazard
requires that decision makers once they move marginal cropland to another use leave it in
that use. Given the improvements in agricultural chemicals it is distinctly possible that
122
should crop insurance offer contracts with guaranteed output prices sufficiently above
expected market prices decision makers may have an incentive to spray, break and seed
the marginal land. The extent to which this will pose a problem depends entirely on how
accurately expected prices are reflected in the crop insurance contracts. That is, the
closer the Saskatchewan-Canada Crop Insurance Corporation can come to actual
expected prices when writing their policies the less likely moral hazard is to arise and the
less distortionary crop insurance will be. Second, crop insurance with its subsidized
premiums remains a subsidy that has the ability to make using land for cropping appear
economic to an individual decision-maker, when but for the subsidy it would not be.
However, given the attempts to limit moral hazard in the system, crop insurance is
probably not now as distortionary as it was.
In as far as railroads and agricultural input suppliers can and do utilize market
power they can effect land use decisions. If through noncompetitive behavior these
organizations can extract rents from farmers, farmers will move marginal land from
cereal and oilseed production into pasture or some other form ofbetter habitat than
cropped land. By raising the costs that farmers face above that of the competitive
equilibrium, farmers who face a fixed world price for their output will lower their
production to reflect their higher marginal costs. This ·will drive land out of crop
production and into some other use, either pasture or idleness, both presumably superior
habitats than crop production. While allowing these uses ofmarket power to exist has a
positive effect on levels ofhabitat the costs of this habitat are being borne by farmers.
123
Farmers can also be forced to bear the costs of improved habitat through the
elimination of water subsidies for irrigation. While this is of little practical importance in
Saskatchewan where irrigation is essentially insignificant, there are areas throughout the
world where, but for irrigation, land would not be cropped, and if the water was not
subsidized the land would not be irrigated. Anderson and Leal make this point repeatedly
with regard to substantial areas of the Western United States (Anderson and Leal (1991)).
7.3 Policies that Grant Benefits
As well as the small sticks, we have also seen recent examples of carrots being
used to improve habitat. Saskatchewan has established conservation easement under the
Conservation Easement Act (R.S.S. 1978 c. 27.01). The basic concept is extremely
simple. You as a landowner grant an easement over some portion of your land that has
some particular conservation characteristic, that is something that forms good species
habitat, to a qualifying agency, some organization like Ducks Unlimited Canada, or the
NatUre Conservancy of Canada. You get a tax break; the agency gets to file an easement
against your certificate of title at the appropriate land titles office. Once the easement is
filed the land, which you retain title to, can only be dealt with subject to the easement.
That is to say that the land stays in its habitat form until such time as the agency agrees
otherwise. While the presence of the easement may affect the salability of the land,
lower its sale price to a third party, the tax break you receive plus any utility you receive
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from the presence of the habitat plus any financial benefits you receive from the
conservation agency should in theory compensate you for any decrease in price. It bears
notice that not all the easements that you might enter into need cause a decrease in the
value of the property. For example you might fence off a stream th!ough a pasture and
grant the easement on the stream, it is conceivable that a purchaser might pay the same
price for such a pasture as he would ofwithout the easement. You will of course,
however, have to pay the capital and maintenance costs for the fence. These cost;
particularly the capital costs may however be offset by an organization such as Ducks
Unlimited Canada.
The Government of Saskatchewan is also a participant in the North American
Waterfowl Management Plan. The plan is largely administered, in Saskatchewan, by
Ducks Unlimited Canada (DUC). Under the plan DUC has established various programs
ranging from the outright purchase of land through long term leases and funding
farmer/rancher capital expenditures in exchange for easements and contractual
undertakings for things like delayed forage harvest and rotational grazing, to establish
marshes and prairie upland habitat for waterfowl nesting. As a corollary benefit the same
prairie upland habitat that is suitable waterfowl nesting is suitable for other upland
species. While the Gray, Rosaasen, Taylor, Burden arid Stefanson study suggests that the
plan has overall been reasonably successful (Gray, Rosaasen, Taylor, Burden and
Stefanson (1992)) it is not without some potential problems. Contracts whether for lease
or for sale must be negotiated separately. This will have the effect of increasing
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transaction costs. The potential for hold up problems also exists. Should a project
require dealing with several land owners, each owning key pieces ofproperty with
specific physical attributes once one agreement is reached and the money invested the
other land owners can be expected to raise their prices to extract additional rents. The
purchaser being aware ofthis phenomenon may elect not to enter into negotiations at all
rather than fmd he or she held up after the expenditure of the time and money necessary
to enter negotiations. Finally, the limitation on land ownership found in the
Saskatchewan Farm Security Act (R.S.S. 1978 c. S-17.1), and the constraints on
subdividing a quarter section of land in the Planning and Development Act (R.S.S 1978
c. P-13.1.) impose administrative and other transaction costs that may result in land
being leased that should be purchased.
Supply management in that it restricts the amount ofa commodity that can be sold
has a corollary effect of limiting the amount of the commodity produced from that which ,
the free market would produce. Consequently, the quantity of inputs used in the
production of the commodity is also limited from the free market equilibrium. In so far
as cereal grains are used as feeds in the production of supply managed commodities, the
retention of supply management will limit the demand for local use ofcereal production,
and should therefore limit the demand for land to produce cereals. This should then
prompt marginal land out of cereal production and into pasture or other better forms of
habitat. It is trite economics to observe that it is the consumers of these supply managed
commodities that bear the cost of the system. This would suggest that if the state's sole
126
policy goal is a desire to increase habitat while forcing the cost on to as broad a segment
of society as possible that supply management in all areas of agricultural goods
production could prove effective. This ignores the very real problems of effective border
controls, the inevitable ire of our trading partners, particularly if the quotas are set to
leave Canada as a net exporter of cereals and oil seeds, and such a schemes highly
questionable legality under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
If you can sell the hunts of plentiful species that share habitat with endangered
species you will provide habitat on land to that level where the marginal cost of the land
as habitat, including the opportunity cost of not fanning the land equals the price you can
charge for the hunts. Thus habitat should be created. Anderson and Leal point to several
African examples where this was done through charging for access to hunt species that
are not endangered (Anderson and Leal (1977)). Private land holdings in Saskatchewan
tend to be too small to allow a single individual to successfully attempt charged access.
This could be overcome with the use ofa co-operative similar to the model used in Africa
reported by Anderson and Leal. In this sort ofventure it would appear to be the
individual who values the habitat highest who is meeting the cost of expanding habitat. It
bears notice that for such a scheme to be viable that you require people who are prepared
to pay to hunt. A 1994 survey by ,Gray, Conacher and McNinch suggests that such a
market exists (Gray, Conacher and McNinch (1994)).
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If you desire people to do something, there remains the tried and true method of
paying them to do so. Ifyou want land to remain idle there is always the example of the
United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Conservation Reserve program.
Essentially, the American government enters into contracts with farmers where they
agree to pay them a set fee for the length of the contract, ten years, to let the land sit and
allow natural habitat to grow up. The Americans have also had some success with tying
the receiving ofagricultural subsidies with environmentally friendly activities, for
example the draining ofwetlands can bar an American farmer from access to the subsidy
programs administered by USDA. In these sorts ofprograms it is the taxpayers that bear
the costs of improved habitat. In the northern grain growing region of Saskatchewan, the
transition zone from the short grass prairie to the boreal forest, tax concessions to tree
farms could generate publicly funded habitat improvement.
7.4 The Saskatchewan Endangered Species Protection Legislation
The Province of Saskatchewan has also recently legislated in this area, passing
what has the potential to become fairly big stick. Two pieces of legislation have passed
Saskatchewan's legislature and received royal assent. The Wildlife Act, 1997 (R.S.S.
1978 c. W-13.11) and The Wildlife Act, 1998 (R.S.S.. 1978 c. W-13.l2) which while it
received Royal Assent remains unproclaimed (collectively hereinafter referred to as The
Sask. Act as the statutes are identical in their treatment of endangered species). The
Sask. Act like the Bill and the Act uses a listing procedure. The Sask. Act does not
however immediately confer protection on the listed species' habitat, but rather arrives at
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habitat protection through section 50, which allows for the formation of recovery plans.
Sub,section 50(5), which sets out the factors that the minister, may consider in a recovery
plan reads:
50(5) the factors that the minister may take into consideration when
determining the priority to be assigned to a recovery plan or any portion of
a recovery plan include:
(a) whether scientific evidence indicates that the wild species at
risk mentioned in the recovery plan is naturally becoming
extirpated;
(b) whether it is technically or economically feasible to recover the
wild species at risk; and
(c) the status of the wild species at risk elsewhere.
Thus, the Sask. Act has the potential to avoid some ofthe worst problems perceived to
plague the Act and would have potentially plagued the Bill. While the Sask. Act has
apparently never been litigated the language ofthe sections suggest the following. Under
the Sask. Act if a species is doomed, its mere listing will not be sufficient to require that
costs be born to attempt the impossible. Ifa species is at risk ofextirpation in
Saskatchewan, but is thriving elsewhere, the Sask. Act does not mandate that costs
necessarily be born to protect the species in Saskatchewan. Thus, if private landowners
are to face an externality for the protection of listed species under the Sask. Act it is
relatively clear that the instances of such an externality occurring should be rarer under
the Sask. Act then under the Act or the Bill, and should be related to species with
generally better chances of recovery than can be expected under either the Act or the Bill.
The Sask. Act, in section 52, also has an exception to the protection granted a listed
species which allows the director to license the removal, death, capture or destruction of
an endangered species if it is necessary to do so to protect human health or to prevent
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property loss. If Mann and Plumber are correct that it is impossible to save all species,
the~ the course taken in the Sask. Act may well be wiser than that adopted by the Bill or
the Act.
It bears notice that had the Bill be reintroduced and passed, and should an actual
conflict have arisen between the operation of the Bill and the Sask. Act that under the
paramouncy doctrine the federal law would have prevailed. That is to say, that if the
federal government acting constitutionally under the criminal law power and the
provincial government acting constitutionally under their property and civil rights powers
enact legislation which is contradictory, by the doctrine ofparamouncy the federal
legislation rules. Given the wording of the two statutes the only actual conflict that
seems possible to arise is a listing of a species under the Bill when that species is not
listed under the Sask. Act, or vice versa. Should such an event occur the species would
be listed and entitled to the protection of the legislation under which it is listed. Conflict
also appears to be possible if a species is listed under both pieces of legislation. If the
Saskatchewan Minister in his or her discretion decides to do nothing it will still be
posSible for federal authorities to act to protect habitat, even on private or provincial
Crown land, to the extent that the word residence is interpreted to allow them. Whether
these constitute conflict within the meaning of Canadian constitutional jurisprudence, or
the mere exercise ofconcurrent jurisdiction is beyond the scope ofthis work. The reader
is however reminded that litigation to resolve such questions in the area is possible,
although potentially not likely.
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7.5 Subsequent Federal Legislative Initiatives
When the Bill died on the order paper with the calling of the 1997 Canadian
Federal General Election, the Government of Canada undertook a consultation process,
seeking input on endangered species protection from a wide variety of stake holder
groups, that ultimately ended with the introduction ofThe Species at Risk Act (Bill C-
33, Second Session, Thirty-sixth Parliament, 48-49 Elizabeth II, 1999.-2000)(hereinafter
Bill C-33), Bill C-33 ultimately died on the order paper with the calling ofthe 2000
Canadian Federal Election, and was subsequently reintroduced, with some minor
amendments, on February 2, 2001 as The Species at Risk Act (Bill C-5 ofthe First
Session of the Thirty-seventh Parliament 49 Elizabeth II, 2001)( hereinafter Bill C-5).
Bill C-5 passed second reading and was referred to the House of Commons Standing
Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development on March 20, 2001, who
reported it back to the House of Commons with amendments on December 3,2001.
During this process there appeared to arise an informal coalition of various industries
involved in the extraction of both renewable and nonrenewable natural resources, whose
participants held interests in real property. These property interests scored a victory in
the transition from Bill C-65 to Bill C-5. The victory comes in the manner that
endangered species protection could have affected property owners under the Bill
compared to the regulation property owners will face should Bill C-5 be enacted.
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The summary of Bill C-5 as reprinted by the Standing Committee on Environment
and Sustainable Development reads:
The purposes of this enactment are to prevent Canadian indigenous
species, subspecies and distinct populations ofwildlife from becoming
extirpated or extinct, to provide for the recovery of endangered or
threatened species, to encourage the management of other species to
prevent them from becoming at risk.
This enactment establishes the Committee on the Status of Endangered
Wildlife in Canada (COSEWIC) as an independent body of experts
responsible for assessing and identifying species at risk. It provides that
COSEWIC's assessments are to be reported to the Minister of the
Environment and to the Canadian Endangered Species Conservation
Council and it authorizes the Governor in Council to establish by
regulation the official list of species at risk based on that process.
It requires that the best available knowledge be used to defme long- and
short-term objectives in a recovery strategy for endangered and threatened
species and it provides for action plans to identify specific actions.
It creates prohibitions to protect listed threatened and endangered species
and their critical habitat.
It recognizes that compensation may be needed to ensure fairness
following the imposition of the critical habitat prohibitions.
It creates a public registry to assist in making documents under the Act
more accessible to the public.
It is consistent with Aboriginal and treaty rights and respects the authority
of other federal ministers and provincial governments.
The claim that the property lobby was victorious relies on the four principal
changes from Bill C-65 common to both Bills C-5 and C-33. There is a notable change
in tone, from Bill C-65 to Bills C-5 and C-33. There is a clarification of when and how
private property will be affected in both Bills C-5 and C-33 when compared to Bill C-65.
Both the latter Bills also expressly contemplate compensation for affected landowners,
132
which Bill C-65 does not. Finally neither Bill C-33 nor Bill C-5 contain the public
interest standing provisions found in Bill C-65.
The absence of public interest standing rules removes a huge property lobby
concern with Bill C-65. Property holders do not have to worry about facing nuisance
lawsuits being brought through statutory standing provisions. If the Ministry of the
Environment is not doing its job under the newer Bills, it is the Ministry that will have to
worry about the lawsuits, not the individual property holders. This renders the expected
costs faced by property owners due to endangered species legislation lower under Bills
C-5 and C-33 than they would have been under Bill C-65.
Like Bill C-33 before it, Bill C-5 requires consultations with landowners and all
other interested parties through the recovery planning process. This is not a marked
departure from Bill C-65, section 39 of Bill C-65 requires that the Minister in the
recovery planning process consult with any wildlife management board established under
an aboriginal land claim or any other persons that the Minister considers directly affected
by or interested in the recovery plan. This change is essentially one oftone.
Consultation under Bills C-5 and C-33 is mandatory and the requirement is often
repeated. When reading these latter two Bills the reader is left with the impression that
there is very little, particularly in the recovery process, that the Government can do
without extensive consultation with anyone who may be affected. Bill C-65, while
hardly exclusionary, lacks the focus on consultation found in the subsequent Bills.
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Environics in a poll of rural residents, done in 2000, noted: "Moreover although the
research reveal that there may be some barriers to overcome, policy makers and
communicators will be rewarded in their efforts to increase stewardship practices among
Canadian landowners, as long as appropriate initiatives are launched and as long as
trusted channels of communication are employed."(Environics (2000): 36) Thus, the
additional emphasis that Bills C-33 and C-5 places on consultation over Bill C-65 should
be expected to aid in the building oftrust. Furthermore, if a level of trust can be
established, the consultation process, over a long enough period oftime, may be able to
take on an educational component that may result in a change in the utility functions of
land owners. These changing perceptions could move their private perceptions of the
returns from habitat closer to the perceptions required for a societal optimal. That is,
landowners may at some time be prepared to accept more free riding because of the
increased value they place upon habitat.
Both Bills C-5 and C-33 at fITst blush appear to broaden the ability of the
Government ofCanada to regulate private property use compared to Bill C-65. This
appearance is largely illusionary. Both the latter Bills allow for the regulation ofprivate
property once it has been designated as critical habitat. Both Bills also add to the
defmition of residence, while retaining Bill C-65's prohibition on damaging the residence
of a cross boundary endangered species. Bill C-33' s definition ofresidence is:
"residence" means a specific dwelling-place, such as a den, nest or other
similar area, place or structure, that is occupied or habitually occupied by
one or more individuals during all or part of their life cycles, including
breeding, rearing or hibernating.
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While Bill C-5's definition of residence follows:
"residence" means a dwelling-place, such as a den, nest or other similar
area or a place that is occupied or habitually occupied by one or more
individuals during all or part of their life cycles, including breeding,
rearing, staging, wintering, feeding or hibernating.
As was noted above the cross boundary species mostly live in Southern Canada where
most of the private land in the country is located, thus the expansion of the definition of
habitat and the allowance of regulation of critical habitat really only clarify the situation
as to where and when private property can be regulated. All that these changes seem to
really do if to specify with greater clarity the size of front and back yard that come with
the residence, and thus allow for greater certainty as to what landowners can expect.
Under the definition ofresidence in Bill C-65, as was argued earlier, there existed a
substantial potential for litigation about the size ofa yard that came with a residence.
Under the latter two Bills once the species is listed, not only does its residence gain
protection but recovery planning becomes mandated. During the recovery planning
process the latter Bills mandate the identification and designation of any habitat critical to
the species recovery. Thus, ifno habitat is designated only the hole in the ground or the
nest in the tree is protected, with no yard what so ever. If the species required any
beyond the hole or the nest by the latter Bills it would have to be designated as critical
habitat, and subject to regulation and compensation associated with same.
Bill C-5, like Bill C-33 before it and unlike BILL C-65 expressly contemplates
the payment ofcompensation for those adversely affected by the designation of their
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property as critical habitat under the recovery planning process. Section 63 of Bill C-5
reads:
63. (1) The Minister may, in accordance with the regulations, provide fair
and reasonable compensation to any person for losses suffered as a result
of any extraordinary impact of the application of
(a) section 58, 60 or 61; or
(b) an emergency order in respect ofhabitat identified in the emergency
order that is necessary for the survival or recovery of a wildlife species.
(2) The Governor in Council shall make regulations that the Governor in
Council considers necessary for carrying out the purposes and provisions
of subsection (1), including regulations prescribing
(a) the procedures to be followed in claiming compensation;
(b) the methods to be used in determining the eligibility of a person for
compensation, the amount of loss suffered by a person and the amount
of compensation in respect of any loss; and
(c) the terms and conditions for the provision of compensation.
Section 58 allows the Minster of the Environment to make regulations affecting critical
habitat as identified in a recovery strategy and specifically allows such regulations to be
binding on private property anywhere in the country following consultation for the
purpose ofnegotiating an agreement for the use of the property (s. 58(4)). Section 60
prohibits the destruction ofcritical habitat that is in a province or territory but not on
federal lands. Section 60 allows the Government ofCanada to enter into agreements to
purchase land for the protection of critical habitat. The question of interest surely must
be will rational landowners view this section as being sufficient to protect them from any
adverse effect of the presence of an endangered specie"s that they would otherwise be
unprepared to accept? That is, will it allow them to gain some ofthe benefits received by
the general public who would otherwise be free riders on the forced habitat investment?
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The short answer is maybe. Compensation is in the Minister's discretion. The
Minister's discretion is subject to the regulations. Section 63(2)(b) obliges the Governor
in Council to make regulations determining who is eligible for compensation, how to
calculate the amount of the loss and how to compensate the loss. Thus, who will be able
to receive what in compensation is going to depend upon the wording in the regulations.
What are property holders going to want to see in the regulations?
Property interests are almost surely going to argue that an "extraordinary impact"
is any sort ofdisruption to their present or planned uses of the property. They will also
almost surely argue that to be "fair and reasonable" the level of compensation is going to
have to be, at the minimum, the difference between the value of the property under its
actual or planned use prior to the designation as critical habitat and its value under the
uses allowable under the regulation that follows the designation. That is, in economic
terms, property interests will want compensation for any change in use that leaves them
at the very least indifferent between the prior and subsequent uses. As free riders would
like the landowners to bear all of the costs, if the regulations were to establish a level of
compensation that left the landowners indifferent it can be argued that the regulations
would achieve an efficient allocation ofcritical habitat.
Will the property interests be able to achieve regulations that suggest an efficient
allocation of critical habitat? Given the success they have had to this point in time it
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seems decidedly possible.7
7 As an aside it may bear notice that it is received economic theory that the initial endowment of rights is
going to have an effect on the fmal outcome ofa bargain. Thus, the apparent victory ofproperty rights
over the broader right to a clean environment would seem to suggest that our society remains as wedded to
property as ever, and that in the last fifty or so years we have not moved particularly far toward Leopold's
land ethic.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
COSTS OF PRESERVING HABITAT
8.1 How Much Habitat Is There?
The Bruntland Commission in Our Common Future (World Commission on
Environment and Development (1987)) calls for 12% ofall land, both public and private,
to be conserved. In the agricultural region of Saskatchewan that would constitute
approximately eight million acres being 12% ofthe just over 65.65 million acres reported
by Statistics Canada from the 1996 Census ofAgriculture.
From the 1996 Census of Agriculture 71% of Saskatchewan farmland was
cropland or summerfallow (author's calculation from census data). This is 5% greater
than the 66% of farmland that falls into these two categories for the Canadian prairies
overall reported by Neave, Neave, Weins and Riche (2000). Tame or seeded pasture
represents 5% of farmland in the prairies generally (Neave, Neave, Weins and Riche
(2000)) which is the same percentage as occurred in Saskatchewan (author's calculation
from census data). In the prairies overall this suggests"that 71 % of the agricultural
region is ofpoorer quality habitat, while in Saskatchewan poorer quality habitat makes up
76% of farmland. Neave, Neave, Weins and Riche report that 93% of the prairie ecozone
is agricultural land (2000). They also report estimates that all that remains oforiginal
139
native vegetation is 1% of the tall grass prairie, 19% of the mixed grass prairie, and 16%
of aspen parkland.
These estimates do not seem inconsistent with those supplied by Conrad Olson, of
Saskatchewan Environment and Resource Management (SERM), who suggests that
between six and seven million acres of some form habitat better than crop land exist in
the agricultural region of the Saskatchewan. This imprecision has two sources. First,
there is no general agreement as to exactly what constitutes habitat. Second, these lands
are often divided between different programs such as the representative areas network,
the conservation easement program, Ducks Unlimited Canada lands or Saskatchewan
Provincial Parks for example. This Mr. Olson explains makes it difficult to determine
exact acreage as land can be and in fact is counted under different programs at the same
time. He further added that about one-fifth of these lands remain in a natural (pre
European contact state) while the remainder has in some sense been changed from its pre-
contact state. Essentially this suggests that in order for the Province of Saskatchewan to
attain the 12% suggested by Bruntland in the agricultural region ofthe province that an
additional one to two million acres will be needed (Olson, telephone conversation ofJuly
7, 1999). The costs of converting and/or preserving this land are going to have to be born
by someone. For example should the Bill be successful, unlike as has been argued above,
the costs will largely be born by landowners. Should government elect to purchase or
lease any necessary private land while converting crown land the cost can be largely
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expected to be born by taxpayers. Should the task fall to private groups like Ducks
Unlimited Canada the costs will fallon the groups' members.
8.2 Some Problems Associated with Valuing Habitat
Given the public good nature ofhabitat, caused by the apparent technical limits on
excluding anyone from its entropy limiting benefits, valuing habitat becomes difficult. It
is trite economics that when a resource is optimally used the benefit of its use at the
margin equals the cost of its use. In a perfectly competitive market, such as the market
for land in the agricultural region of Saskatchewan appears, it is easily shown that at the
optimum the use to which a resource is put must generate benefits at the margin equal to
or greater than the opportunity cost associated with the next best use. To convert land
from agricultural use to habitat, the next best use would appear to be agricultural, and
thus if the land is to be converted to habitat it must return at least what it would in its
agricultural use. This implicitly assumes that the benefits from habitat exceed those
from agricultural use. For this to be true the benefits that free riders gain from habitat
must be greater than any additional costs landowners are forced to bear plus the value of
lost production. If humanity is indeed faced with an endangered species crisis driven by
habitat loss then the assumption would appear to be true.
Humanity's understanding of the exact nature and extent of the benefits that free
riders accrue from additional habitat is nebulous at best. If as was averred above the
141
market for agricultural land, in the agricultural region of Saskatchewan, is perfectly
competitive and if agriculture is the next best use of the land after habitat then the current
price of agricultural land should represent the opportunity cost that the benefits of habitat
must equal or exceed at the margin. That is, if landowners can earn the same or greater
return from land used as habitat as they can for land used for agriculture, they will use it
for habitat. Thus, in economic theory the optimal amount ofhabitat will be that amount
of habitat such that the benefits earned from the last unit ofhabitat would be equal to
what could be earned had that last unit been used for agriculture instead. The question
then becomes one of what constitutes the mix of types of land necessary to form the 12%
the Bruntland Commission specifies.
Theory suggests that at the margin for optimal land use to be achieved land should
be used for its highest value purpose. Gray, Burden and Dehaan draw a distinction
between land's physical margin and its economic margin. Their basic findings suggest
that because of other production risks economically marginal land can differ from
physically marginal land (Gray Burden and Dehaan (1994)). That is, land can be ill
suited for agricultural purposes for physical reasons, it may be marshy or sandy for
instance or for economic reasons, say distance to markets. This implies that ifhabitat is
drawn from land that at the margin is uneconomical for agriculture that a mix ofdifferent
soil types is still possible. This, of course suggests that ifhabitat is drawn only from least
economic portions of the agricultural land base that it should still be distributed through
out the agricultural region ofthe province. Thus, it would seem reasonable to convert the
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least economically viable agricultural land to habitat. This suggests that the costs of
habitat can be calculated by examining the economic viability of any particular piece of
land, choosing those that will be cheapest.
8.3 A Method of Valuing Habitat
Something similar to this was done in The Economic and Sociological
Evaluation of Land Use Options, Saskatchewan Implementation Plan of The North
American Waterfowl Management Plan (Gray, Rosassen, Taylor, Burden and
Stefanson (1992)). This compares the cash rent, paid by DUC under the Prairie Care
lease ofuplands for nesting for waterfowl, to what the fanner could expect to earn, as the
landlord under a one-third to the landlord crop share lease. They do this by creating
representative fann budgets. They commence with a soil class G budget, the most
prevalent soil classification in the area (Quill Lakes region of Saskatchewan), and adjust
it for the other soil classes by prorating the G budget by the ratio ofexpected yields of the
enterprise in soil class 'X' divided by the expected yields of the enterprise in soil class
'G'. Income is calculated by taking the area average yields for each soil classification
multiplied by GRIP prices over a rotation that represents the then ten year average
rotation in the area. The rotation is expressed as a ratio of the enterprise, seeding wheat,
barley, canola or summerfallowing, acreage, by soil classification, to the total acreage in
the area by soil classification (see table 1 in the appendix F). With this model they
concluded that the cash leases paid by DUC were roughly comparable to what the fanner
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could expect, for a return to land, were he to fann the land himself or lease it to another
f~er on a one-third to the landlord crop share lease, rather then lease it to DUC as
nesting habitat. Using this procedure they found that under the prairie CARE leases that
DUC was paying fanners a return which was roughly equivalent to what they could earn
as landlords under a one-third to the landlord crop share (See table 13 in Appendix F).
This result was generated by adding to income what Gray, Rosaasen, Taylor,
Burden and Stefanson call an inventory adjustment. They credit the budget they use as
coming from Top Management Workshop data. In a footnote to the budget they call the
miscellaneous income line of the budget an inventory adjustment (Gray, Rosaasen,
Taylor, Burden and Stefanson (1992)), in the lexicon of the Top Management Workshop
miscellaneous income includes things like straw and subsidies, this suggests that they
may have double counted the GRIP subsidy. In any event, within a cash accounting
world, such as Canadian agriculture, this adjustment is difficult to justify. It would seem
more likely that farmers would be more interested in specific annual earnings from their
various enterprises in a given year, rather then some form of accrued income earnings.
Particularly, when comparing those earnings to an annual cash lease payment. Correcting
for this, but otherwise following the same procedure, yields substantial rents to the
representative farm, generated by leasing property to DUC (see Appendix F table 10).
These rents range from a high of seven dollars and ninety cents, to a low of five dollars
and forty cents, depending upon soil classification. These rents become even larger
ranging from fifteen dollars and seventy-two cents to eight dollars and thirty-four cents, if
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one utilizes the estimates of 1992 fanngate prices for the three commodities that Gray,
Rosaasen, Taylor, Burden and Stefanson provide (see table 12 in Appendix F). As is
clear from tables 10 and 12, the prairie CARE lease payments provide returns to land far
in excess of the one-third crop share lease.
One further observation is in order, regarding the comparison between the crop
share and the Prairie CARE leases. It is readily apparent from tables 10 and 12 that as
land quality falls the premium extracted by entering a Prairie Care lease, at least in
percentage terms, increases. That is, DUC is paying relatively more money for relatively
poorer farming land. At first this may appear counter intuitive. It, however, may well be
the case that what is poorer farming land may be ideal waterfowl producing land. Land
that is covered in potholes with saline soil which is marginal for crop production could be
ideal for DUC's purposes, provided that they can establish the grass cover and habitat
that they desire. The reason that DUC could expect to pay proportionally higher rents to
attract this land, than an observer would expect the producers to be most interested in not
farming, may well lie in the ability of the farmers to realize the particular suitability of
this land to DUC's purposes. As producer seem aware of the premium that DUC is
apparently prepared to pay for this more marginal crop producing land they have been
able to extract proportionally higher rents from DUe for this more marginal land. This is
a typical result from holdup problems.
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It is interesting to note that even with rents as large are shown in tables 10 and 12,
that some of the participants in the program expressed, when surveyed by Gray,
Rosaasen, Taylor, Burden and Stefanson the opinion that the compensation was
inadequate. Economic theory, of course, suggests that such an attitude must be irrational,
given that these producers voluntarily entered the program. Ofthose surveyed producers,
who were not in the program, a significantly smaller percentage expressed the opinion
that the compensation was inadequate (Gray, Rosaasen, Taylor, Burden and Stefanson
(1992». It is submitted that if the dissatisfaction expressed is anYtlring other then an
attempt to improve the farmers negotiating position, in the hope ofextracting even more
substantial rents when these contracts are renegotiated, the disgruntled producers must be
viewing the payment as compensation for the negative externalities associated with
waterfowl as well as returns to land.
While it is possible that the participating farmers view the lease payment as, at
least partially, compensation for the negative externalities associated with having large
numbers of wild waterfowl, it must be remembered that this can only be partial. The
Waterfowl Crop Damage Compensation Program, administered by the Saskatchewan
Crop Insurance Corporation, will pay for seventy percent of the damage inflicted by
waterfowl at the then current crop insurance price for that commodity
(http://www.gov.sk.ca/agfood/scic/addprog.htm of29 MAR 97). Thus, any
compensatory value, that the fanners perceive themselves as receiving, must be for the
thirty percent of-the loss not covered by the Waterfowl Crop Damage Compensation
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Program, or for some' other externality such as a perceived increase in the risk of fITe due
to the abundance of dry grass that the nesting cover programs tend to cause in an area.
Finally, there is, at least, one other potential thing that farmers might view themselves as
being compensated for. This is, of course, the costs associated with reverting the land
leased to DUe to crop production land at the expiration of the leaseS.
In another attempt to ascertain the likely costs associated with habitat protection
as part of the survey respondents were asked to indicate the amount of their operations
land base that they would be prepared to return to habitat for property tax relief and
annual cash payments often, twenty, thirty and forty dollars per acre. Respondents were
given the choice of zero, five, ten, twenty or fifty per cent of the land base, or they could
elect other and specify a percentage not listed. The median responses was zero for every
option except the forty dollar payment were one more respondent elected the other
category over zero with a median response of one hundred per cent in the other category.
This methodology shares the typical problems associated with contingent valuation, that
is the respondents have very little incentive to tell the truth. This is clearly evident from
the responses received. Forty dollars per acre per year represents a cash lease that most
landlords would unquestionable accept for good produ.ctive crop land, yet twenty-six per
cent of the respondents claimed that they would not cede any of their operations' land
8 I am indebted to Dick Schoney who raised this issue with me in a discussion that we had while we were
working on this study. In the same conversation Dr. Schoney also pointed out that as the lease payments
under this program are cash payments that a certainty equivalent to the crop share may be a more
appropriate comparison then the crop share, however he also conceded that the length ofthe lease is such
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base for such a payment, never mind any of their best land. Thus, based on Gray's
Rosaasen's, Taylor's, Burden's and Stefanson's work it seems likely that an annual
payment in the neighborhood of twenty dollars per acre should attract the one to two
million acres that it appears are necessary to get to the eight million acres of land that the
Bruntland Commission suggests. Assuming that all of these numbers are correct and
doing the multiplication suggests that the total costs to be born by someone to arrive at a
level of habitat that allows sustainable human existence in the agricultural portion of
Saskatchewan will be some twenty to forty million dollars per year.
that a certainty equivalent would need to be adjusted for the risk inherent in the length ofthe contract and
to do so, with any accuracy, is a problem that the discipline needs to further address.
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CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
9.1 Conclusions
If the results ofthe survey reflect true responses by the critical landowners, then it
would appear that had the Bill become law there is good reason to believe that it would
not have proven effective in protecting endangered species and their habitats even given
the relatively pro conservation stance found among Saskatchewan cattle producers. This
likely is a result of the perception amongst the survey sample that the costs that the Bill
was likely to impose on the owners ofprivate land would have exceeded the benefits to
those same landowners. The costs imposed by the Bill can, of course, be avoided by
landowners by the simple expedient ofnot complying with the Bill. The survey further
suggests that the social costs of not complying are low. As the analysis fmds no
significant differences between Canada and the United States in respect to the
enforcement of laws we cannot expect that Canadians would have reacted any differently
towards the Bill, had it become law, than Americans have reacted towards the
Endangered Species Act, 1973. This suggests, that had the Bill become law, that it
would have been reasonable to expect compliance problems with the Bill not unlike those
suffered by the Act.
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As the Bill was not likely to be successful, in regards to private land, as it failed to
address the free rider problem in any meaningful way, the question ofwhether or not
prohibitive policy has any place in what is essentially a land use problem arises. Coupled
with some other policy, such as the American Conservation Reserve Program the
prohibiting ofkilling endangered species may prove more palatable to the land owning
community. As long as there is some incentive that the land owning community can
capture to go along with habitat restoration and protection it will doubtless become more
inclined to engage in such activity. Should this incentive be tied to the presence of
endangered species it will be in the land owning communities best interest to ensure that
endangered species are present, and thus the social costs associated with noncompliance
with legislation like the Bill will rise. Similarly the probability ofdetection should also
rise, if land owners need endangered species present to access some tax payer funded
program it is in their best interest to report individuals who breach prohibitions on the
killing ofendangered species. The combination of these two effects should render
compliance with prohibitive legislation like the Bill more palatable to the land owning
community. It bears notice that if the compensation regulations under Bill C-5 are such
that "they seek an efficient allocation ofcritical habitat that this is essentially what the
Government of Canada will have done.
The work of Gray, Rosaasen, Taylor, Burden and Stefanson suggests that a policy
that pays landowners in the neighborhood of twenty dollars per acre per year should be
sufficient to advance the habitat protection and restoration goal. This would also suggest
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that had the Bill became law and been effectively implemented, which appears to be
unlikely, that landowners, had they remained uncompensated, would have faced costs of
the same magnitude.
9.2 Policy Recommendations
From the foregoing it appears that a policy package meant to address a habitat
driven endangered species problem needs to consider several things. First and foremost it
must address the free rider problem. This is the tendency to under invest in public goods
on the part of individual agents because of their inability to extract the benefits that others
receive from the agent's investment. Secondly, the policy bundle should seek to limit to
as great an extent as is possible any distortions in the economy that encourage the
production ofgrains and oilseeds. Thirdly, it should seek to avoid wasting resources on
attempts to save doomed species. Finally, a successful policy package will require a
broadening of approach from that of species by species protection to a more generalized
ecosystem protection approach.
Table 9.1, that follows, summarizes argument made earlier respecting several
steps that governments have taken or could take that, in the long run, should move land
from grain and oilseed production into pasture and other better forms ofhabitat. These
include the abandonment of GRIP, the repeal of the transportation subsidy under the
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Table 9.1 Summary of Existing and Proposed Policies that can Affect Land Use Decisions
Cost Bearer Direct Habitat Determining Solve Free Riding enforcement
Protection Factor on land owners problems
Remove Land
GRIP Owner no GATT yes no
Remove Land Transportation
WGTA Owner no Policy yes no
Act Land biological
Owner yes evidence no yes
Bill Land biological
Owner yes evidence no yes
Sask. Act Land with recovery cost/benefit likely not but better likely not but better
Owner plan than Act or Bill than Act or Bill
NAWMP tax payers presumably
and hunters yes habitat quality yes no
Conservation Concerned presumably
Easements Citizens yes habitat quality yes no
Conservation tax payers yes presumably
Reserve habitat quality yes no
Bill C-5/C-33 tax payers yes biological yes, if regulations no
evidence drafted correctly
WGTA, the legislative establishment of conservation easements, the North American
Waterfowl Management Plan and paying land owners to make the change like the
American Conservation Reserve Program. As is also readily apparent from table 9.1
there are several steps that governments have taken or could take that are, or can be
expected to prove, adverse to the policy goal ofprotecting habitat. These include the Act,
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the Bill and the Saskatchewan Act. From table 9.1 two groups appear from the
summarized policies, those with and those without enforcement problems. The principal
difference between these two groups ofpolicies, as summarized, is their ability to solve
the free riding problem with respect to landowners.
This ability to solve the free riding problem takes one of two forms. The first is to
compensate landowners and includes: NAWMP, conservation easements, conservation
reserves and Bill C-5/C-33 depending upon the nature of their associated regulations .
The second that includes the removal of the WGTA and GRIP insures that the landowner
has no means to avoid the costs imposed or benefits removed by the policy. A policy
package that uses either or both of these means to overcome the free rider incentive to
under invest will prove useful in achieving habitat protection.
Removing distortions in the economy that promote the production of grains and
oilseeds does not promote direct habitat protection. It will, however, cause land to be
used, by rational agents, in that manner which generates the highest return possible to that
land~ This will lead to marginal grain and oilseed producing land moving into pasture
and other better forms of habitat. Thus, while in Saskatchewan there remain limited
subsidies for grain and oilseed production to add new subsidies would be perverse to the
goal ofprotecting habitat.
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Avoiding a waste of resources on doomed species and broadening the scope of
efforts beyond species by species protection go hand in hand. The challenge is, of
course, how to accomplish this. Essentially both aims require decisions to be made.
Decisions must be made about which species are doomed, about what is necessary to
maintain an ecosystem. The discretion granted to the minister by the Sask. Act is a
means to accomplish this decision making. The administrative law structure that has
developed provides a means to avoid abuse of this discretion on the part of the minister.
The problem with this solution is that ecosystems cannot speak for themselves and the
public interest standing rules in Canada are not generally broad enough to allow others to
speak for an ecosystem. Thus, a policy bundle aimed at protecting habitat should include
procedures for automatic public interest standing to seek judicial review ofeither
ministerial action or inaction, much as the Bill and Bill C-33 and Bill C-5 do. While this
has the potential to generate substantial litigation, allowing actions only against the
minister and granting automatic intervenor standing to anyone who can show a pecuniary
interest while making solicitor and client cost, or perhaps double or treble costs,
automatic against unsuccessful applicants should substantially limit frivolous or
vexatious litigation.
Thus, a policy package to successfully protect habitat in Saskatchewan should
avoid subsidizing grain and oil seed production. It should grant a fairly wide ministerial
discretion to make decisions respecting what should be protected where. This discretion
will need to be subject to the standing and cost changes suggested above. The policy
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package will also have to address the free rider problem in a manner that avoids
compliance problems. Given the current property rights system that is going to require
expenditures from the public purse. Whether these expenditures should take the form of
tax concessions in programs such as the conservation easement program, or direct
payments to landowners for set asides in programs such as the American Conservation
Reserve Program, or subsidies for the production of grazing livestock is beyond the scope
of this study.
9.3 Limitations of this Study
This study is clearly limited in the fact that it relies upon survey data. This has
two key implications. Firstly, given the impracticality ofusing a revealed preferences
surveying technique there is no way to guarantee that the respondents provided responses
that truly reveal their opinions. Secondly, while there is a substantial literature dedicated
to the drawing of statistical inferences regarding a population from a sample, short of a
census there is no means to assure that the sample is truly representative of the
population.
The reliance on the premises set out in section 1.4 is another clear limitation on
this work. If our society is not in the presence of an extinction crisis caused by lack of
habitat that is indicative of a want of a level ofbiodiversity necessary to ensure our
society's existence, then the recommendations in this thesis are ofquestionable use.
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Following Becker (1974) to model compliance inflicts upon the study the inherent
limits of Becker's model. Taken to the extreme under Becker's model any outlawed
behavior can be eliminated by imposing an infinite sentence even if there is an
infinitesimal probability of conviction, unless there is an infinite benefit to be obtained
from breaking the law. That humanity continues to observe the commission of capital
offences for little or no apparent gain that result routinely in conviction and execution
suggests that in the extremes, at least, the model is flawed. This concern is somewhat
alleviated by the fact that the study is concerned with finite penalties and probabilities of
conviction.
This study is also limited by its reliance on the Bruntland Commissions estimate
of 12% of land area as being the necessary habitat to support sustainable human
existence. While this estimate was undoubtedly based on the best evidence available to
the Commission the underlying biological knowledge is not sufficient to detennine if this
estimate is anything beyond a best guess, and in no way can be taken to be optimal.
9.4 Areas for further Research
There is a considerable amount ofwork that remains to be done in this area before
more definitive conclusions can be drawn. In order to detennine ifoptimal levels of
habitat are being achieved requires a far superior understanding of the relationships
between ecosystems and the manner in which they abate pollutants. It will also be
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necessary to achieve a far greater understanding of the internal functions of ecosystems to
ascertain those species whose extinction will have the least impact on humanity. In other
words, humanity has to determine more precisely that level ofnatural capital stock that
cannot be replaced by man made capital. If these relationships and ievels can be
accurately determined then the benefits that society in general receives from the natural
environment should be amenable to more accurate determination, the costs ofachieving
those benefits can be compared to the benefits and optimal levels determined.
The concern expressed in the previous section respecting Becker's model of
compliance suggests another area were further study is necessary. The area of
compliance requires further study. Until economists can explain why capital punishment
fails to provide a complete deterrent to crime our discipline's understanding ofhuman
behavior is suspect.
Finally, given that Bill C-5 has gotten closer to becoming law than any of the
Federal Government's previous legislative attempts in this area, and that Bill C-5 clearly
contemplates compensation two further potential issues arise. How exactly does a
society set the compensation rules to arise at an optimal level of critical habitat? How do
you design the compensation program to minimize relit seeking? That is, how do you
determine who should be compensated? Ifa rancher uses an open grazing system and all
that is necessary to achieve the requisite critical habitat protection is the adoption, by that
rancher of a rotational grazing system why should the rancher be compensated?
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APPENDIX A
Endangered Species Act
16 U.S.C. Sections 1531-1544
TABLE OF CONTENTS
* Section 1531. [ESA Section 2] Congressional findings and declaration
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* Section 1537A. [ESA Section 8A] Convention implementation
* Section 1538. [ESA Section 9] Prohibited acts
* Section 1539. [ESA Section 10] Exceptions
* Section 1540. [ESA Section 11] Penalties and enforcement
Section 1531. Congressional fmdings and declaration ofpurposes and policy
[ESA Section 2]
(a) Findings
The Congress finds and declares that -
(1) various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have been rendered
extinct as a consequence ofeconomic growth and development untempered by adequate
concern and conservation;
(2) other species of fish, wildlife, and plants have been so depleted in numbers that they
are in danger ofor threatened with extinction;
(3) these species of fish, wildlife, and plants are ofaesthetic, ecological, educational,
historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people;
(4) the United States has pledged itself as a sovereign state in the international
community to conserve to the extent practicable the various species of fish or wildlife and
plants facing extinction, pursuant to -
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(A) migratory bird treaties with Canada and Mexico;
(B) the Migratory and Endangered Bird Treaty with Japan;
(C) the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western
Hemisphere;
(D) the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries;
(E) the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean;
(F) the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora; and
(G) other international agreements; and
(5) encouraging the States and other interested parties, through Federal fmancial
assistance and a system of incentives, to develop and maintain conservation programs
which meet national and international standards is a key to meeting the Nation's
international commitments and to better safeguarding, for the benefit of all citizens, the
Nation's heritage in fish, wildlife, and plants.
(b) Purposes
The purposes of this chapter are to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, to provide a
program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species, and to
take such steps as may be appropriate to achieve the purposes of the treaties and
conventions set forth in subsection (a) of this section.
(c) Policy
(1) It is further declared to be the policy of Congress that all Federal departments and
agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species and shall
utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter.
(2) It is further declared to be the policy of Congress that Federal
agencies shall cooperate with State and local agencies to resolve water
resource issues in concert with conservation ofendangered species.
Section 1532. Definitions [ESA Section 3]
For the purposes of this chapter -
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(1) The term "alternative courses of action" means all alternatives and thus is not limited
to original project objectives and agency jurisdiction.
(2) The term "commercial activity" means all activities of industry and trade, including,
but not limited to, the buying or selling of commodities and activities conducted for the
purpose of facilitating such buying and selling: Provided, however, That it does not
include exhibition of commodities by museums or similar cultural or historical
organizations.
(3) The terms "conserve", "conserving", and "conservation" mean to use and the use ofall
methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or
threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter
are no longer necessary. Such methods and procedures include, but are not limited to, all
activities associated with scientific resources management such as research, census, law
enforcement, habitat acquisition and maintenance, propagation, live trapping, and
transplantation, and, in the extraordinary case where population pressures within a given
ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved, may include regulated taking (Section 9(a)(I)(B)
& Section 3(19».
(4) The term "Convention" means the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, signed on March 3, 1973, and the appendices thereto.
(5)(A) The term "critical habitat" for a threatened or endangered species means -
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the species, at the time it is
listed in accordance with the provisions of section 1533 of this title, on which are found
those physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and
(II) which may require special management considerations or protection; and
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species at the time it is
listed in accordance with the provisions of section 1533 ofthis title, upon a determination
by the Secretary that such areas are essential for the conservation of the species.
(B) Critical habitat may be established for those species now listed as threatened or
endangered species for which no critical habitat has heretofore been established as set
forth in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph.
(C) Except in those circumstances determined by the Secretary, critical habitat shall not
include the entire geographical area which can be occupied by the threatened or
endangered species.
(6) The term "endangered species" means any species which is in danger ofextinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range other than a species of the Class Insecta
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determined by the Secretary to constitute a pest whose protection under the provisions of
this chapter would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to man.
(7) The term "Federal agency" means any department, agency, or instrumentality of the
United States.
(8) The term "fish or wildlife" means any member of the animal kingdom, including
without limitation any mammal, fish, bird (including any migratory, nonmigratory, or
endangered bird for which protection is also afforded by treaty or other international
agreement), amphibian, reptile, mollusk, crustacean, arthropod or other invertebrate, and
includes any part, product, egg, or offspring thereof, or the dead body or parts
thereof.
(9) The term "foreign commerce" includes, among other things, any transaction-
(A) between persons within one foreign country;
(B) between persons in two or more foreign countries;
(C) between a person within the United States and a person in a foreign country; or
(D) between persons within the United States, where the fish and wildlife in question are
moving in any country or countries outside the United States.
(10) The term "import" means to land on, bring into, or introduce into, or attempt to land
on, bring into, or introduce into, any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,
whether or not such landing, bringing, or introduction constitutes an importation within
the meaning ofthe customs laws of the United States.
(11) Repealed. Pub.L. 97-304, Section 4(b), Oct. 13, 1982, 96 Stat. 1420.
(12) The term "permit or license applicant" means, when used with respect to an action of
a Federal agency for which exemption is sought under section 1536 ofthis title, any
person whose application to such agency for a permit or license has been denied
primarily because of the application of section 1536(a) of this title to such agency action.
(13) The term "person" means an individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association,
or any other private entity; or any officer, employee, agent, department, or
instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or political
subdivision of a State, or of any foreign government; any State, municipality, or political
subdivision of a State;
or any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
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(14) The term "plant" means any member of the plant kingdom, including seeds, roots
and other parts thereof.
(15) The term "Secretary" means, except as otherwise herein provided, the Secretary of
the Interior or the Secretary of Commerce as program responsibilities are vested pursuant
to the provisions of Reorganization Plan Numbered 4 of 1970; except that with respect to
the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter and the Convention which pertain to the
importation or exportation of terrestrial plants, the term also means the Secretary of
Agriculture.
(16) The term "species" includes any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any
distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds
when mature.
(17) The term "State" means any ofthe several States, the District ofColumbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
(18) The term "State agency" means any State agency, department, board, commission, or
other governmental entity which is responsible for the management and conservation of
fish, plant, or wildlife resources within a State.
(19) The term "take" (Section 9(a)(I)(B) & Section 3(3)) means to harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in-any such
conduct.
(20) The term "threatened species" means any species which is likely to become an
endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of
its range.
(21) The term "United States", when used in a geographical context, includes all States.
Section 1533. Determination ofendangered species and threatened species
[ESA Section 4]
(a) Generally
(1) The Secretary shall by regulation promulgated in accordance with subsection (b) of
this section determine whether any species is an endangered species or a threatened
species because of any of the following factors:
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(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or
range;
(B) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes;
(C) disease or predation;
(D) the inadequacy ofexisting regulatory mechanisms; or
(E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued existence.
(2) With respect to any species over which program responsibilities have been vested in
the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to Reorganization Plan Numbered 4 of 1970 -
(A) in any case in which the Secretary ofCommerce determines that such species
should -
(i) be listed as an endangered species or a threatened species, or
(ii) be changed in status from a threatened species to an endangered species, he shall so
inform the Secretary of the Interior, who shall list such species in accordance with this
section;
(B) in any case in which the Secretary ofCommerce determines that such species
should -
(i) be removed from any list published pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, or
(ii) be changed in status from an endangered species to a threatened species, he shall
recommend such action to the Secretary of the Interior, and the Secretary of the Interior,
if he concurs in the recommendation, shall implement such action; and
(C) the Secretary of the Interior may not list or remove from any list any such species,
and may not change the status of any such species which are listed, without a prior
favorable determination made pursuant to this section by the Secretary of Commerce.
(3) The Secretary, by regulation promulgated in accordance with subsection (b) of this
section and to the maximum extent prudent and determinable -
(A) shall, concurrently with making a determination under paragraph (1) that a species is
an endangered species or a threatened species, designate any habitat of such species
which is then considered to be critical habitat; and
(B) may, from time-to-time thereafter as appropriate, revise such designation.
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(b) Basis for determinations
(l)(A) The Secretary shall make determinations required by subsection (a) (1) of this
section solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available to him
after conducting a review ofthe status of the species and after taking into account those
efforts, if any, being made by any State or foreign nation, or any political subdivision of a
State or foreign nation, to protect such species, whether by predator control, protection of
habitat and food supply, or other conservation practices, within any area under its
jurisdiction, or on the high seas.
(B) In carrying out this section, the Secretary shall give consideration to species which
have been-
(i) designated as requiring protection from unrestricted commerce by any foreign nation,
or pursuant to any international agreement; or
(ii) identified as in danger of extinction, or likely to become so within the foreseeable
future, by any State agency or by any agency of a foreign nation that is responsible for
the conservation of fish or wildlife or plants.
(2) The Secretary shall designate critical habitat, and make revisions thereto, under
subsection (a) (3) of this section on the basis of the best scientific data available and after
taking into consideration the economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of
specifying any particular area as critical habitat. The Secretary may exclude any area
from critical habitat if he determines that the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the
benefits of specifyingsuch area as part of the critical habitat, unless he determines, based
on the best scientific and commercial data available, that the failure to designate such
area as critical habitat will result in the extinction ofthe species concerned.
(3)(A) To the maximum extent practicable, within 90 days after receiving the petition of
an interested person under section 553(e) of Title 5 to add a species to, or to remove a
species from, either of the lists published under subsection (c) of this section, the
Secretary shall make a fmding as to whether the petition presents substantial scientific or
commercial information indicating that the petitioned action may be warranted. If such
a petition is found to present such information, the Secretary shall promptly commence a
review of the status of the species concerned. The Secretary shall promptly publish each
finding made under this subparagraph in the Federal Register.
(B) Within 12 months after receiving a petition that is found under subparagraph (A) to
present substantial information indicating that the petitioned action may be warranted, the
Secretary shall make one of the following findings:
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(i) The petitioned action is not warranted, in which case the Secretary shall promptly
publish such finding in the Federal Register.
(ii) The petitioned action is warranted, in which case the Secretary shall promptly publish
in the Federal Register a general notice and the complete text of a proposed regulation to
implement such action in accordance with paragraph (5).
(iii) The petitioned action is warranted, but that -
(I) the immediate proposal and timely promulgation ofa final regulation implementing
the petitioned action in accordance with paragraphs (5) and (6) is precluded by pending
proposals to determine whether any species is an endangered species or a threatened
species, and
(II) expeditious progress is being made to add qualified species to either of the lists
published under subsection (c) of this section and to remove from such lists species for
which the protections of this chapter are no longer necessary, in which case the Secretary
shall promptly publish such finding in the Federal Register, together with a description
and evaluation of the reasons and data on which the finding is based.
(C) (i) A petition with respect to which a finding is made under subparagraph (B)(iii)
shall be treated as a petition that is resubmitted to the Secretary under subparagraph (A)
on the date of such finding and that presents substantial scientific or commercial
information that the petitioned action may be warranted.
(ii) Any negative fmding described in subparagraph (A) and any finding described in
subparagraph (B) (i) or (iii) shall be subject to judicial review.
(iii) The Secretary shall implement a system to monitor effectively the status of all
species with respect to which a fmding is made under subparagraph (B)(iii) and shall
make prompt use of the authority under paragraph 7 to prevent a significant risk to the
well being of any such species.
(D) (i) To the maximum extent practicable, within 90 days after receiving the petition of
an interested person under section 553(e) of Title 5, to revise a critical habitat
designation, the Secretary shall make a finding as to whether the petition presents
substantial scientific information, indicating that the revision may be warranted. The
Secretary shall promptly publish such fmding in the Federal Register.
(ii) Within 12 months after receiving a petition that is found under clause (i) to present
substantial information indicating that the requested revision may be warranted, the
Secretary shall determine how he intends to proceed with the requested revision, and
shall promptly publish notice of such intention in the Federal Register.
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(4) Except as provided in paragraphs (5) and (6) of this subsection, the provisions of
section 553 of Title 5 (relating to rulemaking procedures), shall apply to any regulation
promulgated to carry out the purposes of this chapter.
(5) With respect to any regulation proposed by the Secretary to implement a
determination, designation, or revision referred to in subsection (a) (1) or (3) of this
section, the Secretary shall -
(A) not less than 90 days before the effective date of the regulation-
(i) publish a general notice and the complete text of the proposed regulation in the
Federal Register, and
(ii) give actual notice of the proposed regulation (including the complete text of the
regulation) to the State agency in each State in which the species is believed to occur, and
to each county or equivalent jurisdiction in which the species is believed to occur, and
invite the comment of such agency, and each such jurisdiction, thereon;
(B) insofar as practical, and in cooperation with the Secretary of State, give notice of the
proposed regulation to each foreign nation in which the species is believed to occur or
whose citizens harvest the species on the high seas, and invite the comment of such
nation thereon;
(C) give notice of the proposed regulation to such professional scientific organizations as
he deems appropriate;
(D) publish a summary ofthe proposed regulation in a newspaper ofgeneral circulation
in each area of the United States in which the species is believed to occur; and
(E) promptly hold one public hearing on the proposed regulation if any person files a
request for such a hearing within 45 days after the date ofpublication of general notice.
(6)(A) Within the one-year period beginning on the date on which general notice is
published in accordance with paragraph (5) (A) (i) regarding a proposed regulation, the
Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register-
(i) if a determination as to whether a species is an endangered species or a threatened
species, or a revision of critical habitat, is involved, either -
(I) a final regulation to implement such determination,
(II) a fmal regulation to implement such revision or a finding that such revision should
not be made,
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(III) notice that such one-year period is being extended under subparagraph (B) (i), or
(IV) notice that the proposed regulation is being withdrawn under subparagraph (B) (ii),
tog'ether with the fmding on which such withdrawal is based; or
(ii) subject to subparagraph (C), if a designation of critical habitat is involved, either -
(I) a final regulation to implement such designation, or
(II) notice that such one-year period is being extended under such subparagraph.
(B) (i) If the Secretary finds with respect to a proposed regulation referred to in
subparagraph (A) (i) that there is substantial disagreement regarding the sufficiency or
accuracy of the available data relevant to the determination or revision concerned, the
Secretary may extend the one-year period specified in subparagraph (A) for not more
than six months for purposes of soliciting additional data.
(ii) If a proposed regulation referred to in subparagraph (A) (i) is not promulgated as a
final regulation within such one-year period (or longer period if extension under clause
(i) applies) because the Secretary finds that there is not sufficient evidence to justify the
action proposed by the regulation, the Secretary shall immediately withdraw the
regulation. The finding on which a withdrawal is based shall be subject to judicial review.
The Secretary may not propose a regulation that has previously been withdrawn under
this clause unless he determines that sufficient new information is available to warrant
such proposal.
(iii) If the one-year period specified in subparagraph (A) is extended under clause (i) with
respect to a proposed regulation, then before the close of such extended period the
Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register either a final regulation to implement the
determination or revision concerned, a fmding that the revision should not be made, or a
notice of withdrawal of the regulation under clause (ii), together with the fmding on
which the withdrawal is based.
(C) A final regulation designating critical habitat of an endangered species or a
threatened species shall be published concurrently with the final regulation implementing
the determination that such species is endangered or threatened, unless the Secretary
deems that - .
(i) it is essential to the conservation of such species that the regulation implementing such
determination be promptly published; or
(ii) critical habitat of such species is not then determinable, in which case the Secretary,
with respect to the proposed regulation to designate such habitat, may extend the one-
year period specified in subparagraph (A) by not more than one additional year, but not
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later than the close of such additional year the Secretary must publish a final regulation,
based on such data as may be available at that time, designating, to the maximum extent
prudent, such habitat.
(7) Neither paragraph (4), (5), or (6) of this subsection nor section 553 of Title 5 shall
apply to any regulation issued by the Secretary in regard to any emergency posing a
significant risk to the well-being of any species offish or wildlife or plants, but only if -
(A) at the time ofpublication of the regulation in the Federal Register the Secretary
publishes therein detailed reasons why such regulation is necessary; and
(B) in the case such regulation applies to resident species of fish or wildlife, or plants, the
Secretary gives actual notice of such regulation to the State agency in each State in which
such species is believed to occur.
Such regulation shall, at the discretion of the Secretary, take effect immediately upon the
publication of the regulation in the Federal Register. Any regulation promulgated under
the authority of this paragraph shall cease to have force and effect at the close of the 240-
day period following the date of publication unless, during such 240-day period, the
rulemaking procedures which would apply to such regulation without regard to this
paragraph are complied with. If at any time after issuing an emergency regulation the
Secretary determines, on the basis of the best appropriate data available to him, that
substantial evidence does not exist to warrant such regulation, he shall withdraw it.
(8) The publication in the Federal Register of any proposed or fmal regulation which is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this chapter shall include a summary
by the Secretary of the data on which such regulation is based and shall show the
relationship of such data to such regulation; and ifsuch regulation designates or revises
critical habitat, such summary shall, to the maximum extent practicable, also include a
brief description and evaluation ofthose activities (whether public or private) which, in
the opinion of the Secretary, if undertaken may adversely modify such habitat, or may be
affected by such designation.
(c) Lists
(1) The Secretary of the Interior shall publish in the Federal Register a list ofal! species
determined by him or the Secretary ofCommerce to be endangered species and a list of
all species determined by him or the Secretary of Commerce to be threatened species.
Each list shall refer to the species contained therein by scientific and common name or
names, if any, specify with respect to each such species over what portion of its range it
is endangered or threatened, and specify any critical habitat within such range. The
Secretary shall from time to time revise each list published under the authority of this
subsection to reflect recent determinations, designations, and revisions made in
accordance with subsections (a) and (b) of this section.
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(2) The Secretary shall -
(A) conduct, at least once every five years, a review ofall species included in a list which
is published pursuant to paragraph (1) and which is in effect at the time of such review;
and
(B) determine on the basis of such review whether any such species should -
(i) be removed from such list;
(ii) be changed in status from an endangered species to a threatened species; or
(iii) be changed in status from a threatened species to an endangered species.
Each determination under subparagraph (B) shall be made in accordance with the
provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section.
(d) Protective regulations
Whenever any species is listed as a threatened species pursuant to subsection (c) of this
section, the Secretary shall issue such regulations as he deems necessary and advisable to
provide for the conservation of such species. The Secretary may by regulation prohibit
with respect to any threatened species any act prohibited under section 1538(a) (1) of this
title, in the case offish or wildlife, or section 1538(a) (2) of this title, in the case of
plants, with respect to endangered species; except that with respect to the taking of
resident species of fish or wildlife, such regulations shall apply in any State which has
entered into a cooperative agreement pursuant to section 1535(c) of this title only to the
extent that such regulations have also been adopted by such State.
(e) Similarity of appearance cases
The Secretary may, by regulation ofcommerce or taking, and to the extent he deems
advisable, treat any species as an endangered species or threatened species even though it
is not listed pursuant to this section ifhe fmds that -
(A) such species so closely resembles in appearance, at the point in question, a species
which has been listed pursuant to such section that enforcement personnel would have
substantial difficulty in attempting to differentiate between the listed and unlisted species;
(B) the effect of this substantial difficulty is an additional threat to an endangered or
threatened species; and
(C) such treatment ofan unlisted species will substantially facilitate the enforcement and
further the policy of this chapter.
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(t) Recovery plans
(1) The Secretary shall develop and implement plans (hereinafter in this subsection
referred to as "recovery plans") for the conservation and survival of endangered species
and threatened species listed pursuant to this section, unless he fmds that such a plan will
not promote the conservation of the species. The Secretary, in developing and
implementing recovery plans, shall, to the maximum extent practicable -
(A) give priority to those endangered species or threatened species, without regard to
taxonomic classification, that are most likely to benefit from such plans, particularly
those species that are, or may be, in conflict with construction or other development
projects or other forms ofeconomic activity;
(B) incorporate in each plan -
(i) a description of such site-specific management actions as may be necessary to achieve
the plan's goal for the conservation and survival of the species;
(ii) objective, measurable criteria which, when met, would result in a determination, in
accordance with the provisions ofthis section, that the species be removed from the list;
and
(iii) estimates of the time required and the cost to carry out those measures needed to
achieve the plan's goal and to achieve intermediate steps toward that goal.
(2) The Secretary, in developing and implementing recovery plans, may procure the
services of appropriate public and private agencies and institutions, and other qualified
persons. Recovery teams appointed pursuant to this subsection shall not be subject to the
Federal Advisory Committee Act.
(3) The Secretary shall report every two years to the Committee on Environment and
Public Works of the Senate and the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the
House of Representatives on the status of efforts to develop and implement recovery
plans for all species listed pursuant to this section and on the status ofall species for
which such plans have been developed.
(4) The Secretary shall, prior to final approval of a new or revised recovery plan, provide
public notice and an opportunity for public review and comment on such plan. The
Secretary shall consider all information presented during the public comment period prior
to approval of the plan.
(5) Each Federal agency shall, prior to implementation ofa new or revised recovery plan,
consider all information presented during the public comment period under paragraph (4).
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(g) Monitoring
(1) The Secretary shall implement a system in cooperation with the States to monitor
effectively for not less than five years the status of all species which have recovered to
the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary
and which, in accordance with the provisions of this section, have been removed from
either of the lists published under subsection (c) of this section.
(2) The Secretary shall make prompt use of the authority under paragraph 7 of subsection
(b) of this section to prevent a significant risk to the well being of any such recovered
speCIes.
(h) Agency guidelines; publication in Federal Register; scope; proposals
and amendments: notice and opportunity for comments
The Secretary shall establish, and publish in the Federal Register, agency guidelines to
insure that the purposes of this section are achieved efficiently and effectively. Such
guidelines shall include, but are not limited to -
(1) procedures for recording the receipt and the disposition of petitions submitted under
subsection (b)(3) of this section;
(2) criteria for making the findings required under such subsection with respect to
petitions;
(3) a ranking system to assist in the identification of species that should receive priority
review under subsection (a)(l) of this section; and
(4) a system for developing and implementing, on a priority basis, recovery plans under
subsection (t) of this section.
The· Secretary shall provide to the public notice of, and opportunity to submit written
comments on, any guideline (including any amendment thereto) proposed to be
established under this subsection.
(i) Submission to State agency ofjustification for regulations
inconsistent with State agency's comments or petition
If, in the case of any regulation proposed by the Secretary under the authority of this
section, a State agency to which notice thereof was given in accordance with subsection
(b)(5)(A)(ii) of this section files comments disagreeing with all or part of the proposed
regulation, and the Secretary issues a final regulation which is in conflict with such
comments, or if the Secretary fails to adopt a regulation pursuant to an action petitioned
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by a State agency under subsection (b)(3) of this section, the Secretary shall submit to the
State agency a written justification for his failure to adopt regulations consistent with the
agency's comments or petition.
Section 1534 Land Acquisition [ESA Section 5] [omitted]
Section 1535. Cooperation with States [ESA Section 6]
(a) Generally
In carrying out the program authorized by this chapter, the Secretary shall cooperate to
the maximum extent practicable with the States Secretary shall cooperate to the
maximum extent practicable with the States. Such cooperation shall include consultation
with the States concerned before acquiring any land or water, or interest therein, for the
purpose ofconserving any endangered species or threatened species.
Section 1536. Interagency cooperation [ESA Section 7]
(a) Federal agency actions and consultations
(1) The Secretary shall review other programs administered by him and utilize such
programs in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter. All other Federal agencies shall,
in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities in
furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs for the conservation
of endangered species and threatened species listed pursuant to section 1533 ofthis
title.
(2) Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the
Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency
(hereinafter in this section referred to as an "agency action") is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification ofhabitat of such species which is determined by the
Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical, unless such
agency has been granted an exemption for such action by the Committee pursuant to
subsection (h) of this section. In fulfilling the requirements of this paragraph each agency
shall use the best scientific and commercial data available.
(3) Subject to such guidelines as the Secretary may establish, a Federal agency shall
consult with the Secretary on any prospective agency action at the request of, and in
cooperation with, the prospective permit or license applicant if the applicant has reason to
believe that an endangered species or a threatened species may be present in the area
affected by his project and that implementation of such action will likely affect such
species.
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(4) Each Federal agency shall confer with the Secretary on any agency action which is
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any species proposed to be listed under
section 1533 ofthis title or result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical
habitat proposed to be designated for such species. This paragraph does not require a
limitation on the commitment of resources as described in subsection (d) of this
section.
(b) Opinion of Secretary
(1)(A) Consultation under subsection (a) (2) of this section with respect to any agency
action shall be concluded within the 90-day period beginning on the date on which
initiated or, subject to subparagraph (B), within such other period of time as is mutually
agreeable to the Secretary and the Federal agency.
(B) In the case of an agency action involving a pennit or license applicant, the Secretary
and the Federal agency may not mutually agree to conclude consultation within a period
exceeding 90 days unless the Secretary, before the close of the 90th day referred to in
subparagraph (A)-
(i) if the consultation period proposed to be agreed to will end before the 150th day after
the date on which consultation was initiated, submits to the applicant a written statement
setting forth -
(I) the reasons why a longer period is required,
(II) the information that is required to complete the consultation, and
(III) the estimated date on which consultation will be completed; or
(ii) if the consultation period proposed to be agreed to will end 150 or more days after the
date on which consultation was initiated, obtains the consent of the applicant to such
period.
The Secretary and the Federal agency may mutually agree to extend a consultation period
established under the preceding sentence if the Secretary, before the close of such period,
obtains the consent of the applicant to the extension. .
(2) Consultation under subsection (a) (3) of this section shall be concluded within such
period as is agreeable to the Secretary, the Federal agency, and the applicant concerned.
(3)(A) Promptly after conclusion of consultation under paragraph (2) or (3) of subsection
(a) of this section, the Secretary shall provide to the Federal agency and the applicant, if
any, a written statement setting forth the Secretary's opinion, and a summary of the
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information on which the opinion is based, detailing how the agency action affects the
species or its critical habitat. Ifjeopardy or adverse modification is found, the Secretary
shall suggest those reasonable and prudent alternatives which he believes would not
violate subsection (a) (2) of this section and can be taken by the Federal agency or
applicant in implementing the agency action.
(B) Consultation under subsection (a) (3) of this section, and an opimon issued by the .
Secretary incident to such consultation, regarding an agency action shall be treated
respectively as a consultation under subsection (a) (2) of this section, and as an opinion
issued after consultation under such subsection, regarding that action if the Secretary
reviews the action before it is commenced by the Federal agency and fmds, and notifies
such agency, that no significant changes have been made with respect to the action and
that no significant change has occurred regarding the information used during the initial
consultation.
(4) If after consultation under subsection (a)(2) of this section, the Secretary concludes
that -
(A) the agency action will not violate such subsection, or offers reasonable and prudent
alternatives which the Secretary believes would not violate such subsection;
(B) the taking ofan endangered species or a threatened species incidental to the agency
action will not violate such subsection; and
(C) if an endangered species or threatened species of a marine mammal is involved, the
taking is authorized pursuant to section 1371(a)(5) of this title; the Secretary shall
provide the Federal agency and the applicant concerned, if any, with a written statement
that -
(i) specifies the impact of such incidental taking on the species,
(ii) specifies those reasonable and prudent measures that the Secretary considers
necessary or appropriate to minimize such impact,
(iii) in the case ofmarine mammals, specifies those measures that are necessary to
comply with section 1371(a)(5) of this title with regard to such taking, and
(iv) sets forth the terms and conditions (including, but not limited to, reporting
requirements) that must be complied with by the Federal agency or applicant (if any), or
both, to implement the measures specified under clauses (ii) and (iii).
(c) Biological assessment
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(1) To facilitate compliance with the requirements of subsection (a) (2) of this section,
each Federal agency shall, with respect to any agency action of such agency for which no
contract for construction has been entered into and for which no construction has begun
on November 10, 1978, request of the Secretary information whether any species which
is listed or proposed to be listed may be present in the area of such proposed action. If the
Secretary advises, based on the best scientific and commercial data available, that such
species may be present, such agency shall conduct a biological assessment for the
purpose of identifying any endangered species or threatened species which is likely to be
affected by such action. Such assessment shall be completed within 180 days after the
date on which initiated (or within such other period as is mutually agreed to by the
Secretary and such agency, except that if a permit or license applicant is involved, the
180-day period may not be extended unless such agency provides the applicant, before
the close of such period, with a written statement setting forth the estimated length of the
proposed extension and the reasons therefor) and, before any contract for construction is
entered into and before construction is begun with respect to such action. Such
assessment may be undertaken as part of a Federal agency's compliance with the
requirements of section 102 ofthe National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C.
4332).
(2) Any person who may wish to apply for an exemption under subsection (g) of this
section for that action may conduct a biological assessment to identify any endangered
species or threatened species which is likely to be affected by such action. Any such
biological assessment must, however, be conducted in cooperation with the Secretary and
under the supervision of the appropriate Federal agency.
(d) Limitation on commitment of resources
After initiation of consultation required under subsection (a) (2) of this section, the
Federal agency and the pennit or license applicant shall not make any irreversible or
irretrievable commitment of resources with respect to the agency action which has the
effect of foreclosing the formulation or implementation ofany reasonable and prudent
alternative measures which would not violate subsection (a) (2) of this section.
(e) Endangered Species Committee
(1) There is established a committee to be known as the Endangered Species Committee
(hereinafter in this section referred to as the· "Committee").
(2) The Committee shall review any application submitted to it pursuant to this section
and determine in accordance with subsection (h) of this section whether or not to grant an
exemption from the requirements of subsection (a) (2) of this section for the action set
forth in such application.
(3) The Committee shall be composed of seven members as follows:
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(A) The Secretary of Agriculture.
(B) The Secretary of the Army.
(C) The Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors.
(D) The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.
(E) The Secretary of the Interior.
(F) The Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
(G) The President, after consideration of any recommendations received pursuant to
subsection (g) (2) (B) of this section shall appoint one individual from each affected
State, as determined by the Secretary, to be a member of the Committee for the
consideration of the application for exemption for an agency action with respect to which
such recommendations are made, not later than 30 days after an application is submitted
pursuant to this section.
(4)(A) Members of the Committee shall receive additional pay on account of their service
on the Committee.
(B) While away from their homes or regular places ofbusiness in the performance of
services for the Committee, members of the Committee shall be allowed travel expenses,
including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as persons employed
intermittently in the Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703 of
Title 5.
(5)(A) Five members of the Committee or their representatives shall constitute a quorum
for the transaction ofany function of the Committee, except that, in no case shall any
representative be considered in determining the existence of a quorum for the transaction
of any function of the Committee if that function involves a vote by the Committee on
any matter before the Committee.
(B) The Secretary of the Interior shall be the Chainnan of the Committee.
(C) The Committee shall meet at the call of the Chairman or five of its members.
(D) All meetings and records of the Committee shall be open to the public.
(6) Upon request of the Committee, the head of any Federal agency is authorized to
detail, on a nonreimbursable basis, any of the personnel of such agency to the Committee
to assist it in carrying out its duties under this section.
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(7)(A) The Committee may for the purpose of carrying out its duties under this section
hold such hearings, sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, and receive
such evidence, as the Committee deems advisable.
(B) When so authorized by the Committee, any member or agent of the Committee may
take any action which the Committee is authorized to take by this paragraph.
(C) Subject to the Privacy Act [5 U.S.C.A. Section 552a], the Committee may secure
directly from any Federal agency infonnation necessary to enable it to carry out its duties
under this section. Upon request of the Chainnan of the Committee, the head of such
Federal agency shall furnish such infonnation to the Committee.
(D) The Committee may use the United States mails in the same manner and upon the
same conditions as a Federal agency.
(E) The Administrator of General Services shall provide to the Committee on a
reimbursable basis such administrative support services as the Committee may request.
(8) In carrying out its duties under this section, the Committee may promulgate and
amend such rules, regulations, and procedures, and issue and amend such orders as it
deems necessary.
(9) For the purpose of obtaining infonnation necessary for the consideration of an
application for an exemption under this section the Committee may issue subpoenas for
the attendance and testimony ofwitnesses and the production of relevant papers, books,
and documents.
(10) In no case shall any representative, including a representative of a member
designated pursuant to paragraph (3) (G) of this subsection, be eligible to cast a vote on
behalfof any member.
(f) Promulgation of regulations; fonn and contents of exemption application
Not later than 90 days after November 10, 1978, the Secretary shall promulgate
regulations which set forth the fonn and manner in which applications for exemption
shall be submitted to the Secretary and the infonnatioIi to be contained in such
applications. Such regulations shall require that infonnation submitted in an application
by the head of any Federal agency with respect to any agency action include, but not be
limited to-
(1) a description of the consultation process carried out pursuant to subsection (a) (2) of
this section between the head ofthe Federal agency and the Secretary; and
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(2) a statement describing why such action cannot be altered or modified to conform with
the requirements of subsection (a) (2) of this section.
(g) Application for exemption; report to Committee
(1) A Federal agency, the Governor of the State in which an agency action will occur, if
any, or a permit or license applicant may apply to the Secretary for an exemption for an
agency action of such agency if, after consultation under subsection (a) (2) of this section,
the Secretary's opinion under subsection (b) of this section indicates that the agency
action would violate subsection (a) (2) of this section. An application for an exemption
shall be considered initially by the Secretary in the manner provided for in this
subsection, and shall be considered by the Committee for a final detennination under
subsection (h) of this section after a report is made pursuant to paragraph (5). The
applicant for an exemption shall be referred to as the "exemption applicant" in this
section.
(2)(A) An exemption applicant shall submit a written application to the Secretary, in a
form prescribed under subsection (f) of this section, not later than 90 days after the
completion of the consultation process; except that, in the case of any agency action
involving a permit or license applicant, such application shall be submitted not later than
90 days after the date on which the Federal agency concerned takes fmal agency action
with respect to the issuance of the permit or license. For purposes of the preceding
sentence, the term "final agency action" mean
(i) a disposition by an agency with respect to the issuance of a permit or license that is
subject to administrative review, whether or not such disposition is subject to judicial
review; or
(ii) if administrative review is sought with respect to such disposition, the decision
resulting after such review. Such application shall set forth the reasons why the
exemption applicant considers that the agency action meets the requirements for an
exemption under this subsection.
(B) Upon receipt of an application for exemption for an agency action under paragraph
(1), the Secretary shall promptly
(i) notify the Governor of each affected State, if any, as determined by the Secretary, and
request the Governors so notified to recommend individuals to be appointed to the
Endangered Species Committee for consideration of such application; and
(ii) publish notice of receipt of the application in the Federal Register, including a
summary of the information contained in the application and a description of the agency
action with respect to which the application for exemption has been filed.
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(3) The Secretary shall within 20 days after the receipt of an application for exemption, or
within such other period of time as is mutually agreeable to the exemption applicant and
the Secretary -
(A) determine that the Federal agency concerned and the exemption applicant have -
(i) carried out the consultation responsibilities described in subsection (a) of this section
in good faith and made a reasonable and responsible effort to develop and fairly consider
modifications or reasonable and prudent alternatives to the proposed agency action which
would not violate subsection (a) (2) of this section;
(ii) conducted any biological assessment required by subsection (c) of this section; and
(iii) to the extent determinable within the time provided herein, refrained from making
any irreversible or irretrievable commitment ofresources prohibited by subsection (d) of
this section; or
(B) deny the application for exemption because the Federal agency concerned or the
exemption applicant have not met the requirements set forth in subparagraph (A) (i), (ii),
and (iii).
The denial of an application under subparagraph (B) shall be considered final agency
action for purposes ofchapter 7 ofTitle 5.
(4) If the Secretary determines that the Federal agency concerned and the exemption
applicant have met the requirements set forth in paragraph (3) (A) (i), (ii), and (iii) he
shall, in consultation with the Members of the Committee, hold a hearing on the
application for exemption in accordance with sections 554, 555, and 556 (other than
subsection (b) (1) and (2) thereof) of Title 5 and prepare the report to be submitted
pursuant to paragraph (5).
(5) Within 140 days after making the determinations under paragraph (3) or within such
other period of time as is mutually agreeable to the exemption applicant and the
Secretary, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee a report discussing -
(A) the availability of reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action, and the
nature and extent of the benefits of the agency action and ofalternative courses ofaction
consistent with conserving the species or the critical habitat;
(B) a summary ofthe evidence concerning whether or not the agency action is in the
public interest and is of national or regional significance;
(C) appropriate reasonable mitigation and enhancement measures which should be
considered by the Committee; and
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(D) whether the Federal agency concerned and the exemption applicant refrained from
making any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources prohibited by
subsection (d) of this section.
(6) To the extent practicable within the time required for action under subsection (g) of
this section, and except to the extent inconsistent with the requirements of this section,
the consideration of any application for an exemption under this section and the conduct
of any hearing under this subsection shall be in accordance with sections 554, 555, and
556 (other than subsection (b) (3) of section 556) of Title 5.
(7) Upon request of the Secretary, the head of any Federal agency is authorized to detail,
on a nonreimbursable basis, any ofthe personnel ofsuch agency to the Secretary to assist
him in carrying out his duties under this section.
(8) All meetings and records resulting from activities pursuant to this subsection shall be
open to the public.
(h) Grant of exemption
(1) The Committee shall make a final determination whether or not to grant an exemption
within 30 days after receiving the report of the Secretary pursuant to subsection (g) (5) of
this section. The Committee shall grant an exemption from the requirements of
subsection (a) (2) of this section for an agency action it: by a vote ofnot less than five of
its members voting in person -
(A) it determines on the record, based on the report of the Secretary, the record of the
hearing held under subsection (g) (4) of this section and on such other testimony or
evidence as it may receive, that -
(i) there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action;
(ii) the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits of alternative courses of
action consistent with conserving the species or its critical habitat, and such action is in
the public interest;
(iii) the action is of regional or national significance; and
(iv) neither the Federal agency concerned nor the exemption applicant made any
irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources prohibited by subsection (d) of this
section; and
(B) it establishes such reasonable mitigation and enhancement measures, including, but
not limited to, live propagation, transplantation, and habitat acquisition and improvement,
188
as are necessary and appropriate to minimize the adverse effects of the agency action
upon the endangered species, threatened species, or critical habitat concerned.
Any final determination by the Committee under this subsection shall be considered final
agency action for purposes of chapter 7 ofTitle 5.
(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), an exemption for an agency action
granted under paragraph (1) shall constitute a permanent exemption with respect to all
endangered or threatened species for the purposes of completing such agency action -
(i) regardless whether the species was identified in the biological assessment; and
(ii) only if a biological assessment has been conducted under subsection (c) of this
section with respect to such agency action.
(B) An exemption shall be permanent under subparagraph (A) unless-
(i) the Secretary finds, based on the best scientific and commercial data available, that
such exemption would result in the extinction of a species that was not the subject of
consultation under subsection (a) (2) of this section or was not identified in any biological
assessment conducted under subsection (c) of this section, and
(ii) the Committee determines within 60 days after the date of the Secretary's fmding that
the exemption should not be permanent.
If the Secretary makes a finding described in clause (i), the Committee shall meet with
respect to the matter within 30 days after the date of the finding.
(i) Review by Secretary of State; violation of international treaty or other international
obligation of United States
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the Committee shall be prohibited
from considering for exemption any application made to it, if the Secretary of State, after
a review of the proposed agency action and its potential implications, and after hearing,
certifies, in writing, to the Committee within 60 days of any application made under this
section that the granting of any such exemption and the carrying out of such action would
be in violation of an international treaty obligation or other international obligation of the
United States. The Secretary of State shall, at the time of such certification, publish a
copy thereof in the Federal Register.
(j) Exemption for national security reasons
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Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the Committee shall grant an
exemption for any agency action if the Secretary of Defense finds that such exemption is
necessary for reasons ofnational security.
(k) Exemption decision not considered major Federal action; environmental impact
statement
An exemption decision by the Committee under this section shall not be a major Federal
action for purposes of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 [42 U.S.C.A.
Section 4321 et seq.]: Provided, That an environmental impact statement which discusses
the impacts upon endangered species or threatened species or their critical habitats shall
have been previously prepared with respect to any agency action exempted by such order.
(1) Committee order granting exemption; cost of mitigation and enhancement measures;
report by applicant to Council on Environmental Quality
(I) If the Committee determines under subsection (h) of this section that an exemption
should be granted with respect to any agency action, the Committee shall issue an order
granting the exemption and specifying the mitigation and enhancement measures
established pursuant to subsection (h) of this section which shall be carried out and paid
for by the exemption applicant in implementing the agency action. All necessary
mitigation and enhancement measures shall be authorized prior to the implementing of
the agency action and funded concurrently with all other project features.
(2) The applicant receiving such exemption shall include the costs of such mitigation and
enhancement measures within the overall costs of continuing the proposed action.
Notwithstanding the preceding sentence the costs of such measures shall not be treated as
project costs for the purpose of computing benefit-cost or other ratios for the proposed
action. Any applicant may request the Secretary to carry out such mitigation and
enhancement measures. The costs incurred by the Secretary in carrying out any such
measures shall be paid by the applicant receiving the exemption. No later than one year
after the granting of an exemption, the exemption applicant shall submit to the Council
on Environmental Quality a report describing its compliance with the mitigation and
enhancement measures prescribed by this section. Such a report shall be submitted
annually until all such mitigation and enhancement measures have been completed.
Notice of the public availability of such reports shall be published in the Federal
Register by the Council on Environmental Quality. .
(m) Notice requirement for citizen suits not applicable
The 60-day notice requirement of section I540(g) of this title shall not apply with respect
to review of any final determination of the Committee under subsection (h) of this section
granting an exemption from the requirements of subsection (a) (2) of this section.
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(n) Judicial review
Any person, as defined by section 1532(13) of this title, may obtain judicial review,
under chapter 7 of Title 5, of any decision of the Endangered Species Committee under
subsection (h) of this section in the United States Court of Appeals for (1) any circuit
wherein the agency action concerned will be, or is being, carried out, or (2) in any case in
which the agency action will be, or is being, carried out outside ofany circuit, the District
of Columbia, by filing in such court within 90 days after the date of issuance of the
decision, a written petition for review. A copy of such petition shall be transmitted by the
clerk of the court to the Committee and the Committee shall file in the court the record in
the proceeding, as provided in section 2112, of Title 28. Attorneys designated by the
Endangered Species Committee may appear for, and represent the Committee in any
action for review under this subsection.
(0) Exemption as providing exception on taking ofendangered species
Notwithstanding sections 1533(d) and 1538(a)(I)(B) and (C) of this title, sections 1371
and 1372 of this title, or any regulation promulgated to implement any such section -
(1) any action for which an exemption is granted under subsection (h) of this section shall
not be considered to be a taking of any endangered species or threatened species with
respect to any activity which is necessary to carry out such action; and
(2) any taking that is in compliance with the terms and conditions specified in a written
statement provided under subsection (b)(4)(iv) of this section shall not be considered to
be a prohibited taking of the species concerned.
(P) Exemptions in Presidentially declared disaster areas
In any area which has been declared by the President to be a major disaster area under the
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [42 U.S.C.A. Section 5121 et seq.], the
President is authorized to make the determinations required by subsections (g) and (h) of
this section for any project for the repair or replacement of a public facility substantially
as it existed prior to the disaster under section 405 or 406 of the Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act [42 U.S.C.A. ss 5171 or 5172], and which the President
determines (1) is necessary to prevent the recurrence of such a natural disaster and to
reduce the potential loss of human life, and (2) to involve an emergency situation which
does not allow the ordinary procedures of this section to be followed. Notwithstanding
any other provision of this section, the Committee shall accept the determinations of the
President under this subsection.
Section 1537. International cooperation [ESA Section 8]
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(a) Financial assistance
As a demonstration of the commitment of the United States to the worldwide protection
of endangered species and threatened species, the President may, subject to the provisions
of section 1306 of Title 31, use foreign currencies accruing to the United States
Government under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 [7
U.S.C.A. Section 1691 et seq.] or any other law to provide to any foreign country (with
its consent) assistance in the development and management ofprograms in that country
which the Secretary determines to be necessary or useful for the conservation ofany
endangered species or threatened species listed by the Secretary pursuant to section 1533
of this title. The President shall provide assistance (which includes, but is not limited to,
the acquisition, by lease or otherwise, of lands, waters, or interests therein) to foreign
countries under this section under such terms and conditions as he deems appropriate.
Whenever foreign currencies are available for the provision ofassistance under this
section, such currencies shall be used in preference to funds appropriated under the
authority of section 1542 of this title.
(b) Encouragement of foreign programs
In order to carry out further the provisions of this chapter, the Secretary, through the
Secretary of State, shall encourage -
(1) foreign countries to provide for the conservation of fish or wildlife and plants
including endangered species and threatened species listed pursuant to section 1533 of
this title;
(2) the entering into ofbilateral or multilateral agreements with foreign countries to
provide for such conservation; and
(3) foreign persons who directly or indirectly take fish or wildlife or plants in foreign
countries or on the high seas for importation into the United States for commercial or
other purposes to develop and carry out with such assistance as he may-provide,
conservation practices designed to enhance such fish or wildlife or plants and their
habitat.
Section 1537A. Convention implementation [ESA Section SA]
(a) Management Authority and Scientific Authority
The Secretary of the Interior (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Secretary") is
designated as the Management Authority and the Scientific Authority for purposes of the
Convention and the respective functions of each such Authority shall be carried out
through the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.
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(b) Management Authority functions
The Secretary shall do all things necessary and appropriate to carry out the functions of
the Management Authority under the Convention.
(c) Scientific Authority functions; determinations
(1) The Secretary shall do all things necessary and appropriate to carry out the functions
of the Scientific Authority under the Convention.
(2) The Secretary shall base the determinations and advice given by him under Article IV
of the Convention with respect to wildlife upon the best available biological information
derived from professionally accepted wildlife management practices; but is not required
to make, or require any State to make, estimates ofpopulation size in making such
determinations or giving such advice.
(d) Reservations by the United States under Convention
If the United States votes against including any species in Appendix I or II of the
Convention and does not enter a reservation pursuant to paragraph (3) of Article XV of
the Convention with respect to that species, the Secretary of State, before the 90th day
after the last day on which such a reservation could be entered, shall submit to the
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House ofRepresentatives, and to the
Committee on the Environment and Public Works of the Senate, a written report setting
forth the reasons why such a reservation was not entered.
(e) Wildlife Preservation in Western Hemisphere
(1) The Secretary of the Interior (hereinafter in this subsection referred to as the
"Secretary"), in cooperation with the Secretary of State, shall act on behalf of, and
represent, the United States in all regards as required by the Convention on Nature
Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere (56 Stat. 1354, T.S. 982,
hereinafter in this subsection referred to as the "Western Convention"). In the discharge
of these responsibilities, the Secretary and the Secretary of State shall consult with the
Secretary ofAgriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, and the heads ofother agencies
with respect to matters relating to or affecting their areas of responsibility.
(2) The Secretary and the Secretary of State shall, in cooperation with the contracting
parties to the Western Convention and, to the extent feasible and appropriate, with the
participation of State agencies, take such steps as are necessary to implement the Western
Convention. Such steps shall include, but not be limited to -
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(A) cooperation with contracting parties and international organizations for the purpose
of developing personnel resources and programs that will facilitate implementation of the
Western Convention;
(B) identification of those species ofbirds that migrate between the United States and
other contracting parties, and the habitats upon which those species depend, and the
implementation of cooperative measures to ensure that such species will not become
endangered or threatened; and
(C) identification of measures that are necessary and appropriate to implement those
provisions of the Western Convention which address the protection of wild plants.
(3) No later than September 30,1985, the Secretary and the Secretary of State shall
submit a report to Congress describing those steps taken in accordance with the
requirements of this subsection and identifying the principal remaining actions yet
necessary for comprehensive and effective implementation of the Western Convention.
(4) The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed as affecting the authority,
jurisdiction, or responsibility of the several States to manage, control, or regulate resident
fish or wildlife under State law or regulations.
Section 1538. Prohibited acts [ESA Section 9]
(a) Generally
(1) Except as provided in sections 1535(g)(2) and 1539 of this title, with respect to any
endangered species offish or wildlife listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title it is
unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to -
(A) import any such species into, or export any such species from the United States;
(B) take (Section 3(19) & Section 3(3») any such species within the United States or the
territorial sea of the United States;
(C) take any such species upon the high seas;
(D) possess, sell, deliver, carry, transport, or ship, by any means whatsoever, any such
species taken in violation of subparagraphs (B) and (C);
(E) deliver, receive, carry, transport, or ship in interstate or foreign commerce, by any
means whatsoever and in the course ofa commercial activity, any such species;
(F) sell or offer for sale in interstate or foreign commerce any such species; or
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(G) violate any regulation pertaining to such species or to any threatened species of fish
or wildlife listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title and promulgated by the Secretary
pursuant to authority provided by this chapter.
(2) Except as provided in sections 1535(g)(2) and 1539 of this title, with respect to any
endangered species ofplants listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title, it is unlawful for
any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to -
(A) import any such species into, or export any such species from, the United States;
(B) remove and reduce to possession any such species from areas under Federal
jurisdiction; maliciously damage or destroy any such species on any such area; or
remove, cut, dig up, or damage or destroy any such species on any other area in knowing
violation ofany law or regulation ofany State or in the course ofany violation ofa State
criminal trespass law;
(C) deliver, receive, carry, transport, or ship in interstate or foreign commerce, by any
means whatsoever and in the course of a commercial activity, any such species;
(D) sell or offer for sale in interstate or foreign commerce any such species; or
(E) violate any regulation pertaining to such species or to any threatened species ofplants
listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title and promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to
authority provided by this chapter.
(b) Species held in captivity or controlled environment
(1) The provisions of subsections (a) (1) (A) and (a) (1) (G) of this section shall not apply
to any fish or wildlife which was held in captivity or in a controlled environment on (A)
December 28, 1973, or (B) the date of the publication in the Federal Register of a fmal
regulation adding such fish or wildlife species to any list published pursuant to subsection
(c) of section 1533 of this title: Provided, That such holding and any subsequent holding
or use of the fish or wildlife was not in the course of a commercial activity. With respect
to any act prohibited by subsections (a) (1) (A) and (a) (1) (G) ofthis section which
occurs after a period of 180 days from (i) December 28, 1973, or (ii) the date of
publication in the Federal Register of a final regulation adding such fish or wildlife
species to any list published pursuant to subsection (c) of section 1533 of this title, there
shall be a rebuttable presumption that the fish or wildlife involved in such act is not
entitled to the exemption contained in this subsection.
(2)(A) The provisions of subsection (a) (1) of this section shall not apply to-
(i) any raptor legally held in captivity or in a controlled environment on November 10,
1978; or
195
(ii) any progeny of any raptor described in clause (i); until such time as any such raptor or
progeny is intentionally returned to a wild state.
(B) Any person holding any raptor or progeny described in subparagraph (A) must be
able to demonstrate that the raptor or progeny does, in fact, qualify under the provisions
of this paragraph, and shall maintain and submit to the Secretary, on request, such
inventories, documentation, and records as the Secretary may by regulation require as
being reasonably appropriate to carry out the purposes of this paragraph. Such
requirements shall not unnecessarily duplicate the requirements ofother rules and
regulations promulgated by the Secretary.
(c) Violation of Convention
(1) It is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to engage
in any trade in any specimens contrary to the provisions of the Convention, or to possess
any specimens traded contrary to the provisions of the Convention, including the
defInitions of terms in article I thereof.
(2) Any importation into the United States offish or wildlife shall, if-
(A) such fish or wildlife is not an endangered species listed pursuant to section 1533 of
this title but is listed in Appendix II to the Convention,
(B) the taking and exportation of such fish or wildlife is not contrary to the provisions of
the Convention and all other applicable requirements of the Convention have been
satisfied,
(C) the applicable requirements of subsections (d), (e), and (f) of this section have been
satisfied, and
(D) such importation is not made in the course of a commercial activity, be presumed to
be an importation not in violation of any provision of this chapter or any regulation
issued pursuant to this chapter.
(d) Imports and exports
(1) In general
It is unlawful for any person, without frrst having obtained permission from the
Secretary, to engage in business -
(A) as an importer or exporter offish or wildlife (other than shellfish and fishery products
which (i) are not listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title as endangered species or
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threatened species, and (ii) are imported for purposes of human or animal consumption or
taken in waters under the jurisdiction of the United States or on the high seas for
recreational purposes) or plants; or
(B) as an importer or exporter of any amount of raw or worked African elephant ivory.
(2) Requirements
Any person required to obtain permission under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall -
(A) keep such records as will fully and correctly disclose each importation or exportation
of fish, wildlife, plants, or African elephant ivory made by him and the subsequent
disposition made by him with respect to such fish, wildlife, plants, or ivory;
(B) at all reasonable times upon notice by a duly authorized representative of the
Secretary, afford such representative access to his place ofbusiness, an opportunity to
examine his inventory of imported fish, wildlife, plants, or African elephant ivory and the
records required to be kept under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, and to copy such
records; and
(C) file such reports as the Secretary may require.
(3) Regulations
The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as are necessary and appropriate to carry
out the purposes of this subsection.
(4) Restriction on consideration ofvalue or amount ofAfrican elephant ivory imported or
exported
In granting permission under this subsection for importation or exportation ofAfrican
elephant ivory, the Secretary shall not vary the requirements for obtaining such
permission on the basis of the value or amount of ivory imported or exported under such
permISSIon.
(e) Reports
It is unlawful for any person importing or exporting fish or wildlife (other than shellfish
and fishery products which (1) are not listed pursuant to section 1533 ofthis title as
endangered or threatened species, and (2) are imported for purposes of human or animal
consumption or taken in waters under the jurisdiction of the United States or on the high
seas for recreational purposes) or plants to fail to file any declaration or report as the
Secretary deems necessary to facilitate enforcement of this chapter or to meet the
obligations of the Convention.
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(f) Designation ofports
(1) It is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to import
into or export from the United States any fish or wildlife (other than shellfish and fishery
products which (A) are not listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title as endangered
species or threatened species, and (B) are imported for purposes of human or animal
consumption or taken in waters under the jurisdiction of the United States or on the
high seas for recreational purposes) or plants, except at a port or ports designated by the
Secretary of the Interior. For the purpose of facilitating enforcement of this chapter and
reducing the costs thereof, the Secretary of the Interior, with approval of the Secretary of
the Treasury and after notice and opportunity for public hearing, may, by regulation,
designate ports and change such designations. The Secretary of the Interior, under such
terms and conditions as he may prescribe, may pennit the importation or exportation at
nondesignated ports in the interest of the health or safety of the fish or wildlife or plants,
or for other reasons if, in his discretion, he deems it appropriate and consistent with the
purpose of this subsection.
(2) Any port designated by the Secretary ofthe Interior under the authority of section
668cc-4(d) of this title, shall, if such designation is in effect on December 27, 1973, be
deemed to be a port designated by the Secretary under paragraph (1) of this subsection
until such time as the Secretary otherwise provides.
(g) Violations
It is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to attempt to
commit, solicit another to commit, or cause to be committed, any offense defmed in this
section.
Section 1539. Exceptions [ESA Section 10]
(a) Permits
(1) The Secretary may permit, under such terms and conditions as he shall prescribe -
(A) any act otherwise prohibited by section 1538 ofthis title for scientific purposes or to
enhance the propagation or survival of the affected species, including, but not limited to,
acts necessary for the establishment and maintenance of experimental populations
pursuant to subsection G) of this section; or
(B) any taking otherwise prohibited by section 1538(a) (1) (B) of this title if such taking
is incidental to, and not the purpose ot: the carrying out ofan otherwise lawful activity.
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(2)(A) No permit may be issued by the Secretary authorizing any taking referred to in
paragraph (1) (B) unless the applicant therefor submits to the Secretary a conservation
plan that specifies -
(i) the impact which will likely result from such taking;
(ii) what steps the applicant will take to minimize and mitigate such'impacts, and the
funding that will be available to implement such steps;
(iii) what alternative actions to such taking the applicant considered and the reasons why
such alternatives are not being utilized; and
(iv) such other measures that the Secretary may require as being necessary or appropriate
for purposes of the plan.
(B) If the Secretary finds, after opportunity for public comment, with respect to a permit
application and the related conservation plan that -
(i) the taking will be incidental;
(ii) the applicant will, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the
impacts of such taking;
(iii) the applicant will ensure that adequate funding for the plan will be provided;
(iv) the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of
the species in the wild; and
(v) the measures, ifany, required under subparagraph (A) (iv) will be met; and he has
received such other assurances as he may require that the plan will be implemented, the
Secretary shall issue the permit. The permit shall contain such terms and conditions as the
Secretary deems necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this paragraph,
including, but not limited to, such reporting requirements as the Secretary deems
necessary for determining whether such terms and conditions are being complied with.
(C) The Secretary shall revoke a permit issued under this paragraph ifhe finds that the
permittee is not complying with the terms and conditions of the permit.
(b) Hardship exemptions
(1) If any person enters into a contract with respect to a species of fish or wildlife or plant
before the date of the publication in the Federal Register of notice ofconsideration of that
species as an endangered species and the subsequent listing of that species as an
endangered species pursuant to section 1533 ofthis title ,will cause undue economic
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hardship to such person under the contract, the Secretary, in order to minimize such
hardship, may exempt such person from the application of section 1538(a) of this title to
the extent the Secretary deems appropriate if such person applies to him for such
exemption and includes with such application such information as the Secretary may
require to prove such hardship; except that
(A) no such exemption shall be for a duration ofmore than one year from the date of
publication in the Federal Register of notice of consideration of the species concerned, or
shall apply to a quantity of fish or wildlife or plants in excess of that specified by the
Secretary;
(B) the one-year period for those species offish or wildlife listed by the Secretary as
endangered prior to December 28, 1973 shall expire in accordance with the terms of
section 668cc-3 of this title; and
(C) no such exemption may be granted for the importation or exportation of a specimen
listed in Appendix I ofthe Convention which is to be used in a commercial activity.
(2) As used in this subsection, the term "undue economic hardship" shall include, but not
be limited to:
(A) substantial economic loss resulting from inability caused by this chapter to perform
contracts with respect to species of fish and wildlife entered into prior to the date of
publication in the Federal Register of a notice ofconsideration of such species as an
endangered species;
(B) substantial economic loss to persons who, for the year prior to the notice of
consideration of such species as an endangered species, derived a substantial portion of
their income from the lawful taking ofany listed species, which taking would be made
unlawful under this chapter; or
(C) curtailment of subsistence taking made unlawful under this chapter by persons (i) not
reasonably able to secure other sources of subsistence; and (ii) dependent to a substantial
extent upon hunting and fishing for subsistence; and (iii) who must engage in such
curtailed taking for subsistence purposes.
(3) The Secretary may make further requirements for ashowing of undue economic
hardship as he deems fit. Exceptions granted under this section may be limited by the
Secretary in his discretion as to time, area, or other factor of applicability.
(c) Notice and review
The Secretary shall publish notice in the Federal Register of each application for an
exemption or permit which is made under this section. Each notice shall invite the
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submission from interested parties, within thirty days after the date of the notice, of
written data, views, or arguments with respect to the application; except that such thirty-
day period may be waived by the Secretary in an emergency situation where the health or
life of an endangered animal is threatened and no reasonable alternative is available to the
applicant, but notice of any such waiver shall be published by the Secretary in the Federal
Register within ten days following the issuance of the exemption or permit. Information
received by the Secretary as a part of any application shall be available to the public
as a matter of public record at every stage of the proceeding.
(d) Permit and exemption policy
The Secretary may grant exceptions under subsections (a) (1) (A) and (b) of this section
only if he finds and publishes his finding in the Federal Register that (1) such exceptions
were applied for in good faith, (2) if granted and exercised will not operate to the
disadvantage of such endangered species, and (3) will be consistent with the purposes and
policy set forth in section 1531 of this title.
(e) Alaska natives [omitted]
(f) Pre-Act endangered species parts exemption; application and certification; regulation;
validity of sales contract; separability ofprovisions; renewal of exemption; expiration of
renewal certification
[omitted]
(g) Burden ofproof
In connection with any action alleging a violation of section 1538 of this title, any person
claiming the benefit of any exemption or permit under this chapter shall have the burden
ofproving that the exemption or permit is applicable, has been granted, and was valid
and in force at the time of the alleged violation.
(h) Certain antique articles; importation; port designation; application
for return of articles [omitted]
(i) Noncommercial transshipments [omitted]
(j) Experimental populations
(1) For purposes ofthis subsection, the term "experimental population" means any
population (including any offspring arising solely therefrom) authorized by the Secretary
for release under paragraph (2), but only when, and at such times as, the population is
wholly separate geographically from nonexperimental populations of the same species.
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(2)(A) The Secretary may authorize the release (and the related transportation) ofany
population (including eggs, propagules, or individuals) of an endangered species or a
threatened species outside the current range of such species if the Secretary detennines
that such release will further the conservation of such species.
(B) Before authorizing the release ofany population under subparagraph (A), the
Secretary shall by regulation identify the population and determine, on the basis of the
best available information, whether or not such population is essential to the continued
existence of an endangered species or a threatened species.
(C) For the purposes of this chapter, each member of an experimental population shall be
treated as a threatened species; except that -
(i) solely for purposes ofsection 1536 ofthis title (other than subsection (a) (1) thereof),
an experimental population determined under subparagraph (B) to be not essential to the
continued existence ofa species shall be treated, except when it occurs in an area within
the National Wildlife Refuge System or the National Park System, as a species proposed
to be listed under section 1533 of this title; and
(ii) critical habitat shall not be designated under this chapter for any experimental
population determined under subparagraph (B) to be not essential to the continued
existence ofa species.
(3) The Secretary, with respect to populations ofendangered species or threatened
species that the Secretary authorized, before October 13, 1982, for release in
geographical areas separate from the other populations of such species, shall determine
by regulation which of such populations are an experimental population for the purposes
of this subsection and whether or not each is essential to the continued existence ofan
endangered species or a threatened species.
Section 1540. Penalties and enforcement [ESA Section11]
(a) Civil penalties
(1) Any person who knowingly violates, and any person engaged in business as an
importer or exporter of fish, wildlife, or plants who violates, any provision of this
chapter, or any provision of any permit or certificate issued hereunder, or of any
regulation issued in order to implement subsection (a)(I)(A), (B), (C), (D), (E), or (F),
(a)(2)(A), (B), (C), or (D), (c), (d) (other than regulation relating to recordkeeping or
filing of reports), (f) or (g) of section 1538 of this title, may be assessed a civil penalty by
the Secretary of not more than $25,000 for each violation. Any person who knowingly
violates, and any person engaged in business as an importer or exporter of fish, wildlife,
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or plants who violates, any provision of any other regulation issued under this chapter
may be assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary ofnot more than $12,000 for each such
violation. Any person who otherwise violates any provision of this chapter, or any
regUlation, permit, or certificate issued hereunder, may be assessed a civil penalty by the
Secretary of not more than $500 for each such violation. No penalty may be assessed
under this subsection unless such person is given notice and opportunity for a hearing
with respect to such violation. Each violation shall be a separate offense. Any such civil
penalty may be remitted or mitigated by the Secretary. Upon any failure to pay a penalty
assessed under this subsection, the Secretary may request the Attorney General to
institute a civil action in a district court of the United States for any district in which such
person is found, resides, or transacts business to collect the penalty and such court shall
have jurisdiction to hear and decide any such action. The court shall hear such action on
the record made before the Secretary and shall sustain his action if it is supported by
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.
(2) Hearings held during proceedings for the assessment of civil penalties authorized by
paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be conducted in accordance with section 554 of
Title 5. The Secretary may issue subpoenas for the attendance and testimony ofwitnesses
and the production of relevant papers, books, and documents, and administer oaths.
Witnesses summoned shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are paid to witnesses
in the courts of the United States. In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena
served upon any person pursuant to this paragraph, the district court of the United States
for any district in which such person is found or resides or transacts business, upon
application by the United States and after notice to such person, shall have jurisdiction to
issue an order requiring such person to appear and give testimony before the Secretary or
to appear and produce documents before the Secretary, or both, and any failure to obey
such order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof.
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no civil penalty shall be imposed
if it can be shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed an
act based on a good faith belief that he was acting to protect himself or herself, a member
ofhis or her family, or any other individual from bodily harm, from any endangered or
threatened species.
(b) Criminal violations
(I) Any person who knowingly violates any provision ·ofthis chapter, of any permit or
certificate issued hereunder, or of any regulation issued in order to implement subsection
(a)(I)(A), (B), (C), (D), (E), or (F); (a)(2)(A), (B), (C), or (D), (c), (d) (other than a
regulation relating to recordkeeping, or filing of reports), (t), or (g) of section 1538 ofthis
title shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned for not more
than one year, or both. Any person who knowingly violates any provision ofany other
regulation issued under this chapter shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than
$25,000 or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both.
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(2) The head of any Federal agency which has issued a lease, license, permit, or other
agreement authorizing a person to import or export fish, wildlife, or plants, or to operate a
quarantine station for imported wildlife, or authorizing the use ofFederal lands, including
grazing of domestic livestock, to any person who is convicted of a criminal violation
of this chapter or any regulation, permit, or certificate issued hereunder may immediately
modify, suspend, or revoke each lease, license, permit, or other agreement. The Secretary
shall also suspend for a period of up to one year, or cancel, any Federal hunting or fishing
permits or stamps issued to any person who is convicted ofa criminal violation ofany
provision of this chapter or any regulation, permit, or certificate issued hereunder.
The United States shall not be liable for the payments of any compensation,
reimbursement, or damages in connection with the modification, suspension, or
revocation of any leases, licenses, permits, stamps, or other agreements pursuant to this
section.
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, it shall be a defense to
prosecution under this subsection if the defendant committed the offense based on a good
faith belief that he was acting to protect himself or herself, a member ofhis or her family,
or any other individual, from bodily harm from any endangered or threatened species.
(c) District court jurisdiction
The several district courts of the United States, including the courts enumerated in section
460 ofTitle 28, shall have jurisdiction over any actions arising under this chapter. For the
purpose of this chapter, American Samoa shall be included within the judicial district of
the District Court of the United States for the District ofHawaii.
(d) Rewards and certain incidental expenses
The Secretary or the Secretary of the Treasury shall pay, from sums received as penalties,
fines, or forfeitures ofproperty for any violation of this chapter or any regulation issued
hereunder (1) a reward to any person who furnishes information which leads to an arrest,
a criminal conviction, civil penalty assessment, or forfeiture of property for any violation
ofthis chapter or any regulation issued hereunder, and (2) the reasonable and necessary
costs incurred by any person in providing temporary care for any fish, wildlife, or plant
pending the disposition of any civil or criminal proceeding alleging a violation of this
chapter with respect to that fish, wildlife, or plant. The amount of the reward, if any, is to
be designated by the Secretary or the Secretary of the Treasury, as appropriate. Any
officer or employee of the United States or any State or local government who furnishes
information or renders service in the performance of his official duties is ineligible for
payment under this subsection. Whenever the balance of sums received under this section
and section 3375(d) of this title, as penalties or fines, or from forfeitures ofproperty,
exceed $500,000, the Secretary of the Treasury shall deposit an amount equal to such
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excess balance in the cooperative endangered species conservation fund established under
section 1535(i) of this title.
(e) Enforcement
(1) The provisions of this chapter and any regulations or permits issued pursuant thereto
shall be enforced by the Secretary, the Secretary of the Treasury, or the Secretary of the
Department in which the Coast Guard is operating, or all such Secretaries. Each such
Secretary may utilize by agreement, with or without reimbursement, the personnel,
services, and facilities of any other Federal agency or any State agency for purposes of
enforcing this chapter.
(2) The judges of the district courts of the United States and the United States magistrates
may, within their respective jurisdictions, upon proper oath or affirmation showing
probable cause, issue such warrants or other process as may be required for enforcement
of this chapter and any regulation issued thereunder.
(3) Any person authorized by the Secretary, the Secretary ofthe Treasury, or the
Secretary ofthe Department in which the Coast Guard is operating, to enforce this
chapter may detain for inspection and inspect any package, crate, or other container,
including its contents, and all accompanying documents, upon importation or exportation.
Such person may make arrests without a warrant for any violation ofthis chapter ifhe has
reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested is committing the violation in
his presence or view, and may execute and serve any arrest warrant, search warrant, or
other warrant or civil or criminal process issued by any officer or court ofcompetent
jurisdiction for enforcement of this chapter. Such person so authorized may search and
seize, with or without a warrant, as authorized by law. Any fish, wildlife, property, or
item so seized shall be held by any person authorized by the Secretary, the Secretary of
the Treasury, or the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating
pending disposition ofcivil or criminal proceedings, or the institution ofan action in rem
for forfeiture of such fish, wildlife, property, or item pursuant to paragraph (4) of this
subsection; except that the Secretary may, in lieu ofholding such fish, wildlife, property,
or item, permit the owner or consignee to post a bond or other surety satisfactory to the
Secretary, but upon forfeiture of any such property to the United States, or the
abandonment or waiver of any claim to any such property, it shall be disposed of (other
than by sale to the general public) by the Secretary in such a manner, consistent with the
purposes of this chapter, as the Secretary shall by regulation prescribe.
(4)(A) All fish or wildlife or plants taken, possessed, sold, purchased, offered for sale or
purchase, transported, delivered, received, carried, shipped, exported, or imported
contrary to the provisions of this chapter, any regulation made pursuant thereto, or any
permit or certificate issued hereunder shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States.
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(B) All guns, traps, nets, and other equipment, vessels, vehicles, aircraft, and other means
of transportation used to aid the taking, possessing, selling, purchasing, offering for sale
or purchase, transporting, delivering~ receiving, carrying, shipping, exporting, or
importing of any fish or wildlife or plants in violation of this chapter, any regulation
made pursuant thereto, or any permit or certificate issued thereunder shall be subject to
forfeiture to the United States upon conviction ofa criminal violation pursuant to
subsection (b)(1) of this section.
(5) All provisions of law relating to the seizure, forfeiture, and condemnation of a vessel
for violation of the customs laws, the disposition of such vessel or the proceeds from the
sale thereof, and the remission or mitigation of such forfeiture, shall apply to the seizures
and forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under the provisions of this
chapter, insofar as such provisions of law are applicable and not inconsistent with the
provisions of this chapter; except that all powers, rights, and duties conferred or imposed
by the customs laws upon any officer or employee of the Treasury Department shall, for
the purposes of this chapter, be exercised or performed by the Secretary or by such
persons as he may designate.
(6) The Attorney General of the United States may seek to enjoin any person who is
alleged to be in violation ofany provision of this chapter or regulation issued under
authority thereof.
(f) Regulations
The Secretary, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of the Department in
which the Coast Guard is operating, are authorized to promulgate such regulations as may
be appropriate to enforce this chapter, and charge reasonable fees for expenses to the
Government connected with permits or certificates authorized by this chapter including
processing applications and reasonable inspections, and with the transfer, board,
handling, or storage of fish or wildlife or plants and evidentiary items seized and forfeited
under this chapter. All such fees collected pursuant to this subsection shall be deposited
in the Treasury to the credit of the appropriation which is current and chargeable for the
cost of furnishing the services. Appropriated funds may be expended pending
reimbursement from parties in interest.
(g) Citizen suits
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) ofthis subsection any person may commence a
civil suit on his own behalf -
(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental
instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation ofany provision of this chapter or
regulation issued under the authority thereof; or
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(B) to compel the Secretary to apply, pursuant to section I535(g) (2) (B) (ii) ofthis title,
the prohibitions set forth in or authorized pursuant to section I533(d) or 1538(a) (1) (B)
of this title with respect to the taking ofany resident endangered species or threatened
species within any State; or
(C) against the Secretary where there is alleged a failure of the Secretary to perform any
act or duty under section 1533 ofthis title which is not discretionary with the Secretary.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or
the citizenship of the parties, to enforce any such provision or regulation, or to order the
Secretary to perform such act or duty, as the case may be. In any civil suit commenced
under subparagraph (B) the district court shall compel the Secretary to apply the
prohibition sought if the court finds that the allegation that an emergency exists is
supported by substantial evidence.
(2)(A) No action may be commenced under subparagraph (l)(A) of this section-
(i) prior to sixty days after written notice of the violation has been given to the Secretary,
and to any alleged violator of any such provision or regulation;
(ii) if the Secretary has commenced action to impose a penalty pursuant to subsection (a)
of this section; or
(iii) if the United States has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a criminal action in
a court of the United States or a State to redress a violation ofany such provision or
regulation.
(B) No action may be commenced under subparagraph (1)(B) of this section-
(i) prior to sixty days after written notice has been given to the Secretary setting forth the
reasons why an emergency is thought to exist with respect to an endangered species or a
threatened species in the State concerned; or
(ii) if the Secretary has commenced and is diligently prosecuting action under section
1535(g)(2)(B)(ii) of this title to determine whether an~ such emergency exists.
(C) No action may be commenced under subparagraph (1) (C) of this section prior to
sixty days after written notice has been given to the Secretary; except that such action
may be brought immediately after such notification in the case ofan action under this
section respecting an emergency posing a significant risk to the well-being ofany species
of fish or wildlife or plants.
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(3)(A) Any suit under this subsection may be brought in the judicial district in which the
violation occurs.
(B) In any such suit under this subsection in which the United States is not a party, the
Attorney General, at the request of the Secretary, may intervene on behalf of the United
States as a matter of right.
(4) The court, in issuing any fmal order in any suit brought pursuant to paragraph (1) of
this subsection, may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert
witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate.
(5) The injunctive reliefprovided by this subsection shall not restrict any right which any
person (or class ofpersons) may have under any statute or common law to seek
enforcement ofany standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief
against the Secretary or a State agency).
(h) Coordination with other laws
The Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary shall provide for appropriate coordination
of the administration of this chapter with the administration of the animal quarantine laws
(21 U.S.C. 101-105, 111-135b, and 612-614) and section 306 of the TariffAct of 1930
(19 U.S.C. 1306). Nothing in this chapter or any amendment made by this Act shall be
construed as superseding or limiting in any manner the functions of the Secretary of
Agriculture under any other law relating to prohibited or restricted importations or
possession ofanimals and other articles and no proceeding or determination under this
chapter shall preclude any proceeding or be considered determinative ofany issue of fact
or law in any proceeding under any Act administered by the Secretary of Agriculture.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as superseding or limiting in any manner the
functions and responsibilities of the Secretary of the Treasury under the Tariff Act of
1930 [19 V.S.C.A. Section 1202 et seq.], including, without limitation, section 527 of
that Act (19 U.S.C. 1527), relating to the importation of wildlife taken, killed, possessed,
or exported to the United States in violation of the laws or regulations ofa foreign
country.
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APPENDIXB
2nd Session, 35th Parliament
45 Elizabeth II, 1996-97
The House of Commons of Canada
BILL C-65
An Act respecting the protection of wildlife species in Canada from extirpation or
extinction
Preamble Recognizing that
Canada's natural heritage is an integral part of our national identity and
history, wildlife, in all its forms, has value in and of itselfand is valued by
Canadians for aesthetic, cultural, spiritual, recreational, educational,
historical, economic, medical, ecological and scientific reasons,
Canadian wildlife species and ecosystems are also part of the world's
heritage and the Government of Canada has ratified the United Nations
Convention on the Conservation of Biological Diversity,
providing legal protection for wildlife species at risk will in part meet
Canada's commitments under that Convention,
the Government ofCanada is committed to conserving biological diversity
and to the principle that, if there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage to wildlife species, cost effective measures to prevent the
reduction or loss of the species should not be postponed for a lack of
scientific certainty,
responsibility for the conservation of wildlife in Canada is shared among
the various levels of government in this country and it is important to
work together in this regard,
all Canadians have a role to play in the conservation of wildlife in this
country, including the prevention of wildlife species from becoming
extirpated or extinct,
the role of the aboriginal peoples of Canada in the conservation ofwildlife
in this country is especially important, and
knowledge of wildlife species and ecosystems is critical to their
conservation,
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Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons
of Canada, enacts as follows:
SHORT TITLE
Short title
1. This Act may be cited as the Canada Endangered Species Protection Act.
INTERPRETATION
Definitions
2. (1) The definitions in this subsection apply in this Act.
· ·alternative measures"
.,alternative measures" means measures, other than judicial proceedings,
used to deal with a person alleged to have committed an offence.
· 'aquatic species"
"aquatic species" means a wildlife species that is a fish, as defined in
section 2 of the Fisheries Act, or a marine plant, as defmed in section 47 of that Act.
"Attorney General"
"Attorney General" means the Attorney General ofCanada and, for the
purposes of sections 87 to 93, it includes the delegate of the Attorney General of Canada.
"COSEWIC"
"COSEWIC" means the Committee on the Status ofEndangered
Wildlife in Canada established by section 13.
"Council"
"Council" means the Canadian Endangered Species Conservation
CoUncil established by section 12.
"critical habitat"
· ·critical habitat" means habitat that is identified as critical to the survival
of a wildlife species in a status report or a decision under section 24.
"emergency order"
"emergency order" means an order made under section 34.
, 'endangered species"
"endangered species" means a wildlife species that is facing imminent
extirpation or extinction.
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"endangered species protection action"
"endangered species protection action" means an action under section 60.
, 'extirpated species"
"extirpated species" means a wildlife species that no longer exists in the
wild in Canada, but exists elsewhere in the wild.
, ,federal land"
"federal land" means
(a) land that belongs to Her Majesty in right ofCanada, or that Her
Majesty in right of Canada has the power to dispose of, and all
waters on and airspace above that land;
(b) the following land and areas, namely,
(i) the internal waters of Canada within the meaning of the
Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, including the seabed and
subsoil below and the airspace above those waters, and
(ii) the territorial sea ofCanada as determined in accordance
with the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, including the
seabed and subsoil below and the airspace above that sea; and
(c) reserves and any other lands that are set apart for the use and
benefit ofa band under the Indian Act, and all waters on and
airspace above those reserves and lands.
, 'individual"
"individual" means an individual of a wildlife species, whether living or
dead, at any developmental stage and includes eggs, sperm, pollen and spores.
"listed"
"listed" means listed on the List of Wildlife Species at Risk established
under section 30. .
, 'Minister"
"Minister" means the Minister of the Environment.
"offence"
"offence" means an offence under this Act.
, 'provincial minister"
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, 'provincial minister" means the minister of the government of a
province who is responsible for wildlife species in that province.
, 'public registry"
"public registry" means the registry established under section 9.
"recovery plan"
"recovery plan" means a plan prepared under section 38.
"residence"
"residence" means a specific dwelling place, such as a den, nest or other
similar area habitually occupied by an individual during all or part of its life cycle.
"responsible minister"
"responsible minister" means
(a) the Minister of Canadian Heritage with respect to individuals
In
or on federal land under the authority of that Minister;
(b) the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans with respect to aquatic
species, other than individuals mentioned in paragraph (a); and
(c) the Minister of the Environment with respect to all other
individuals.
, 'species at risk"
"species at risk" means an extirpated, endangered, threatened or
vulnerable species.
, 'status report"
"status report" means a report, in accordance with the requirements of
subsection 20(2), containing a summary ofthe best available scientific information or
traditional or community knowledge on the status ofa wildlife species.
"threatened species"
"threatened species" means a wildlife" species that is likely to become an
endangered species ifnothing is done to reverse the factors leading to its extirpation or
extinction.
, 'vulnerable species"
"vulnerable species" means a wildlife species that is of special concern
because it is particularly sensitive to human activities or natural events, but it does not
include an endangered or threatened species.
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, 'wildlife species"
"wildlife species" means a species, subspecies or geographically distinct
population of animal, plant or other organism that is wild by nature and
(a) is native to Canada; or
(b) extended its range into Canada without h~an intervention and
has been present in Canada for at least 50 years.
For the purposes of this definition, a species, subspecies or geographically distinct
population is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, presumed to have bee present in
Canada for at least 50 years.
Aboriginal and treaty rights
(2) For greater certainty, nothing in this Act is to be construed so as to abrogate or
derogate from any existing aboriginal or treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada
under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
APPLICATION
Application to wildlife species and habitats
3. (I) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), this Act applies in respect of
wildlife species and their habitats, including
(a) aquatic species and their habitats; and
(b) species ofmigratory birds and their habitats that are protected by
the Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994.
Application in provinces
(2) Sections 30 to 32, regulations under section 42 and emergency orders
apply in a province, other than the Yukon Territory or the Northwest
Territories, in respect of wildlife species and their habitats, other than
those mentioned in paragraphs (1)(a) and (b), only in so far as
individuals of those species and their habitats are found on federal
land.
Non-application ofprovisions in territories
(3) The Governor in Council, on the recommendation ofthe Minister,
may make an order providing that a provision of this Act does not
apply in respect of a wildlife species, other than one mentioned in
paragraph (I)(a) or (b), in so far as individuals of that species are
found in the Yukon Territory or the Northwest Territories, but
outside federal land under the authority of the Minister of Canadian
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Heritage. Despite the order, the provision continues to apply to Her
Majesty in right of Canada.
Agreement
(4) Before recommending the order to the Governor in Council, the
Minister and the minister of the territorial government who is
responsible for wildlife species must agree in writing that an
equivalent provision is in force by or under the laws of the territory.
Consultation
(5) Before making the agreement, the Minister must consult any wildlife
management board established under aboriginal land claims
legislation if the Minister considers that the order will directly affect
the board.
Publication of agreement
(6) The Minister must make the agreement public by including it in the
public registry.
Termination of agreement and repeal of order
(7) The agreement may be terminated by either party giving to the other
at least six months notice of termination, in which case the Governor
in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister, must repeal the
order.
Report to Parliament
(8) The Minister must include in the annual report required by section
101 a report on the administration of subsections (3) to (7).
HER MAJESTY
Binding on Her Majesty
4. (1) This Act is binding on Her Majesty in right of Canada or a
province, but it applies to Crown corporations, as defmed in
subsection 83(1) of the Financial Administration Act, only in respect
of .
(a) aquatic species and their habitats;
(b) species of migratory birds and their habitats that are protected by
the Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994; and
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(c) other wildlife species and their habitats to the extent provided in
the regulations.
Regulations
(2) The Governor in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister,
may make regulations providing for the application of this Act to
Crown corporations in respect ofwildlife species and their habitats
mentioned in paragraph (l)(c).
PURPOSES
Prevention and recovery
5. The purposes of this Act are to prevent wildlife species from being
extirpated or becoming extinct and to provide for the recovery of
wildlife species that are extirpated, endangered or threatened as a
result of human activity.
ADMINISTRATION
Responsibility for administration
6. (1) The Minister is responsible for the administration of this Act,
except in so far as this Act gives responsibility to another
responsible minister.
Delegation
(2) A responsible minister may authorize any person or governmental
body to exercise or perform any ofthat minister's powers or
functions under this Act relating to its enforcement or to the
issuance ofpermits.
Agreements with provincial governments
7. (1) A responsible minister may
(a) with the approval of the Governor in Council, enter into an
agreement with one or more provincial governments with
respect to the administration ofany provision of this Act for
which that minister has responsibility, including the
preparation and implementation of recovery plans; and
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(b) agree to amendments of the agreement, subject to any terms
and conditions that the Governor in Council may specify in the
approval.
Conservation agreements
(2) A responsible minister may enter into an agreement for the
conservation ofa species at risk, including the protection oftheir
habitats. The agreement may be with one or more governments of
provinces or countries, or organizations or persons. If there is
another responsible minister with respect to the species, the
agreement may only be made with the concurrence of that
minister.
Pre-publication
(3) At least 60 days before an agreement is concluded under this
section, the responsible minister must make the proposed text of it
public by including it in the public registry and by any other
means that the responsible minister considers appropriate.
Publication and report
(4) Once the agreement is concluded, the responsible minister must
make it public by including it in the public registry.
Funding agreements
8. (1) The Minister may, with the approval of the Governor in
Council, enter into an agreement with the government of a
province, a municipal authority or organization or any other
person to provide for the payment of contributions to the costs of
programs and measures for the conservation of wildlife species.
Provisions to be included
(2) The agreement must
(a) specify the contribution to the cost of the program or measure
that is payable by any party·and the time or times at which any
amounts under the agreement will be paid;
(b) specify the authority that will be responsible for undertaking,
operating and maintaining the program or measure or any part
of it;
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(c) specify the proportions of any revenue from the program or
measure that is payable to the parties; and
(d) specify the terms and conditions governing the operation and
maintenance of the program or measure.
PUBLIC ACCESS
Public registry
9. The Minister must establish a public registry for the purpose of
facilitating access to documents relating to matters under this Act.
Form and manner ofpublic registry
10. The Minister may determine the form of the public registry, how it
is to be kept and how access to it is to be provided.
Protection from proceedings
11. Despite any other Act of Parliament, no civil or criminal
proceedings may be brought against any ofthe following persons
for the full or partial disclosure in good faith of any notice or other
document through the public registry or any consequences of its
disclosure:
(a) Her Majesty in right ofCanada; and
(b) the Minister or any person acting on behalfof or under the
direction of the Minister.
CANADIAN ENDANGERED SPECIES CONSERVATION COUNCIL
Establishment
12. (1) The Canadian Endangered Species Conservation Council is
established, to be composed of the responsible ministers and any
provincial ministers who agree "to attend the meetings of the
Council.
Co-chairpersons
(2) The Council is to be chaired jointly by the Minister and a
provincial minister chosen by a majority of the provincial
ministers who are members of the Council.
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Responsibilities
(3) The Council is responsible for providing general direction on the
activities of COSEWIC and on the development and
implementation of recovery plans.
WILDLIFE SPECIES LISTING PROCESS
Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada
Establishment
13. (1) The Committee on the Status ofEndangered Wildlife in
Canada (COSEWIC) is established to carry out its functions under
this Act solely on the basis ofthe best available information on the
biological status of species at risk.
Composition
(2) COSEWIC is to be composed ofnot more than nine members
appointed by the Minister after consulting the Council.
Functions
(3) In addition to designating species at risk, COSEWIC has the
following functions:
(a) developing scientific criteria for assessing the status ofwildlife
species and for classifying them and recommending the criteria
to the Minister;
(b) ranking the urgency ofassessing the status of particular
wildlife species and classifying them; and
(c) providing advice to the Minister and any other functions that
the Minister, in consultation with the Council, may assign.
Administrative support
(4) COSEWIC may receive administrative support from the Minister
to carry out its functions.
Qualifications ofmembers
14. (1) The members ofCOSEWIC must have expertise drawn from a
discipline such as conservation biology, population dynamics,
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taxonomy, systematics, genetics or from traditional or community
knowledge of the protection of species at risk.
Representative nature
(2) In appointing the members, the Minister must consider the
importance of maintaining a membership that is broadly
representative ofall regions of Canada. However, the members
are not to be appointed as representatives of particular regions or
interest groups.
Term ofappointment
(3) The members are to be appointed to hold office during pleasure
for a renewable term ofnot more than three years.
Not part of the public service of Canada
(4) Appointment as a member of COSEWIC is not an appointment to
the public service of Canada.
Remuneration and expenses
(5) The members are to be paid remuneration and expenses in
amounts that the Minister may set.
Meetings
15. COSEWIC must meet at least once every six months.
Subcommittees
16. COSEWIC may establish advisory and other subcommittees to
advise or assist it or to exercise or perform any of its powers or
functions.
Rules
17. COSEWIC may make rules respecting the holding ofmeetings
and the general conduct of its activities, including
(a) the selection ofpersons to chair its meetings; and
(b) the meetings and activities of its subcommittees.
Designation of Species at Risk
Designation
18. COSEWIC must designate wildlife species that it considers to be
at risk and classify them as
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(a) extinct;
(b) extirpated;
(c) endangered;
(d) threatened; or
(e) vulnerable.
Applications
19. (1) Any person may apply to COSEWIC for the designation or
reclassification ofa wildlife species or the revocation of its
designation.
Infonnation to be included
(2) The application must include relevant infonnation about the
biological status of the species and, ifpossible, a status report.
Examination ofapplications
(3) Within 90 days after receiving the application, COSEWIC must
examine it and infonn the applicant in writing ofwhat it has
decided to do about the application and the reasons for its
decision.
Status reports
20. (1) Each decision ofCOSEWIC about the designation or
classification ofa wildlife species must be based on a status report
on the species that COSEWIC either has had prepared or has
received with an application.
Fonn and content of status reports
(2) The Minister may, on the recommendation of COSEWIC, make
regulations establishing the fonn and content of the status reports,
but the reports must
(a) include an assessment of the past and present distribution and
population of the wildlife species concerned;
(b) identify the habitat that is important or critical to the species;
and
(c) identify existing and potential threats to the species and its
critical habitat and evaluate how serious they are.
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Decision with reasons
21. (1) COSEWIC must make a decision about the designation or
classification of a wildlife species within one year after it receives
a status report on the species and the decision must be supported
by reasons.
Notification ofapplicant
(2) If the decision results from an application, COSEWIC must notify
the applicant of the decision and the reasons.
Decision not to designate
(3) COSEWIC must include the wildlife species on a list, to be called
the "List of Non-designated Species", if it decides that the
species should not be designated, either because it is not at risk or
because there is not enough information to determine whether it is
at risk.
Public registry
(4) The List ofNon-designated Species must be included in the public
registry.
Emergency Designations and Reclassifications
Emergency designation or reclassification
22. COSEWIC may, on an emergency basis, designate or reclassify a
wildlife species as threatened or endangered before receiving a
status report if it has information indicating that there is an
imminent threat to the survival of the species.
Application for emergency designation or reclassification
23. (1) Any person may apply to COSEWIC for an emergency
designation or reclassification ofa wildlife species as threatened
or endangered. The application must include relevant information
indicating that there is an imminent threat to the survival of the
species.
Examination ofapplication
(2) Within 30 days after receiving the application, COSEWIC must
examine it and inform the applicant in writing of what it has
decided to do about the application and the reasons for its
decision.
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Decision and reasons
24. If COSEWIC decides to designate or reclassify the wildlife
species, it must give reasons for its decision and identify the
imminent threat to the survival of the species. If loss ofhabitat is
an imminent threat, COSEWIC must also identify the habitat that
is critical to the survival of the species.
Status report and fmal decision
25. Within 18 months after making an emergency designation or
reclassification, COSEWIC must have a status report on the
species prepared and make a final decision on whether it should be
designated or reclassified.
Publication
Documents in public registry
26. The following documents must be included in the public registry:
(a) COSEWIC's criteria for the designation and classification of
wildlife species;
(b) the status reports on wildlife species; and
(c) COSEWIC's decisions about the designation and classification
ofwildlife species and the reasons for the decisions.
Reviews and Reports
Review ofdesignations and classifications
27. COSEWIC must review the designation and classification of each
species at risk at least once every 10 years, or more frequently if it
has reason to believe that the status of the species has changed
significantly.
Reports to Council
28. When COSEWIC makes a decision about the designation or
classification ofa wildlife species, COSEWIC must report the
decision to the members of the Council.
Annual reports
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29. As soon as possible after the end of each year, COSEWIC must
report to the Council on its activities during that year.
List of Wildlife Species at Risk
Regulations
30. (1) The Governor in Council, on the recommendation ofthe
Minister, may make regulations establishing and amending the
List of Wildlife Species at Risk based on COSEWIC's
designations and classifications ofwildlife species.
Notice of response to designation, etc.
(2) Within 90 days after COSEWIC designates a wildlife species,
changes its classification or revokes a designation, the Governor
in Council must give notice in the public registry ofwhether the
Governor in Council intends to amend the List accordingly.
Listing at request ofprovincial minister
(3) The Governor in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister,
may also include a wildlife species on the List if a provincial
minister designates it as a species at risk, asks that it be listed and
agrees to participate in the preparation of a recovery plan for the
species.
Public registry
(4) The List must be included in the public registry.
MEASURES TO PROTECT LISTED SPECIES
Prohibitions
Killing, harming, etc., listed species
31. (1) No person shall kill, harm, harass, capture or take an
individual of a listed endangered or threatened species.
Possession, collection, etc.
(2) No person shall possess, collect, buy, sell or trade an individual of
a listed endangered or threatened species, or any part or derivative
of one.
Damage or destruction of residence
32. No person shall damage or destroy the residence of an individual
of a listed endangered or threatened species.
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Regulations protecting certain crossboundary species
33. The Minister may make regulations prohibiting any person from
(a) wilfully killing, harming, harassing, capturing or taking an
individual of a wildlife animal species, other than one
mentioned in paragraph 3(l)(a) or (b), ifCOSEWIC
(i) has determined that the species migrates across an
international boundary of Canada or has a range extending
across such a boundary, and
(ii) has designated the species as an endangered or threatened
species; or
(b) knowingly engaging in activities that damage or destroy the
residence of the individual.
Before making the regulations, the Minister must consult the
provincial minister of each province in which the regulations will
apply.
Emergency Orders
Order based on emergency designation or classification
34. (1) The responsible minister may make an emergency order
providing for the protection ofa wildlife species if COSEWIC
designates or reclassifies the species as endangered or threatened
on an emergency basis. The order may include provisions
regulating or prohibiting activities that may adversely affect the
species or the residences of its individuals.
Order based on inadequate recovery plan, etc.
(2) The responsible minister may make an emergency order providing
for the protection of a wildlife species if the responsible minister
determines that the recovery plan for the species no longer
adequately protects it or that immediate action is required to
protect the species. The order may include provisions regulating
or prohibiting activities that may adversely affect the species or
the residences of its individuals.
Notification of Minister
(3) If the responsible minister is the Minister of Canadian Heritage or
the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, he or she must
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(a) notify the Minister of any decision (including the reasons) not
to make an order under subsection (1) in response to an
emergency designation or reclassification; and
(b) notify the Minister before making an order under subsection
(2).
Provisions for the protection ofhabitat
(4) An emergency order must include provisions regulating or
prohibiting activities that may adversely affect the critical habitat
of the species if the responsible minister, based on the advice of
COSEWIC, determines that there is an imminent threat to that
habitat.
Repeal of subsection (1) orders
(5) The responsible minister must repeal an emergency order made
under subsection (1) when
(a) the responsible minister detennines that adequate measures
have been implemented in response to the emergency
designation or reclassification; or
(b) the Governor in Council, on the recommendation of the
Minister, decided that no change to the List of Wildlife Species
at Risk is needed in response to the emergency designation or
reclassification.
Repeal of subsection (2) orders
(6) The responsible minister must repeal an emergency order made
under subsection (2) when he or she determines that, under the
circumstances, adequate measures have been implemented or the
order is no longer needed.
Non-application of the Statutory Instruments Act
35. Sections 3, 5 and 11 of the Statutory Instrwnents Act do not apply
to emergency orders, but each order must be included in the public
registry and published in the Canada Gazette within 23 days after
it is made.
Application of Prohibitions
General exceptions
36. (1) Sections 31 and 32, regulations under section 33 or 42 and
emergency orders do not apply to persons who are engaging in
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(a) activities authorized by or under any other Act of Parliament
for the protection ofnational security, safety or health,
including animal and plant health;
(b) activities in accordance with regulatory or conservation
measures for wildlife species under an aboriginal treaty, land
claims agreement, self-government agreement or co-
management agreement that deals with wildlife species; or
(c) activities authorized under section 46 or 47 by an agreement,
pennit, licence, order or similar document.
Authorization of activities under other Acts
(2) A power under an Act described in paragraph (1)(a) may be used
to authorize an activity prohibited by or under section 31, 32, 33,
34 or 42 only if the person exercising the power
(a) determines that the activity is necessary for the protection of
national security, safety or health, including animal and plant
health; and
(b) respects the purposes of this Act to the greatest extent possible.
Exemptions for activities under recovery plans
(3) Sections 31 and 32 and regulations under section 33 do not apply
to persons who are engaging in activities authorized by a recovery
plan.
Possession exception
(4) The prohibition against possession in subsection 31(2) does not
prevent a person from possessing an individual ofa listed
endangered or threatened species, or any part or derivative ofone,
if
(a) it was in their possession when the species was listed;
(b) they acquired it legally in another country and imported it
legally into Canada;
(c) they acquired it by succession from someone who was entitled
to possess it under this subsection; or
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(d) they are, or are acting on behalf of, a museum, zoo, educational
institution, scientific society or government and they acquired
it from someone who entitled to possess it under this
subsection.
Species listed at the request of a provincial minister
37. If a wildlife species is listed at the request of a provincial minister
under subsection 30(3), then sections 31 and 32 and emergency
orders apply in respect of that species and its habitat only in so far
as individuals of that species and its habitat are found on federal
land in the province of that minister.
Recovery and Management Plans
Preparation of recovery plans
38. (1) The responsible minister must prepare a recovery plan that
describes the measures to be taken to protect each wildlife species
that is listed as endangered, threatened or extirpated as a result of
human activity and, ifpossible, provide for its recovery. If there is
more than one responsible minister with respect to the species,
they must prepare the recovery plan together.
Cooperation with other ministers and governments
(2) To the extent possible, the recovery plan must be prepared in
cooperation with
(a) the provincial minister ofeach province in which the wildlife
species is found;
(b) any minister of the Government ofCanada who has authority
over federal land or other areas on which the species is found;
and
(c) the government of any other country in which the species is
found.
Time limit
(3) The recovery plan must be completed within one year after listing,
if the wildlife species is listed as endangered, and within two years
after listing, if it is listed as threatened or extirpated.
Detennination of feasibility
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(4) The responsible minister, based on the advice ofCOSEWIC, must
determine whether the recovery of the wildlife species is
technically and biologically feasible and must give notice in the
public registry of the determination and the reasons for it.
Contents of recovery plan if recovery feasible
(5) If the recovery of the wildlife species is technically and
biologically feasible, the recovery plan must address the threats to
the survival of the species identified by COSEWIC, including loss
ofhabitat, and must include
(a) a description of the species and its needs, including an
identification of its critical habitat;
(b) an identification of the threats to the survival of the species;
(c) achievable population and distribution objectives that will
provide for the recovery of the species and a detailed
description of the research and management activities needed
to meet the objectives;
(d) an evaluation of the costs and benefits of each research and
management activity and the likelihood of its success;
(e) a description of any broader ecosystem management and multi-
species approaches that are feasible;
(f) methods to be used to monitor the recovery ofthe species and
its long-term viability;
(g) a description of the measures needed to reduce or eliminate the
threats to the survival of the species, including regulations
needed to regulate or prohibit activities that will adversely
affect the species or its critical habitat;
(h) a mechanism for reviewing and evaluating the effectiveness of
the plan; and .
(i) any other information or recovery measures that the
responsible minister considers appropriate.
Principles to be considered
(6) In determining the content of the recovery plan, the responsible
minister must consider the commitment of the Government of
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Canada to conserving biological diversity and to the principle that,
if there are threats of serious or irreversible damage to the wildlife
species, cost effective measures to prevent the reduction or loss of
the species should not be postponed for a lack of full scientific
certainty.
Contents of recovery plan if recovery not feasible
(7) If the recovery of the wildlife species is not technically or
biologically feasible, the recovery plan must include recovery
measures limited to the prohibition ofactivities that directly affect
individuals of the species or their residences.
Consultation on recovery plans
39. The recovery plan must be prepared in consultation with
(a) any wildlife management board that is established under
aboriginal land claims legislation and is affected by the plan;
and
(b) other persons who the responsible minister considers are
directly affected by, or interested in, the plan.
Publication of recovery plans
40. (1) Once the recovery plan is completed,
(a) it must be included in the public registry; and
(b) the responsible minister must publish a summary ofthe
recovery plan in the Canada Gazette and invite interested
persons to comment within 60 days on the plan and its
implementation.
Implementation report
(2) Within 150 days after the summary is published in the Canada
Gazette, the responsible minister must prepare and publish in the
public registry a report on how, and within what time-frames, the
Government of Canada intends to implement the measures
contained in the plan.
National recovery planning agreement
41. (1) The Minister, in cooperation with the other responsible
ministers, may enter into an agreement with the provincial
ministers to establish a framework for national recovery planning,
including the incorporation, with the approval of the Governor in
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Council, of a not-for-profit corporation under the Canada
Corporations Act.
Authority to procure incorporation, etc.
(2) A responsible minister may procure the incorporation of the not-
for-profit corporation or be a member of the corporation.
Regulations
42. (1) A responsible minister may make regulations for the purpose
of implementing measures included in recovery plans that he or
she has prepared.
Incorporation by reference
(2) The regulations may incorporate by reference any legislation of a
province, as amended from time to time, in so far as the
regulations apply in that province. They may also incorporate by
reference other docwnents as amended from time to time.
Use ofpowers under other Acts
43. For the purpose of implementing the recovery plan, the
responsible minister may use any powers that he or she has under
any other Act ofParliament.
Monitoring implementation of recovery plans
44. A responsible minister must monitor the implementation ofeach
recovery plan that he or she has prepared and must assess and
report on its implementation within five years after the plan is
included in the public registry and in each subsequent five-year
period. The reports must be included in the public registry.
Management plans for vulnerable species
45. (1) Within three years after a wildlife species is listed as
vulnerable, the responsible minister must prepare a management
plan for the species and its critical habitat. The plan may apply
with respect to more than one wildlife species and must include
any measures for the conservation of the species that the
responsible minister considers appropriate.
Publication of management plans
(2) Once the management plan is completed, it must be included in
the public registry.
Monitoring implementation of management plans
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(3) The responsible minister must monitor the implementation of the
management plan and must fully assess its implementation five
years after the plan comes into effect.
Agreements and Permits
Powers of responsible minister
46. (1) The responsible minister may make an agreement with a
person, or issue a pennit to a person, authorizing them to engage
in an activity affecting
(a) a listed endangered or threatened species or its critical habitat;
or
(b) a wildlife species to which regulations under section 33 apply
or its residence.
Preconditions
(2) Before making the agreement or issuing the pennit, the
responsible minister must be satisfied that
(a) all reasonable alternatives to the activity have been
considered;
(b) all feasible measures will be taken to minimize the impact of
the activity on the species or its habitat or residence; and
(c) the activity will not imperil the survival of the species.
Terms and conditions
(3) The agreement or permit may contain any terms and conditions
governing the activity that the responsible minister considers
necessary for protecting the species, minimizing the impact of the
authorized activity on the species or providing for its recovery.
Review ofagreements and permits
(4) The responsible minister must·review the agreement or permit if
an emergency order is made with respect to the wildlife species.
Regulations
(5) The Minister may make regulations respecting the issuance,
renewal, revocation and suspension of agreements and pennits.
Agreements and permits under other Acts
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47. An agreement, pennit, licence, order or other similar document
authorizing a person to engage in an activity mentioned in
subsection 46(1) and made or issued by the responsible minister
under another Act of Parliament has the same effect as an
agreement or pennit under that subsection if, before making or
issuing it, the responsible minister is satisfied of the matters
mentioned in subsection 46(2).
Publication ofagreements
48. Each agreement made under section 46 or in effect under section
47 must be included in the public registry.
Project Review
Notification ofMinister
49. (1) A responsible authority, as defmed in subsection 2(1) of the
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, must notify the
Minister in writing of any project that
(a) is likely to affect a wildlife species, or its critical habitat, that
is listed as vulnerable, threatened or endangered or, in the case
ofa project outside Canada, a wildlife species on the Red List
of Threatened Animals or the Red List of Threatened Plants of
the World Conservation Union; and
(b) is required to have an environmental assessment under that
Act before the authority
(i) exercises a power or perfonns a duty or function in respect
of the project, or
(ii) recommends that the Governor in Council take any
measures for the purpose ofenabling the project to be
carried out in whole or in part. Required action by
responsible authority
(2) The responsible authority must ensure that measures are taken to
identify the effects of the project on the wildlife species and its
critical habitat, to lessen the effects and to monitor them. The
measures must be taken in a way that is consistent with the
recovery plan for the species.
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ENFORCEMENT MEASURES
Enforcement officers
50. (1) A responsible minister may designate any person or class of
persons to act as enforcement officers for the purposes of this
Act.
Designation of provincial government employees
(2) The responsible minister may not designate any person or class of
persons employed by the government of a province unless that
government agrees.
Certificate ofdesignation
(3) An enforcement officer must be provided with a certificate of
designation as an enforcement officer in a form approved by the
responsible minister and, on entering any place under this Act, the
officer must, if so requested, show the certificate to the occupant
or person in charge of the place.
Powers ofpeace officers
(4) For the purposes of this Act, enforcement officers have all the
powers of a peace officer, but the responsible minister may
specify limits on those powers when designating any person or
class ofpersons.
Exemptions for law enforcement activities
(5) For the purpose of investigations and other law enforcement
activities under this Act, a responsible minister may, on any terms
and conditions that he or she considers necessary, exempt from
the application of any provision of this Act, the regulations or an
emergency order
(a) enforcement officers that the responsible minister has
designated and who are carrying out duties or functions under
this Act; and
(b) persons acting under their direction and control.
Obstruction
(6) When an enforcement officer is carrying out duties or functions
under this Act, no person shall
(a) knowingly make any false or misleading statement either
orally or in writing to the enforcement officer; or
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Inspections
Conveyance
Dwelling-place
Warrant
(b) otherwise wilfully obstruct the enforcement officer.
51. (1) For the purpose ofensuring compliance with any provision of
this Act, the regulations or an emergency order, an enforcement
officer may, subject to subsection (3), at any reasonable time
enter and inspect any place in which the officer believes, on
reasonable grounds, there is any thing to which the provision
applies or any document relating to its administration, and the
enforcement officer may
(a) open or cause to be opened any container that the enforcement
officer believes, on reasonable grounds, contains any such
thing or document;
(b) inspect the thing and take samples free of charge;
(c) require any person to produce the document for inspection or
copying, in whole or in part; and
(d) seize any thing by means ofor in relation to which the
enforcement officer believes, on reasonable grounds, the
provision has been contravened or that the enforcement officer
believes, on reasonable grounds, will provide evidence of a
contravention.
(2) For the purposes of carrying out the inspection, the enforcement
officer may stop a conveyance or direct that it be moved to a
place where the inspection can be carried out.
(3) The enforcement officer may not enter a dwelling-place except
with the consent ofthe occupant or person in charge ofthe
dwelling-place or under the authority of a warrant.
(4) If on ex parte application a justice, as defined in section 2 ofthe
Criminal Code, is satisfied by information on oath that
(a) the conditions for entry described in subsection (1) exist in
relation to a dwelling-place,
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(b) entry to the dwelling-place is necessary in relation to the
administration of this Act or the regulations, and
(c) entry to the dwelling-place has been refused or there are
reasonable grounds for believing that entry will be refused, the
justice may issue a warrant authorizing the enforcement
officer to enter the dwelling-place subject to any conditions
that may be specified in the warrant.
Search and seizure without warrant
52. For the purpose ofensuring compliance with this Act, the
regulations or an emergency order, an enforcement officer may
exercise the powers of search and seizure provided in section 487
ofthe Criminal Code without a warrant if the conditions for
obtaining a warrant exist but, by reason ofexigent circumstances,
it would not be feasible to obtain the warrant.
Custody of things seized
53. (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), if an enforcement officer
seizes a thing under this Act or under a warrant issued under the
Criminal Code,
(a) sections 489.1 and 490 of the Criminal Code apply; and
(b) the enforcement officer, or any person that the officer may
designate, must retain custody of the thing subject to any order
made under section 490 of the Criminal Code.
Forfeiture if ownership not ascertainable
(2) If the lawful ownership ofor entitlement to the seized thing
cannot be ascertained within 30 days after its seizure, the thing, or
any proceeds of its disposition, are forfeited to'
(a) Her Majesty in right of Canada, if the thing was seized by an
enforcement officer employed in the public service of Canada;
or
(b) Her Majesty in right of a province, if the thing was seized by
an enforcement officer employed by the government of that
province.
Perishable things
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(3) If the seized thing is perishable, the enforcement officer may
dispose of it or destroy it, and any proceeds of its disposition
must be
(a) paid to the lawful owner or person lawfully entitled to
possession of the thing, unless proceedings under this Act are
commenced within 90 days after its seizure; or
(b) retained by the enforcement officer pending the outcome of the
proceedings.
Abandonment
(4) The owner of the seized thing may abandon it to Her Majesty in
right of Canada or a province.
Disposition by responsible minister
54. Any thing that has been forfeited or abandoned under this Act is
to be dealt with and disposed of as the responsible minister may
direct.
Liability for costs
55. The lawful owner and any person lawfully entitled to possession
of any thing seized, abandoned or forfeited under this Act are
jointly and severally liable for all the costs of inspection, seizure,
abandonment, forfeiture or disposition incurred by Her Majesty in
excess ofany proceeds ofdisposition of the thing that have been
forfeited to Her Majesty under this Act.
Application for investigation
56. (1) A person, other than a corporation, who is resident in Canada
and at least 18 years of age may apply to the responsible minister
for an investigation ofwhether an alleged offence has been
committed or whether anything directed towards its commission
has been done.
Statement to accompany application
(2) The application must be in a fonn approved by the responsible
minister and must include a solemn affirmation or declaration
containing
(a) the name and address of the applicant;
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(b) a statement that the applicant is at least 18 years old and a
resident of Canada;
(c) a statement of the nature of the alleged offence and the name
of each person alleged to be involved;
(d) a summary of the evidence supporting the allegations;
(e) the names and addresses of each person who might be able to
give evidence about the alleged offence, together with a
summary of the evidence they might give, to the extent that
this information is available to the applicant;
(f) a description ofany document or other material that the
applicant believes should be considered in the investigation
and, if possible, a copy ofthe document; and
(g) details of any previous contact between the applicant and the
responsible minister about the alleged offence.
Investigation
57. (1) The responsible minister must acknowledge receipt of the
application and must investigate all matters that he or she
considers necessary to determine the facts relating to the alleged
offence.
Frivolous or vexatious applications
(2) No investigation is required if the responsible minister decides
that the application is frivolous or vexatious.
Notice of decision
(3) If the responsible minister decides not to conduct the
investigation, he or she must, within 60 days after the application
for investigation is received, give notice of the decision, including
the justification, to
(a) the applicant; and
(b) each person alleged in the application to have been involved in
the commission ofthe offence for whom an address is given in
the application.
When notice need not be given
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(4) The responsible minister need not give the notice if an
investigation in relation to the alleged offence is ongoing apart
from the application.
Progress reports
58. (1) After acknowledging receipt of the application, the
responsible minister must report to the applicant every 90 days on
the progress of the investigation and the action, if any, that the
responsible minister has taken or proposes to take, but a report is
not required if the investigation is suspended or concluded before
the end of the 90 days.
Responsible minister may send evidence to Attorney General
(2) At any stage of the investigation, the responsible minister may
send any documents or other evidence to the Attorney General for
consideration ofwhether an offence has been or is about to be
committed, and for any action that the Attorney General may
wish to take.
Suspension or conclusion of investigation
59. (1) The responsible minister may suspend or conclude the
investigation ifhe or she is of the opinion that
(a) the alleged offence does not require further investigation; or
(b) the investigation does not substantiate the alleged offence or
any other offence.
Report if investigation suspended
(2) If the investigation is suspended, the responsible minister must
(a) prepare a written report describing the information obtained
during the investigation and stating the reasons for its
suspension and the action, if any, that the responsible minister
has taken or proposes to take;
(b) send a copy of the report to the applicant; and
(c) notify the applicant if the investigation is subsequently
resumed.
Report when investigation concluded
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(3) When the investigation is concluded, the responsible minister
must
(a) prepare a written report describing the information obtained
during the investigation and stating the reasons for its
conclusion and the action, if any, that the responsible minister
has taken or proposes to take; and
(b) send a copy of the report to the applicant and to each person
whose conduct was investigated.
A copy of the report sent to a person whose conduct was investigated
must not disclose the name or address of the applicant or any other
personal information about them.
When report need not be sent
(4) If another investigation in relation to the alleged offence is
ongoing apart from the application, the responsible minister need
not send copies of a report described in subsection (2) or (3) until
the other investigation is suspended or concluded.
ENDANGERED SPECIES PROTECTION ACTION
Circumstances in which a person may bring an action
60. (1) A person who has applied for an investigation may bring an
endangered species protection action if
(a) the responsible minister has decided not to conduct the
investigation and has given a justification for the decision that
is not reasonable;
(b) the responsible minister has, without giving notice required by
subsection 57(3), not conducted and reported on the
investigation within a reasonable time;
(c) the responsible minister's reasons for suspending or concluding
the investigation are unreasonable; or
(d) the responsible minister's response to the investigation is
unreasonable.
Nature of the action
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(2) The action may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction
against a person who committed, or has done anything directed
towards the commission of, an offence that
(a) was alleged in the application for the investigation; and
(b) caused or will cause significant harm to a listed endangered or
threatened species or its critical habitat.
Relief that may be claimed
(3) In the action, the person may claim any or all of the following:
(a) a declaratory order;
(b) an order, including an interlocutory order, requiring the
defendant to refrain from doing anything that, in the opinion of
the court, may constitute or be directed towards an offence;
(c) an order, including an interlocutory order, requiring the
defendant to do anything that, in the opinion of the court, may
prevent an offence;
(d) an order to the parties to negotiate corrective measures with
respect to the significant harm resulting from the offence and to
report to the court on the negotiations within a time set by the
court; and
(e) any other appropriate relief, including the costs of the action,
but not including damages.
Limitation period of two years
61. (1) An endangered species protection action may be brought only
within a limitation period of two years beginning when the
plaintiffbecomes aware of the conduct on which the action is
based, or should have become aware of it.
Time during investigation not included
(2) The limitation period does not include any time following the
plaintiffs application for an investigation, but before the plaintiff
receives a report under subsection 59(2) or (3).
No action for remedial conduct
62. An endangered species protection action may not be brought if the
alleged conduct was or will be
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(a) taken to protect a listed endangered or threatened species or its
habitat or to protect the environment, national security, safety
or health, including animal and plant health; and
(b) reasonable and consistent with public safe~y.
Notice of the action
63. (1) The plaintiff in an endangered species protection action must
give notice of the action in the public registry no later than ten
days after the document originating the action is fust served on a
defendant.
Notice of other matters
(2) The court may order any party to the action to give notice in the
public registry ofany other matter relating to the action.
Attorney General to be served
64. (1) A plaintiffmust serve the Attorney General with a copy ofthe
document originating an endangered species protection action
within ten days after first serving the document on a defendant.
Attorney General may participate
(2) The Attorney General is entitled to participate in the action, either
as a party or otherwise. Notice ofa decision ofthe Attorney
General to participate must be given to the plaintiff and the public
registry within 45 days after the copy ofthe originating document
is served on the Attorney General.
Right of appeal
(3) The Attorney General is entitled to appeal from ajudgment in the
action and to make submissions and present evidence in an appeal.
Other participants
65. (1) The court may allow any person to participate in an
endangered species protection action in order to provide fair and
adequate representation of the private and public interests
involved, including governmental interests.
Manner and terms of participation
(2) The court may determine the manner and terms ofthe person's
participation, including the payment of costs.
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Burden of proof
66. The burden of proof in an endangered species protection action is
on a balance ofprobabilities.
Defence of due diligence
67. (1) The defence ofdue diligence in complying with this Act, the
regulations or an emergency order is available in an endangered.
species protection action.
Other defences not excluded
(2) This section does not limit the availability of any other defence.
Undertakings to pay damages
68. In deciding whether to dispense with an undertaking to pay
damages caused by an interlocutory order, the court in an
endangered species protection action may consider any special
circumstances, including whether the action is a test case or raises
a novel point of law.
Remedies
69. If a court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment in an
endangered species protection action, it may grant any relief
mentioned in subsection 60(3).
Orders to negotiate corrective measures
70. (1) A court order to negotiate corrective measures with respect to
significant harm caused by an offence may include the following
measures to the extent that they are reasonable, practical and
ecologically sound:
(a) measures for the prevention, reduction or elimination ofthe
harm or the risk of harm;
(b) measures to assist in the recovery of the species involved and
its habitat; and
(c) the payment ofmoney by the defendant, as the court may direct
to achieve the purposes of the measures.
Before making the order, the court must take into account any efforts
that the defendant has already made to deal with the harm or risk of
harm.
Other orders
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(2) The court may also make interlocutory or ancillary orders to
ensure that the negotiation of the corrective measures runs
smoothly, including orders
(a) for the payment of the costs ofnegotiation;
(b) requiring any party to prepare a draft of the measures; and
(c) setting a time limit for the negotiations.
Appointment of other person to prepare measures
(3) The court may appoint a person who is not a party to prepare draft
corrective measures if the parties cannot agree on the measures or
the court is not satisfied with the measures that they negotiate.
Order to prepare other measures
(4) The court may order the parties to prepare other corrective
measures if it is not satisfied with the measures that they
negotiate.
Approval and effective date
(5) The court may approve corrective measures that the parties
negotiate or corrective measures prepared by a person appointed
under subsection (3) and the approved measures come into effect
on a day detennined by the court.
Restriction on orders to negotiate corrective measures
71. A court may not order the negotiation of corrective measures if it
determines that
(a) the objectives mentioned in paragraphs 70(1)(a) to (c) have
already been achieved; or
(b) corrective measures that meet the same objectives have already
been ordered under this Act or any other law in force in
Canada.
Settlement or discontinuance
72. An endangered species protection action may be settled or
discontinued only with the approval of the court and on terms that
it considers appropriate.
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Settlements and orders binding
73. If an endangered species protection action results in a final order
ofa court or a settlement approved by a court,
(a) the resolution ofany question of fact by the order or settlement
is binding on a court in any other endangered species
protection action in which it arises; and
(b) no other endangered species protection action may be brought
with respect to the facts of the offence dealt with by the order
or settlement.
Costs
74. In deciding whether to award costs in an endangered species
protection action, the court may consider any special
circumstances, including whether the action is a test case or raises
a novel point of law.
Evidence ofoffence
75. (1) In an endangered species protection action, the record of
proceedings in any court in which the defendant was convicted of
an offence is evidence that the defendant committed the offence.
Certificate evidence of conviction
(2) In the action, evidence that a defendant was convicted ofan
offence may be given by a certificate stating with reasonable
particularity the defendant's conviction and sentence.
Signature on certificate
(3) The certificate must be signed by
(a) the judge or other person who made the conviction; or
(b) the clerk of the court in which the conviction was made.
Once it is proved that the defendant is the offender mentioned in the
certificate, it is evidence without proofof the signature or the official
character of the person appearing to have signed it.
Civil remedies not affected
76. (1) No civil remedy for any conduct is suspended or affected by
reason only that the conduct is an offence.
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Remedies not repealed, etc.
(2) Nothing in this Act may be interpreted so as to repeal, remove or
reduce any remedy available to any person under any law in force
in Canada.
OFFENCES AND PUNISHMENT
Contraventions
77. (1) Every person who contravenes section 31 or 32 or any
prescribed provision ofa regulation or an emergency order
(a) is guilty ofan offence punishable on summary conviction and
is liable
(i) in the case of a corporation, to a fme not exceeding
$100,000, and
(ii) in the case of any other person, to a fine not exceeding
$50,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one
year, or to both; or
(b) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable
(i) in the case of a corporation, to a fme not exceeding
$500,000, and
(ii) in the case of any other person, to a fine not exceeding
$250,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five
years, or to both.
A regulation or emergency order may prescribe which of its
provisions may give rise to an offence.
Subsequent offence
(2) If a person is convicted of an offence a second or subsequent time,
the amount of the fme for the subsequent offence may, despite
subsection (1), be double the amount set out in that subsection.
Continuing offence
(3) A person who commits or continues an offence on more than one
day is liable to be convicted for a separate offence for each day on
which the offence is committed or continued.
Fines cumulative
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(4) A fine imposed for an offence involving more than one animal,
plant or other organism may be calculated in respect of each one
as though it had been the subject of a separate information and the
fine then imposed is the total of that calculation.
Additional fine
(5) If a person is convicted of an offence and the court is satisfied that
monetary benefits accrued to the person as a result of the
commission of the offence,
(a) the court may order the person to pay an additional fine in an
amount equal to the court's estimation of the amount of the
monetary benefits; and
(b) the additional fine may exceed the maximum amount ofany
fine that may otherwise be imposed under this Act.
Officers, etc., of corporations
78. If a corporation commits an offence, any officer, director or agent
of the corporation who directed, authorized, assented to, or
acquiesced or participated in, the commission of the offence is a
party to and guilty of the offence and is liable on conviction to the
punishment provided for the offence, whether or not the
corporation has been prosecuted or convicted.
Offences by employees or agents
79. In any prosecution for an offence, it is sufficient proofof the
offence to establish that it was committed by an employee or
agent of the accused, whether or not the employee or agent is
identified or has been prosecuted for the offence.
Defence of due diligence
80. No person may be found guilty of an offence if the person
establishes that they exercised all due diligence to prevent its
commission.
Venue
81. A prosecution for an offence may be instituted, heard and
determined in the place where
(a) the offence was committed;
(b) the subject-matter of the prosecution arose;
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(c) the accused was apprehended; or
(d) the accused happens to be, or is carrying on business.
Forfeiture
82. (1) If a person is convicted of an offence, the convicting court
may, in addition to any punishment imposed, order that any seized
thing by means ofor in relation to which the offence was
committed, or any proceeds of its disposition, be forfeited to Her
Majesty.
Return if no forfeiture ordered
(2) If the convicting court does not order the forfeiture, the seized
thing, or the proceeds of its disposition, must be returned to its
lawful owner or the person lawfully entitled to it.
Retention or sale
83. If a fine is imposed on a person convicted of an offence, any
seized thing, or any proceeds of its disposition, may be retained
until the fme is paid or the thing may be sold in satisfaction of the
fme and the proceeds applied, in whole or in part, in payment of
the fme.
Orders of court
84. If a person is convicted of an offence, the court may, in addition to
any punishment imposed and having regard to the nature of the
offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission, make
an order containing one or more of the following prohibitions,
directions or requirements:
(a) prohibiting the person from doing any act or engaging in any
activity that could, in the opinion of the court, result in the
continuation or repetition ofthe offence;
(b) directing the person to take any action that the court considers
appropriate to remedy or avoid any harm to any wildlife
species that resulted or may'result from the commission of the
offence;
(c) directing the person to publish, in any manner that the court
considers appropriate, the facts relating to the commission of
the offence;
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(d) directing the person to pay a responsible minister or the
government of a province an amount for all or any of the cost
of remedial or preventive action taken, or to be taken, by or on
behalfof the responsible minister or that government as a
result of the commission of the offence;
(e) directing the person to perform community service in
accordance with any conditions that the court considers
reasonable;
(t) directing the person to submit to the responsible minister, on
application to the court by the responsible minister within
three years after the conviction, any information about the
activities ofthe person that the court considers appropriate;
(g) requiring the person to comply with any other conditions that
the court considers appropriate for securing the person's good
conduct and for preventing the person from repeating the
offence or committing other offences; and
(h) directing the person to post a bond or pay into court an amount
ofmoney that the court considers appropriate for the purpose
ofensuring compliance with any prohibition, direction or
requirement under this section.
Suspended sentence
85. (1) If a person is convicted ofan offence and the court suspends
the passing of sentence under paragraph 731(1)(a) of the Criminal
Code, the court may, in addition to any probation order made
under that Act, make an order containing one or more of the
prohibitions, directions or requirements mentioned in section 84.
Imposition of sentence
(2) If the person does not comply with the order or is convicted of
another offence, within three years after the order is made, the
court may, on the application of the prosecution, impose any
sentence that could have been "imposed if the passing of sentence
had not been suspended.
Limitation period
86. (1) Proceedings by way of summary conviction in respect of an
offence may be commenced at any time within, but not later than,
two years after the day on which the subject-matter of the
proceedings became known to the responsible minister.
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Responsible minister's certificate
(2) A document appearing to have been issued by the responsible
minister, certifying the day on which the subject-matter of any
proceedings became known to the responsible minister, is
admissible in evidence without proof of the signature or official
character of the person appearing to have signed the document
and is proof of the matter asserted in it.
References to the responsible minister
(3) A reference to the responsible minister in this section includes a
provincial minister if
(a) the responsible minister has delegated responsibility for the
enforcement of this Act, the regulations or an emergency order
to the provincial minister; and
(b) the offence is alleged to have been committed in that province.
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES
When alternative measures may be used
87. (1) Alternative measures may be used to deal with a person
alleged to have committed an offence, but only if it is not
inconsistent with the purposes of this Act to do so and the
following conditions are met:
(a) the measures are part of a program of alternative measures
authorized by the Attorney General, after consultation with the
responsible minister;
(b) an information has been laid in respect of the offence;
(c) the Attorney General, after consulting with the responsible
minister, is satisfied that the measures would be appropriate,
having regard to the nature of the offence and the
circumstances surrounding its commission and the following
factors, namely,
(i) the protection of species at risk,
(ii) the person's history ofcompliance with this Act,
(iii) whether the offence is a repeated occurrence,
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(iv) any allegation that information is being or was concealed
or other attempts to subvert the purposes and requirements
of this Act are being or have been made, and
(v) whether any remedial or preventive action has been taken
by or on behalf of the person in relation to the offence;
(d) the person fully and freely consents to participate in the
alternative measures after having been informed of them;
(e) the person and the Attorney General have concluded an
agreement respecting the alternative measures within 180 days
after the person has, with respect to the offence,
(i) been served with a summons,
(ii) been issued an appearance notice, or
(iii) entered into a promise to appear or a recognizance;
(f) before consenting to participate in the alternative measures,
the person has been advised of the right to be represented by
counsel;
(g) the person accepts responsibility for the act or omission that
forms the basis of the offence;
(h) there is, in the opinion ofthe Attorney General, sufficient
evidence to proceed with the prosecution of the offence; and
(i) the prosecution of the offence is not barred at law.
Restriction on use
(2) Alternative measures must not be used to deal with a person who
(a) denies participation or involvement in the commission ofthe
alleged offence; or
(b) expresses the wish to have any charge against them dealt with
by the court.
Admissions not admissible in evidence
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(3) No admission, confession or statement accepting responsibility
for a given act or omission made by a person as a condition of
being dealt with by alternative measures is admissible in evidence
against the person in any civil or criminal proceedings.
Dismissal of charge
(4) A court must dismiss a charge laid against a person in respect of
an offence if alternative measures have been used to deal with the
person in respect of the alleged offence and
(a) the court is satisfied on a balance ofprobabilities that the
person has totally complied with the agreement; or
(b) the court is satisfied on a balance ofprobabilities that the
person has partially complied with the agreement and, in the
opinion of the court, the prosecution of the charge would be
unfair, having regard to the circumstances and the person's
perfonnance with respect to the agreement.
No bar to proceedings
(5) The use of alternative measures to deal with a person is not a bar
to proceedings against them under this Act.
Laying of infonnation, etc.
(6) This section does not prevent any person from laying an
infonnation, obtaining the issue or confirmation of any process,
or proceeding with the prosecution ofany offence, in accordance
with law.
Tenns and conditions in agreement
88. (1) An alternative measures agreement may contain any tenns
and conditions, including, but not limited to,
(a) tenns and conditions having any or all of the effects set out in
section 84 or any other tenns and conditions having any ofthe
effects prescribed by regulations that the Attorney General,
after consultation with the responsible minister, considers
appropriate; and
(b) tenns and conditions relating to the costs associated with
ensuring compliance with the agreement.
Supervision of compliance
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(2) Any governmental or non-governmental organization may
supervise compliance with the agreement.
Duration of agreement
89. An alternative measures agreement comes into effect on the day
on which it is concluded or on any later day that is specified in
the agreement and continues in effect for a period ofnot more
than three years specified in the agreement.
Filing in court for purpose of public access
90. (1) The Attorney General must consult with the responsible
minister before concluding an alternative measures agreement
and, subject to subsection (5), must have the agreement filed with
the court in which the information was laid within 30 days after
the agreement is concluded. The agreement is to be filed as part
of the court record of the proceedings to which the public has
access.
Reports
(2) A report relating to the administration of, and compliance with,
the agreement must be filed with the same court immediately
after all the terms and conditions of the agreement have been
complied with or the charges in respect ofwhich the agreement
was entered into have been dismissed.
Third party information
(3) Subject to subsection (4), if any ofthe following information is to
be part of the agreement or the report, it must be set out in a
schedule to the agreement or to the report:
(a) trade secrets of any person;
(b) financial, commercial, scientific or technical information that
is confidential information and is treated consistently in a
confidential manner by any person;
(c) information the disclosure ofwhich could reasonably be
expected to result in material financial loss or gain to any
person, or could reasonably be expected to prejudice the
competitive position of any person; or
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(d) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be
expected to interfere with contractual or other negotiations of
any person.
Agreement on information to be in schedule
(4) The parties to the agreement must agree on which information
that is to be part of the agreement or the report is information that
meets the requirements of paragraphs (3)(a) to (d).
How schedule is to be kept secret
(5) The schedule is confidential and must not be filed with the court.
Prohibition of disclosure
(6) The responsible minister must not disclose any information set
out in a schedule to the agreement or to the report, except as
authorized by section 97 or the Access to Information Act.
Filing in public registry
91. The following documents must be included in the public registry:
(a) a copy ofeach agreement and report filed under section 90 or
subsection 93(2); or
(b) a notice that the agreement or report has been filed in court
and is available to the public.
Stay of proceedings
92. (1) Despite section 579 of the Criminal Code, the Attorney
General must, on filing an alternative measures agreement, stay
the proceedings in respect of the alleged offence, or apply to the
court for an adjournment of the proceedings, for a period of not
more than one year after the expiry of the agreement.
Recommencement ofproceedings
(2) Proceedings stayed under subsection (l) may be recommenced
without laying a new information or preferring a new indictment,
as the case may be, by the Attorney General giving notice of the
recommencement to the clerk of the court in which the stay of the
proceedings was entered. If no such notice is given within one
year after the expiration of the agreement, the proceedings are
deemed never to have been commenced.
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Application to vary agreement
93. (1) Subject to subsections 90(2) and (3), the Attorney General
may vary the terms and conditions of an alternative measures
agreement on application by the person bound by the agreement
and after consultation with the responsible minister. The
Attorney General must be of the opinion that the variation is
desirable because of a material change in the circumstances since
the agreement was concluded or last varied. The variation may
include
(a) decreasing the period for which the agreement is to remain in
force; and
(b) by relieving the person of compliance with any condition that
is specified in the agreement, either absolutely or partially or
for any period that the Attorney General considers desirable.
Filing varied agreement
(2) An agreement that has been varied must be filed in accordance
with section 90 with the court in which the original agreement
was filed.
Application ofprovisions dealing with records
94. Sections 95 to 97 apply only in respect of persons who have
entered into an alternative measures agreement, regardless of the
degree of their compliance with the terms and conditions of the
agreement.
Disclosure of information by peace officer or enforcement officer
95. (1) A peace officer or enforcement officer may disclose to any
person any information in a record relating to an offence alleged
to have been committed by a person, including the original or a
copy ofany fingerprints or photographs of the person, if it is
necessary to disclose the information in the conduct of the
investigation of an offence.
Disclosure to insurance company
(2) A peace officer or enforcement officer may also disclose the
information to an insurance company for the purpose of
investigating a claim arising out of an offence committed or
alleged to have been committed by the person to whom the record
relates.
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Government records
96. (1) The responsible minister, any enforcement officer and any
department or agency ofa government in Canada with which the
responsible minister has entered into an agreement under section
7 may keep records and use information obtained as a result of
the use of alternative measures to deal with ~ person
(a) for the purposes of an inspection under this Act or an
investigation ofan offence alleged to have been committed by
a person;
(b) in proceedings against a person under this Act;
(c) for the purpose of the administration ofalternative measures
programs; or
(d) otherwise for the administration of this Act.
Private records
(2) Any person or organization may keep records of information
obtained by them as a result of supervising compliance with an
alternative measures agreement and use the information for the
purpose of supervising such compliance.
Disclosure of records
97. (1) A record or information referred to in section 95 or 96 may be
made available to
(a) any judge or court for any purpose relating to proceedings
relating to offences under this or any other Act committed or
alleged to have been committed by the person to whom the
record relates;
(b) any peace officer, enforcement officer or prosecutor
(i) for the purpose of investigating an offence under this or any
other Act that the person is suspected on reasonable
grounds ofhaving committed, or in respect of which the
person has been arrested or charged, or
(ii) for any purpose related to the administration of the case to
which the record relates;
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(c) any member of a department or agency of a government in
Canada, or any agent of such a government, that is
(i) engaged in the administration of alternative measures in
respect of the person, or
(ii) preparing a report in respect of the person under this Act;
or
(d) any other person who is deemed, or any person within a class
of persons that is deemed, by a judge ofa court to have a valid
interest in the record, to the extent directed by the judge, if
(i) the judge is satisfied that the disclosure is desirable in the
public interest for research or statistical purposes or in the
interest of the proper administration ofjustice, and
(ii) the person gives a written undertaking not to subsequently
disclose the information except in accordance with
subsection (2).
Subsequent disclosure for research or statistical purposes
(2) If a record is made available for inspection to any person under
paragraph (1)(d) for research or statistical purposes, that person
may subsequently disclose information contained in the record,
but may not disclose the information in any form that would
reasonably be expected to identify the person to whom it relates.
Information, copies
(3) A person to whom a record is authorized to be made available
under this section may be given any information contained in the
record and may be given a copy ofany part of the record.
Evidence
(4) This section does not authorize the introduction into evidence of
any part of a record that would not otherwise be admissible in
evidence. .
Exception for public access to court record
(5) For greater certainty, this section does not apply to an alternative
measures agreement, a varied alternative measures agreement or a
report that is filed with the court in accordance with section 90.
Information exchange agreements
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98. The responsible minister may enter into an agreement with a
department or agency ofa government in Canada respecting the
exchange of information for the purpose ofadministering alternative
measures or preparing a report in respect of a person's compliance with
an alternative measures agreement.
Regulations
99. The responsible minister may make regulations respecting the
alternative measures that may be used for the purposes of this Act
including, but not limited to, regulations respecting
(a) the manner ofpreparing and filing reports relating to the
administration ofand compliance with alternative measures
agreements;
(b) the types ofcosts, and the manner ofpaying the costs, associated
with ensuring compliance with alternative measures agreements;
and
(c) the terms and conditions that may be included in an alternative
measures agreement and the effects of those terms and conditions.
COST RECOVERY
Fees and charges
100. (1) Her Majesty may recover any prescribed fee or charge from any
person who requests
(a) an agreement or permit under section 46, or an amendment to, or
renewal of, such an agreement or permit; or
(b) access to the public registry or the inclusion of a document in the
public registry.
Regulations
(2) The Governor in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister, may
make regulations prescribing the fees and charges, or the manner of
calculating them.
REPORTS AND REVIEW OF ACT
Annual report to Parliament
101. The Minister must annually prepare a report on the administration of
this Act during the preceding calendar year and must have a copy of
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the report tabled in each House of Parliament within the first 15 days
that it is sitting after the completion of the report.
Reports to Parliament
102. Three years after this section comes into force and at the end of each
subsequent period of five years, the Minister must prepare a general
report on the status ofwildlife species. The Minister must have the
report tabled in each House of Parliament within the first 15 days that
it is sitting after the completion of the report.
Parliamentary review and report
103. Three years after this section comes into force and at the end ofeach
subsequent period of five years, a committee of the House of
Commons, of the Senate or of both Houses ofParliament is to be
designated or established for the purpose of reviewing this Act. The
committee is to undertake a comprehensive review of the Act as soon
as practicable, including a review of the effects of its application, and
is to report to Parliament within one year after the review is
undertaken or within any additional time that the House of Commons
may authorize.
CONDITIONAL AMENDMENTS
Bill C-25
104. If Bill C-25, introduced in the second session of the thirty-fifth
Parliament and entitled An Act respecting regulations and other
documents, including the review, registration, publication and
parliamentary scrutiny ofregulations and other documents, and to
make consequential and related amendments to other Acts, is assented
to, then, on the later of the coming into force of section 27 of that Act
and section 35 of this Act, section 35 of this Act is replaced by the
following:
Regulatory process does not apply
35. Emergency orders are exempt from·the application of the regulatory
process under the Regulations Act, but each order must be published in
the Canada Gazette within 23 days after it is made.
Bill C-26
105. If Bill C-26, introduced in the second session of the thirty-fifth
Parliament and entitled An Act respecting the oceans ofCanada, is
assented to, then, on the later of the coming into force of
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(a) section 4 of that Act and subparagraph (b)(ii) of the definition
"federal land" in subsection 2(1) of this Act, that subparagraph is replaced
by the following:
(ii) the territorial sea of Canada as determined in accordance with
the Oceans Act, including the seabed and subsoil below and
the airspace above that sea,
(b) section 6 of that Act and subparagraph (b)(i) of the definition
"federal land" in subsection 2(1) of this Act, that subparagraph is
replaced by the following:
(i) the internal waters of Canada within the meaning of the
Oceans Act, including the seabed and subsoil below and the
airspace above those waters,
Bill C-62
106. If Bill C-62, introduced in the second session of the thirty-fifth
Parliament and entitled An Act respectingfisheries, is assented to,
then, on the later of the coming into force of section 2 of that Act and
the defInition "aquatic species" in subsection 2(1) of this Act, that
defInition is replaced by the following:
, 'aquatic species"
"aquatic species" means a wildlife species that is a fish, as defined in
section 2 of the Fisheries Act, or a marine plant, as defined in section 2 of that Act.
COMING INTO FORCE
Order of Governor in Council
107. This Act, or any of its provisions, comes into force on a day or days
to be fixed by order of the Governor in Council.
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APPENDIX C: THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
1. Are you one of the operation's principal decision maker(s)?
__ yes __ no
2. Sex
male female
3. Are you:
__ 75 years of age or greater
__ 65 to 74 years of age
__ 55 to 64 years of age
__ 45 to 54 years of age
__ 35 to 44 years of age
__ 25 to 34 years of age
__ 24 years of age or less
4. Do you live
__on your operation
-population center of less than 1000 people
-population center of 1000 to 5000 people
-population center of 5000 to 10000 people
__population center of 10000 to 20000 people
-population center of greater than 20000 people
5. Does your operation raise any livestock other than cattle?
__ yes __ no
If yes, please specify the type of animals
6. How many head of breeding stock are in your operation's cattle herd?
less than 20 head
20 to 49 head
50 to 99 head
100 to 149 head
150 to 199 head
200 to 250 head
more than 250 head
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7. Does your operation background any cattle?
__ yes __ no
if yes, how many per year?
less than 20 head
20 to 49 head
50 to 99 head
100 to 149 head
150 to 199 head
200 to 250 head
more than 250 head
8. Does your operation finish any cattle?
__ yes __ no
if yes, how many per year?
less than 20 head
20 to 49 head
50 to 99 head
100 to 149 head
150 to 199 head
200 to 250 head
more than 250 head
9. Does your operation milk any cows?
__ yes __ no
if yes, how many head of breeding stock?
less than 20 head
20 to 49 head
50 to 99 head
100 to 149 head
150 to 199 head
200 to 250 head
more than 250 head
10. How many acres of pasture does your operation own?
__none
less than 160 acres
160 to 320 acres
320 to 640 acres
640 to 1280 acres
1280 to 1920 acres
1920 to 2560 acres
more than 2560 acres
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11. How many acres of pasture does your operation rent?
__none
less than 160 acres
160 to 320 acres
320 to 640 acres
640 to 1280 acres
1280 to 1920 acres
1920 to 2560 acres
more than 2560 acres
12. How many acres of forage does your operation own?
__none
less than 160 acres
160 to 320 acres
320 to 640 acres
640 to 1280 acres
1280 to 1920 acres
1920 to 2560 acres
more than 2560 acres
13. How many acres of forage does your operation rent?
__none
less than 160 acres
160 to 320 acres
320 to 640 acres
640 to 1280 acres
1280 to 1920 acres
1920 to 2560 acres
more than 2560 acres
14. How many acres of cropland does your operation own?
__none
less than 160 acres
160 to 320 acres
320 to 640 acres
640 to 1280 acres
1280 to 1920 acres
1920 to 2560 acres
more than 2560 acres
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15. How many acres of cropland does your operation rent?
__none
__ less than 160 acres
__ 160 to 320 acres
__ 320 to 640 acres
640 to 1280 acres
1280 to 1920 acres
1920 to 2560 acres
more than 2560 acres
16. Did you change the size of your operation's cattle herd or land base in the last five
years?
__ yes __ no; if no go to question 24.
17. Did your operation change the size of your its cattle herd because of the elimination
of the WGTA grain transportation subsidy?
__ yes _no
if yes, by how many head of breeding stock?
less than 20 head
20 to 49 head
50 to 99 head
100 to 149 head
150 to 199 head
200 to 250 head
more than 250 head
Was the change an _increase or _ decrease?
18. Did your operation change its owned pasture acreage because of the elimination of
the WGTA grain transportation subsidy?
__ yes __ no
if yes, by how many acres?
less than 160 acres
160 to 320 acres
320 to 640 acres
640 to 1280 acres
1280 to 1920 acres
1920 to 2560 acres
more than 2560 acres
Was the change an _increase or _ decrease?
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19. Did your operation change its leased pasture acreage because of the elimination of
the WGTA grain transportation subsidy?
__ yes __ no
if yes, by how many acres?
less than 160 acres
160 to 320 acres
320 to 640 acres
640 to 1280 acres
1280 to 1920 acres
1920 to 2560 acres
more than 2560 acres
Was the change an _increase or _ decrease?
20. Did your operation change its owned forage crop acreage because of the
elimination of the WGTA grain transportation subsidy?
__ yes __ no
if yes, by how many acres?
less than 160 acres
160 to 320 acres
320 to 640 acres
640 to 1280 acres
1280 to 1920 acres
1920 to 2560 acres
more than 2560 acres
Was the change an _increase or _ decrease?
21. Did your operation change its leased forage crop acreage because of the
elimination of the WGTA grain transportation subsidy?
__ yes __ no
if yes, by how many acres?
less than 160 acres
160 to 320 acres
320 to 640 acres
640 to 1280 acres
1280 to 1920 acres
1920 to 2560 acres
more than 2560 acres
Was the change an _increase or _ decrease?
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22. Did your operation change its owned cropland acreage because of the elimination
of the WGTA grain transportation subsidy?
__ yes __ no
if yes, by how many acres?
less than 160 acres
160 to 320 acres
320 to 640 acres
640 to 1280 acres
1280 to 1920 acres
1920 to 2560 acres
more than 2560 acres
Was the change an _increase or _ decrease?
23. Did your operation change leased cropland acreage because of the elimination of
the WGTA grain transportation subsidy?
__ yes __ no
if yes, by how many acres?
less than 160 acres
160 to 320 acres
320 to 640 acres
640 to 1280 acres
1280 to 1920 acres
1920 to 2560 acres
more than 2560 acres
Was the change an _increase or _ decrease?
24. How much does a mile of three strand barbed wire fence cost to construct? $ _
25. Do you insure currently through Canada Saskatchewan Crop Insurance?
__ yes __ no, if no and you have previously carried Crop Insurance what was
the last year you insured? 19_
26. Does your operation pasture any of its herd on PFRA community pastures?
__ yes __ no
27. Does your operation pasture any of its herd on Government of Saskatchewan
community pastures? __ yes __ no
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For questions 28 to 57 please use thefollowing scale to indicate the extent to which
you agree with the sentiment expressed by the question.
Strongly Moderately Indifferent Moderately Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
1 2 3 4 5
28. I know that one or more endangered species are present on land that my operation
owns or rents.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
29. I know that one or more endangered species is present on land that one or more of
my neighbors own or rent.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
30. I believe that one or more endangered species could be present on land that my
operation owns or rents.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
31. I believe that one or more endangered species could be present on land that one or
more of my neighbors own or rent.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
32. I would invite a convicted poacher to my or my child's wedding.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
33. I would accept an invitation to the wedding of a convicted poacher.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale.
34. I feel that it is manifestly unfair to expect landowners to bear the costs of protecting
endangered species.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
For the remaining questions the words "Bill C-65" will be used to represent Bill C-65
which was titled the Canada Endangered Species Protection Act. In any reference to
Bill C-65 in the remaining questions I will ask you to assume that Bill C-65 will be
reintroduced and passed as it existed when Parliament was prorogued for the last
federal election. That is, pretend that the new law the' Federal Government is talking
about passing will be the same as the last one they tried to pass. Similarly, any
reference to the Saskatchewan Wildlife Act, should be taken as the endangered
species provisions of the current Saskatchewan Wildlife Act, or the new Saskatchewan
Wildlife Act, should it be proclaimed as they are the same in respect to endangered
species protection. Please recall that it is the opinion of the Canadian Cattlemen's
Association that Bill C-65 could protect habitat on private property, while such protection
is not mandated by the Wildlife Act.
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35. I feel that Bill C-65 will affect land that my operation owns or rents should an
endangered species be present on the land.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
36. I feel that Bill C-65 will affect land that my neighbors own or rent should an
endangered species be present on the land.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
37. I feel that the Saskatchewan Wildlife Act is less likely to affect land that my
operation owns or rents then the Bill C-65.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale.
38. I feel that the Saskatchewan Wildlife Act is less likely to affect land that my
neighbors own or rent then Bill C-65.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
39. I feel that should my neighbors believe it to be in their best interest not to obey Bill C-
65 they will not obey it.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
40. I feel that should my neighbors believe it to be in their best interest not to obey the
Saskatchewan Wildlife Act they will not obey it.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
Please only respond with one (1) strongly agree or moderately agree for
questions 41 through 45.
41. I feel that if a person were to violate the provisions of either Bill C-65 or the
Saskatchewan Wildlife Act that there is a 1 in 5 chance or greater that they would
be convicted.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
42. I feel that if a person were to violate the provisions of either Bill C-65 or the
Saskatchewan Wildlife Act that there is a 1 in 100 chance that they would be
convicted.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
43. I feel that if a person were to violate the provisions of either Bill C-65 or the
Saskatchewan Wildlife Act that there is a 1 in 1000 chance that they would be
convicted.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
44. I feel that if a person were to violate the provisions of either Bill C-65 or the
Saskatchewan Wildlife Act that there is a less than 1 in 1000 chance that they
would be convicted.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
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45. I would socialize with a neighbor convicted of violating either Bill C-65 or the
Saskatchewan Wildlife Act.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
46. I would prefer to socialize with a neighbor convicted of violating either Bill C-65 or
the Saskatchewan Wildlife Act over a member of my family who is an urban
resident who objects to socializing with my neighbor because of the conviction.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale.
47. I would prefer to socialize with a neighbor convicted of violating either Bill C-65 or the
Saskatchewan Wildlife Act over a member of my family who is a rural resident, not
of my district, who objects to socializing with my neighbor because of the conviction.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
48. I would prefer to socialize with a neighbor convicted of violating either Bill C-65 or the
Saskatchewan Wildlife Act over a member of my family who is a rural resident, of
my district, who objects to socializing with our neighbor solely because of the
conviction.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale.
49. I do not believe that either the Government of Canada or the Government of
Saskatchewan is particularly committed to the protection of endangered species.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
50. I do not believe that either the Government of Canada or the Government of
Saskatchewan will commit anything beyond minimal resources to the protection of
endangered species.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
51. I feel that the government employees charged with enforcing either Bill C-65 or the
Saskatchewan Wildlife Act will go to ridiculous extremes in the performance of their
jobs by using dictated rather than cooperative means to settle any disputes that may
arise.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
52. I like to watch wildlife on land that my operation owns or rents.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale.
53. I like to watch wildlife on land that my neighbors own or rent.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
54. I would prefer to see more wildlife on land owned or rented by my operation.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale.
55. I would prefer to see more wildlife on land that my operation owns or rents only if my
operation is not solely responsible for the costs associated with the additional
wildlife.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
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56. I am risk adverse that is I do not like to take risks.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
57. I am risk neutral that is I am willing to trade risk for reward.
Please record a number between 1 and 5 based upon the above scale. __
58. For a property tax waiver my operation would be prepared to let
, __none of my operation's land base
__worst five percent of my operation's land base
__worst ten percent of my operation's land base
__worst twenty percent of my operation's land base
__worst fifty percent of my operation's land base
__other, please specify in percentage of your operation's land base __%
return to wildlife habitat.
59. For an annual cash payment of $10.00 per acre my operation would be prepared to
let:
__none of my operation's land base
__worst five percent of my operation's land base
__worst ten percent of my operation's land base
__worst twenty percent of my operation's land base
__worst fifty percent of my operation's land base
__other, please specify in percentage of your operation's land base __%
return to wildlife habitat.
60. For an annual cash payment of $20.00 per acre my operation would be prepared to
let
__none of my operation's land base
__worst five percent of my operation's land base
__worst ten percent of my operation's land base
__worst twenty percent of my operation's land base
__worst fifty percent of my operation's land base
__other, please specify in percentage of your operation's land base __%
return to wildlife habitat.
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61. For an annual cash payment of $30.00 per acre my operation would be prepared to
'let
__none of my operation's land base
__worst five percent of my operation's land base
__worst ten percent of my operation's land base
__worst twenty percent of my operation's land base
__worst fifty percent of my operation's land base
__other, please specify in percentage of your operation's land base _._%
return to wildlife habitat.
62. For an annual cash payment of $40.00 per acre my operation would be prepared to
let
__none of my operation's land base
__worst five percent of my operation's land base
__worst ten percent of my operation's land base
__worst twenty percent of my operation's land base
__worst fifty percent of my operation's land base
__other, please specify in percentage of your operation's land base __%
return to wildlife habitat.
COMMENTS
PLEASE RECORD ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS HERE DO NOT HESITATE
TO ADD AN ADDITIONAL SHEET IF YOU FEEL THE NEED.
THANK YOU
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63. I would like a copy of the survey results mailed to me.
---:les __no
if yes please print you name and address in the space provided below.
Name: _
Address:
64. I would agree to be interviewed to expand on the information contained in this
survey. ---:les __no
if yes please print you name address and telephone number in the space provided
below.
Name:, _
Address:
Or as above__
Telephone: (306) __- _
PLEASE NOTE THAT THIS PAGE WILL BE REMOVED AND FILED SEPARATELY
PRIOR TO THE ENCODING OF THE DATA CONTAINED IN THIS SURVEY.
SHOULD YOU NOT DESIRE A COPY OF THE RESULTS OR TO BE INTERVIEWED
PLEASE DO NOT HESITATE TO REMOVE THIS PAGE
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APPENDIX D: RESPONDENT LOTTERY RESULTS
3 95 183 273 359 457 533 623 695
4 97 185 274 360 458 534 624 697
6 98 186 276 361 459 535 625 699
10 100 188 277 362 461 537 628 703
11 103 190 278 363 462 538 629 704
14 104 192 279 364 463 539 633 708
16 108 196 281 366 464 540 634 710
17 109 197 282 367 465 542 635 711
18 112 201 283 370 467 544 636
22 114 203 284 371 468 546 637
24 115 206 285 372 471 548 638
28 116 207 287 373 472 551 639
29 117 208 292 375 473 553 640
30 118 209 293 377 476 555 641
31 119 212 294 380 482 559 642
32 120 213 295 383 485 560 643
33 121 215 296 384 487 562 644
35 124 216 297 385 490 565 645
36 129 217 299 387 491 566 646
38 130 219 301 388 493 567 647
39 131 222 302 389 494 571 648
40 133 223 303 393 495 574 649
41 134 225 304 395 496 575 650
42 135 226 305 398 497 577 651
47 137 227 307 401 498 578 652
49 143 231 309 403 499 587 653
51 144 233 312 404 501 589 654
53 145 234 313 405 503 590 656
54 149 237 314 406 504 591 657
56 152 238 315 409 506 593 659
61 155 240 316 414 507 595 660
62 156 241 317 418 511 596 662
63 157 242 320 419 512 597 663
64 158 244 330 422 513 598 664
65 159 245 333 423 514 600 665
66 161 250 336 424 515 602 666
67 164 251 340 427 516 603 670
68 166 253 341 431 517 607 671
70 167 254 342 435 518 609 672
71 169 255 344 437 519 611 673
72 170 256 345 443 521 612 674
75 171 257 347 444 522 614 675
76 172 265 351 445 523 616 677
80 173 267 352 447 524 617 679
82 177 268 353 450 525 618 680
87 179 269 355 451 526 619 681
90 180 270 356 453 527 620 683
91 181 271 357 454 529 621 686
94 182 272 358 455 531 622 691
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APPENDIX E: ADDITIONAL REGRESSION RESULTS
The least squares (LS) dependent variables reported in this appendix are: fair, felon over
family member of your district, felon over rural family member, government cares,
EIIN5, EIINIOOO, and GRIINIOOO. Fair is the vector of responses to the question
respecting the belief in the fairness of expecting landowners to pay for protecting
endangered species. Felon over family member of your district and felon over rural
family member, are the responses to the questions that aver a preference to socializing
with a neighbor convicted ofbreaching the Bill or the Saskatchewan Wildlife Act over a
family member who lives in a rural area or a family member who lives in the same rural
area as the respondent who refuses to socialize with the neighbor purely because of the
conviction. Government cares, is the vector of the responses to the assertion: "I do not
believe that either the Government of Canada or the Government of Saskatchewan is
particularly committed to the protection of endangered species". Finally EIIN5,
EIINIOOO and GRIINIOOO, are the responses to the avowal that the probability of
detection is one in five, one in one thousand or greater than one in one thousand
respectively. The independent variables were: c, the intercept; age, the age of the
respondents; sex, the gender of the respondents; res, how large a population center that
the residence of the respondents is located in; herd, the size of the respondents breeding
herd; crp, the amount of crop land that the respondents' operations own and rent; and pas,
the amount of pasture that the respondents' operations own and rent. The F-statistic is
the statistic to test the joint hypothesis that the coefficients of the independent variables a
statistically significantly different from zero. While the column headed t-statistic is the
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statistic to test the hypothesis that the coefficient of each ofthe independent variables is
statistically significantly different from zero.
o
0.0053
0.2025
0.3653
5.456021
Appendix E Table 1 Regression Results with Fair as
the Dependent Variable
LS 1/ Dependent Variable is FAIR
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 4.918868 0.770271 6.385896
AGE -0.26012 0.090697 -2.86803
SEX 0.895451 0.696665 1.28534
RES -0.22636 0.248549 -0.91072
R-squared 0.175307 F-statistic
Sample Size: 82 Source: Survey
o
0.0622
0.206
1.589344
Appendix E Table 2 Regression Results with Felon
over Family Member of your District as the
Dependent Variable
LS 1/ Dependent Variable is FELON OVER FAMILY
MEMBER OF YOUR DISTRICT
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 4.602397 0.53248 8.643325
SEX -1.00132 0.528201 -1.89571
CRP -0.05766 0.045158 -1.27678
R-squared 0.044658 F-statistic
Sample Size: 71 Source: Survey
o
0.1017
0.2336
1.31033
Appendix E Table 3 Regression Results with Felon
over a Rural Family Member as the Dependent
Variable
LS II Dependent Variable is FELON OVER A RURAL
FAMILY MEMBER
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 4.571559 0.532828 8.579807
SEX -0.88296 0.532124 -1.65931
CRP -0.05105 0.042471 -1.20195
R-squared 0.037109 F-statistic
Sample Size: 71 Source: Survey
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o
0.4026
0.1357
0.3642
1.488509
Appendix E Table 4 Regression Results with
Government Cares as the Dependent Variable
LS /I Dependent Variable is GOVERNMENT CARES
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 2.595429 0.594765 4.363793
AGE 0.07906 0.093917 0.841813
HERD 0.127787 0.084708 1.508557
CRP -0.04701 0.051481 -0.91318
R-squared 0.057645 F-statistic
Sample Size: 77 Source: Survey
Appendix E Table 5 Regression Results with
Gr11N1000 as the Dependent Variable
LS II Dependent Variable is GR11N1000
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.905136 0.924532 0.979021 0.3312
SEX 1.039856 0.774759 1.342167 0.1842
RES 0.439915 0.16679 2.63753 0.0104
HERD 0.122803 0.09633 1.274808 0.2069
R-squared 0.079728 F-statistic 1.877097
Sample Size: 70 Source: Survey
o
o
0.0545
0.0146
4.384978
Appendix E Table 6 Regression Results with E11N5
as the Dependent Variable
LS /I Dependent Variable is E11N5
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 5.364966 0.62307 8.610535
RES -0.56339 0.101352 -5.55872
HERD -0.17208 0.087868 -1.95841
CRP -0.12136 0.048385 -2.50823
R-squared 0.168319 F-statistic
Sample Size: 70 Source: Survey
Appendix E Table 7 Regression Results with
E11N1000 as the Dependent Variable
LS /I Dependent Variable is E11N1000
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 1.615917 0.847219 1.907319 0.0608
SEX 1.100346 0.857052 1.283873 0.2037
RES 0.384083 0.144258 2.662472 0.0097
R-squared 0.058883 F-statistic 2.06473
Sample Size: 70 Source: Survey
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APPENDIX F: AMENDED COST CALCULATIONS
APPENDIX F: TABLE 1 % Crop and Summerfollow in Project Area by Enterprise and Soil Class
enterprise wheat barley canola fallow
soil class smt stb smt stb smt stb
E 0.115 0.321 0.018 0.131 0.1 0.081 0.233
F 0.135 0.323 0.017 0.129 0.095 0.054 0.247
G 0.161 0.325 0.015 0.1 0.089 0.043 0.266
H 0.203 0.298 0.017 0.095 0.067 0.034 0.287
J 0.239 0.267 0.02 0.084 0.053 0.026 0.312
K 0.219 0.261 0.026 0.107 0.054 0.034 0.299
L 0.182 0.295 0.03 0.137 0.056 0.033 0.268
M 0.163 0.272 0.038 0.179 0.059 0.03 0.259
0 0.157 0.273 0.055 0.229 0.024 0.026 0.236
P 0.133 0.164 0.069 0.35 0.03 0.023 0.232
Source Gray et. al. p. 36
APPENDIX F: TABLE 2 Expected Yields in Project Area by Enterprise and Soil Class
enterprise wheat barley canola
soil class smt stb smt stb smf stb
E 32.59 26.95 49.96 42.55 24.44 18.45
F 31.72 26.11 48.76 41.29 23.67 17.75
G 30.72 25.14 47.46 40.01 22.82 16.93
H 29.6 24.02 45.82 38.36 21.88 15.96
J 28.3 22.72 43.84 36.37 20.89 14.78
K 26.72 21.11 41.53 34.08 19.78 13.89
L 24.82 19.21 38.86 31.44 18.49 12.54
M 22.55 16.69 35.48 28.04 16.91 11
0 19.58 14 31.28 23.86 14.89 9.06
P 16.5 10.94 26.99 19.56 12.86 6.94
Source Gray et. al. p. 34
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APPENDIX F: TABLE 3 Estimated Cost of Production by Enterprise for Soil Class G
fallow wheat barley canola
smf stb smf stb smf stb
projected input expenses
seed 0 4.82 5.54 4.96 4.59 6.2 5.89
nitrogen 0 0.02 7.43 0.51 8.77 1.6 12.39
phosphorous 0 4.61 4.41 6.82 4.67 5.09 4.56
other fertilizers 0 0.38 2.12 0.73 1.66 1.03 2.95
herbicides 2.93 12.88 9.78 10.19 9.19 11.61 14.94
insecticides 0 0 0.05 0 0.03 0.65 0.64
hail insurance 0 0.23 0.29 0.3 0.44 0.99 0.44
miscellaneous 0.39 0.53 0.53 1.01 0.4 0.6 0.87
total inputs 3.32 23.47 30.15 24.52 29.75 27.77 42.68
equipment and building expenses
fuel, oil and lubricants 3.85 5.22 5.97 6.19 7.85 5.16 6.78
repairs &maintenance 2.66 5.07 5.34 6.94 7.56 6.48 5.89
miscellaneous 0 0 0.62 0 0.44 0.15 0.28
indirect equipment expenses 0.61 3.38 3.73 2.37 3.55 5.26 4.93
total equipment expenses 7.12 13.67 15.66 15.5 19.4 17.05 17.88
other expenses
labour 5.87 5.87 5.87 5.87 5.87 5.87 5.87
property taxes 2.71 3.23 2.86 4.02 3.6 3.09 3.5
miscellaneous 1.33 5.19 5.83 6.46 5.85 6.2 7.61
operating interest 0.58 2.75 3.19 2.81 3.26 3.14 4
total other costs 10.49 17.04 17.75 19.16 18.58 18.3 20.98
total cash costs 20.93 54.18 63.56 59.18 67.73 63.12 81.54
depreciation buildings and equip. 6.44 12.86 15.8 12.16 17.93 14.8 16.55
total cash and depreciation costs 27.37 67.04 79.36 71.34 85.66 77.92 98.09
Source Gray et. al. p. 37
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APPENDIX F: TABLE 4 Adjusted Total Costs for Acre by Soil Classification
adjusted total costs per acre E soil
adjusted total costs per acre F soil
adjusted total costs per acre G soil
adjusted total costs per acre H soil
adjusted total costs per acre J soil
adjusted total costs per acre K soil
adjusted total costs per acre L soil
adjusted total costs per acre M soil
adjusted total costs per acre 0 soil
adjusted total costs per acre P soil
fallow wheat
smf stb
27.37 71.12
27.37 69.22
27.37 67.04
27.37 64.60
27.37 61.76
27.37 58.31
27.37 54.16
27.37 49.21
27.37 42.73
27.37 36.01
barley
smf stb
85.07 75.10
82.42 73.29
79.36 71.34
75.82 68.87
71.72 65.90
66.64 62.43
60.64 58.41
52.69 53.33
44.19 47.02
34.53 40.57
canola
smf stb
91.10 83.45
88.40 80.82
85.66 77.92
82.13 74.71
77.87 71.33
72.96 67.54
67.31 63.14
60.03 57.74
51.08 50.84
41.88 43.91
106.90
102.84
98.09
92.47
85.63
80.48
72.65
63.73
52.49
40.21
APPENDIX F: TABLE 5
adjusted input costs per acre E soil
adjusted input costs per acre F soil
adjusted input costs per acre G soil
adjusted input costs per acre H soil
adjusted input costs per acre J soil
adjusted input costs per acre K soil
adjusted input costs per acre L soil
adjusted input costs per acre M soil
adjusted input costs per acre 0 soil
adjusted input costs per acre P soil
Adjusted Input Costs per Acre by Soil Classification
fallow wheat barley canola
smf stb smf stb smf stb
3.32 24.90 32.32 25.81 31.64 29.74
3.32 24.23 31.31 25.19 30.70 28.80
3.32 23.47 30.15 24.52 29.75 27.77
3.32 22.61 28.81 23.67 28.52 26.63
3.32 21.62 27.25 22.65 27.04 25.42
3.32 20.41 25.32 21.46 25.34 24.07
3.32 18.96 23.04 20.08 23.38 22.50
3.32 17.23 20.02 18.33 20.85 20.58
3.32 14.96 16.79 16.16 17.74 18.12
3.32 12.61 13.12 13.94 14.54 15.65
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46.51
44.75
42.68
40.23
37.26
35.02
31.61
27.73
22.84
17.50
APPENDIX F: TABLE 6
E
F
G
H
J
K
L
M
o
P
APPENDIX F: TABLE 7
Expected Gross Returns GRIP Prices by Soil Classification
fallow wheat barley canDia
smf stb smf stb smf stb
o 132.97 109.96 104.42 88.93 155.68
o 129.42 106.53 101.91 86.30 150.78
o 125.34 102.57 99.19 83.62 145.36
o 120.77 98.00 95.76 80.17 139.38
o 115.46 92.70 91.63 76.01 133.07
o 109.02 86.13 86.80 71.23 126.00
o 101.27 78.38 81.22 65.71 117.78
o 92.00 68.10 74.15 58.60 107.72
o 79.89 57.12 65.38 49.87 94.85
o 67.32 44.64 56.41 40.88 81.92
Expected Net Return GRIP Prices by Soil Classification
117.53
113.07
107.84
101.67
94.15
88.48
79.88
70.07
57.71
44.21
E
F
G
H
J
K
L
M
o
P
fallow wheat
smf stb
-27.37 53.55
-27.37 51.92
-27.37 50.04
-27.37 47.95
-27.37 45.52
-27.37 42.56
-27.37 39.00
-27.37 34.75
-27.37 29.17
-27.37 23.36
barley
smf stb
16.85 20.16
16.10 19.48
15.23 18.76
14.24 17.84
13.08 16.73
11.64 15.42
9.95 13.92
7.69 12.02
5.30 9.63
2.56 7.14
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canDia
smf stb
-10.97 63.69
-10.86 61.45
-10.76 58.97
-10.63 56.24
-10.46 53.37
-10.28 50.14
-10.06 46.38
-9.79 41.76
-9.47 35.84
-9.15 29.86
2.53
2.17
1.73
1.23
0.62
0.16
-0.55
-1.34
-2.36
-3.50
APPENDIX F: TABLE 8 Crop Insurance Premiums
1.34
1.3
1.26
1.21
1.14
1.08
1.01
0.92
0.82
0.74
stb
1.78
1.75
1.71
1.67
1.61
1.56
1.51
1.46
1.41
1.39
canola
smf
2.04
2
1.96
1.91
1.85
1.78
1.7
1.6
1.49
1.39
stb
2.4
2.37
2.33
2.29
2.24
2.19
2.12
2.04
1.97
1.94
barley
smf
1.27
1.25
1.22
1.18
1.14
1.09
1.03
0.96
0.87
0.78
wheat
smf stb
1.54
1.52
1.5
1.46
1.43
1.39
1.34
1.28
1.23
1.19
E
F
G
H
J
K
L
M
o
p
Source Gray et. al. p. 35
APPENDIX F: TABLE 9 Expected Rotation Return
E
F
G
H
J
K
L
M
o
P
fallow wheat barley canola under
smf stb smf stb smf stb rotation
-6.38 6.16 5.41 0.36 -1.44 6.37 0.59 11.07
-6.76 7.01 5.20 0.33 -1.40 5.84 0.54 10.75
-7.28 8.06 4.95 0.28 -1.08 5.25 0.46 10.64
-7.86 9.73 4.24 0.30 -1.01 3.77 0.35 9.54
-8.54 10.88 3.49 0.33 -0.88 2.83 0.19 8.31
-8.18 9.32 3.04 0.40 -1.10 2.71 0.05 6.23
-7.34 7.10 2.93 0.42 -1.38 2.60 -0.15 4.19
-7.09 5.66 2.09 0.46 -1.75 2.46 -0.35 1.49
-6.46 4.58 1.45 0.53 -2.17 0.86 -0.56 -1.77
-6.35 3.11 0.42 0.49 -3.20 0.90 -0.81 -5.45
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Expected Return 1/3 Crop Share GRIP Prices
prairie CARE
under landlord lease CARE
rotation share rates difference % large
5.10 57.48 19.16 27.06 -7.90 41
3.25 55.19 18.40 26.22 -7.82 43
2.46 52.80 17.60 25.25 -7.65 43
1.82 49.52 16.51 24.14 -7.63 46
1.27 45.93 15.31 22.90 -7.59 50
1.55 42.52 14.17 21.41 -7.24 51
1.34 39.06 13.02 19.70 -6.68 51
1.04 33.74 11.25 17.60 -6.35 56
0.71 27.13 9.04 14.96 -5.92 65
0.44 20.26 6.75 12.15 -5.40 80
canola
smf stb
6.35 11.74
6.04 10.78
4.52 9.71
4.08 6.99
3.39 5.26
4.00 5.05
4.64 4.87
5.26 4.66
5.47 1.65
6.37 1.74
stb
1.25
1.15
0.98
1.07
1.20
1.47
1.57
1.79
2.23
2.33
barley
smf
22.34
21.71
20.94
18.25
15.37
13.82
14.03
10.98
8.93
3.93
fallow wheat
smf stb
-0.77 11.47
-0.82 13.08
-0.88 15.07
-0.95 18.26
-1.04 20.47
-0.99 17.62
-0.89 13.50
-0.86 10.88
-0.78 8.94
-0.77 6.22
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APPENDIX F: TABLE 11 Expected Gross Returns Market Prices
E
F
G
H
J
K
L
M
o
p
wheat
smf stb
81.48
79.30
76.80
74.00
70.75
66.80
62.05
56.38
48.95
41.25
barley
smf stb
67.38 62.95
65.28 61.44
62.85 59.80
60.05 57.73
56.80 55.24
52.78 52.33
48.03 48.96
41.73 44.70
35.00 39.41
27.35 34.01
canota
smf stb
53.61 132.95
52.03 128.76
50.41 124.14
48.33 119.03
45.83 113.64
42.94 107.60
39.61 100.59
35.33 91.99
30.06 81.00
24.65 69.96
100.37
96.56
92.10
86.82
80.40
75.56
68.22
59.84
49.29
37.75
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APPENDIX F: TABLE 12
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APPENDIX F: TABLE 13
Soil
Class
E
F
G
H
J
K
L
M
o
P
Source Gray et. a!. p. 51
Expected Returns 1/3 Crop Share Market Prices
prairie CARE
fallow· wheat barley canola under landlord lease CARE
smf stb smf stb smf stb rotation share rates difference % large
-0.77 6.33 10.84 0.63 2.61 10.14 4.25 34.03 11.34 27.06 -15.72 139
-0.82 7.23 10.57 0.58 2.49 9.33 2.73 32.10 10.70 26.22 -15.52 145
-0.88 8.34 10.23 0.49 1.87 8.42 2.07 30.55 10.18 25.25 -15.07 148
-0.95 10.13 8.96 0.54 1.70 6.08 1.54 28.00 9.33 24.14 -14.81 159
-1.04 11.40 7.59 0.61 1.42 4.59 1.09 25.66 8.55 22.90 -14.35 168
-0.99 9.85 6.88 0.75 1.69 4.43 1.34 23.95 7.98 21.41 -13.43 168
-0.89 7.60 7.07 0.80 1.99 4.29 1.17 22.03 7.34 19.70 -12.36 168
-0.86 6.17 5.64 0.92 2.31 4.13 0.94 19.25 6.42 17.60 -11.18 174
-0.78 5.14 4.73 1.17 2.48 1.48 0.67 14.89 4.96 14.96 -10.00 201
-0.77 3.65 2.21 1.25 3.05 1.59 0.45 11.42 3.81 12.15 -8.34 219
Difference Between Prairie Care Lease Rates and a 1/3 Crop Share by Soil Class
Prairie CARE
lease One -third
rates crop share Difference
27.06 27.31 0.25
26.22 26.59 0.37
25.25 25.80 0.55
24.14 24.55 0.41
22.90 23.08 0.18
21.41 21.48 0.07
19.70 21.02 1.32
17.60 17.63 0.03
14.96 14.91 -0.05
12.15 11.5 -0.65
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